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short takes
editors’ column
Encounter between East and West
In Magnus Lunggren’s 
article “August Strindberg” 
(BW V:2, p. 32), Stringberg’s 
Ensam was referred to un-
der two different names in 
English, potentially causing 
confusion. One was a gloss, 
a literal translation of the 
word ensam: “Alone”, the 
other was the name that 
one particular translator 
happened to choose for his 
translation of Ensam, “Days 
of Loneliness”. Both the 
gloss “Alone” and the title 
“Days of Loneliness” refer 
to the same work, Ensam. In 
addition, a misprint in a quo-
tation from Pyast’s memoirs 
fundamentally changes the 
meaning of a key sentence: 
“You, the abode of the 
writer of Days of Loneliness, 
my first Strindberg book ---, 
chose: I have been in you!” 
should actually read: “You, 
the abode that the writer 
[...]”. (Emphasis ours.)
In addition, in Kjetil 
Duvold’s article “Fear and 
Loathing in Lithuania”  
(BW V:2, pp. 40-47), the last 
column in table 4 contained 
inaccurate data. A cor-
rected table can be found 
and downloaded in PDF 
format at balticworlds.com.
We regret these errors. ≈
Corrections
Scholarly rigor & open access
“russIan CuLture In 
exILe (1921–1953)” was the 
theme of a two-day confer-
ence at the Courtauld Insti-
tute in London (November 
2–3, 2012). The conference 
invitation was adorned with 
an illustration for an article 
in Baltic Worlds (IV:3), writ-
ten by Karl Schlögel, about 
Russian emigration to 
Berlin and the West. Karin 
Sunvisson’s illustration is 
republished here.
Conference organizer 
Natalia Murray took the op-
portunity to launch a book, 
The Unsung Hero of the 
Russian Avant-Garde: The 
Life and Times of Nikolay 
Punin, on a key figure in 
Russian art criticism – a 
person who had exception-
al knowledge of modern art 
trends in the West and, as a 
young communist, had col-
laborated with the Cultural 
Commissar Lunacharsky; 
who tried to live in a kind of 
internal exile, and perished 
in the Gulag in  Vorutka; and 
who for posterity has been 
overshadowed by his mistress Anna Akhmatova.
Among the speakers at the conference were Andrei Tolstoy from the 
Pushkin Museum in Moscow, who presented a broad survey of Russian in-
fluences on European art during the first half of the 20th century, and Leslie 
Chamberlain, author of an acclaimed book on the “philosophy steamer” 
bearing Russian intellectuals forced into exile, which set sail in 1921, shortly 
after the Russian Civil War: she talked about the relationship between the 
philosophy of language 
and artistic expressionism 
in the young, exiled Roman 
Jakobson.
Robert Chandler, poet 
and translator of the likes of 
Alexander Pushkin, Nikolai 
Leskov, Vasily Gross-
man, Andrei Platonov, and 
Varlam Shalamov, gave 
an address in which he 
showed how the question 
that Chernyshevsky once 
posed and Lenin tried to 
answer, Shto delat? (What 
is to be done?), was kept 
alive, albeit in an ironic way, 
in Russian émigré literary 
circles – in this case by 
the writer Nadezhda Teffi 
(1872–1952).
The editors hope that 
participants in the confer-
ence on Russian exile 
culture will contribute texts 
to BW during the coming 
publication year. ≈
Note: For more information 
see www.courtauld.ac.uk/
researchforum/index.shtml.
This magazine has now achieved international recognition. The rest is hard work.
the autuMn Issue of Baltic World’s is a thick double 
issue. The heft has increased, but the underlying concept 
is the same: scholarly, peer-reviewed articles from various 
disciplines, reviews written by experts, and high-quality 
popular science/journalistic articles.
Baltic Worlds has been added to the Norwegian 
bibliometric register “Database for Statistics on Higher 
Education (DBH)” and assigned Level 1, which means that 
a peer-reviewed article published in BW will generate one 
publication point for the authors and their institutions. The 
Norwegian register includes more than 20,000 journals. 
As of this writing, BW is one of seven journals published in 
Sweden in the assigned category of international policy 
that have achieved Level 1.
In order to reach Level 1, a journal must:
–  Present novel insights (original research);
–  Be in a form that makes the results reproducible or 
useful in new research;
–  Be presented in a language and via a distribution; 
channel that makes it accessible to most scholars who 
may be interested in it;
–  Be presented in a publishing channel 
that has sophisticated procedures for 
peer review.
a journaL May also be assigned Level  2. 
The requirements for this level include that 
the journal must be a leader in its field of re-
search, which, for a multidisciplinary journal 
like BW, may not be applicable. Neverthe-
less, the editorial board will continue to 
develop the procedures of our peer review 
system to assure the rigorous quality stan-
dards imposed by Level 2.
The editors of BW encourage research-
ers to continue submitting articles for peer 
review. More detailed instructions are 
available on our website under “Become a 
contributor”.
In addition, BW is now an accepted open 
access online journal. We are included in 
the Directory of Open Access Journals 
(DOAJ). All peer-reviewed articles and 
scholarly reviews on the BW website may 
be freely downloaded and reproduced. 
These articles become searchable in all 
catalogs and databases that retrieve data 
from DOAJ. This provides good oppor-
tunities for authors of scholarly articles 
published in BW to be read and cited by 
other scholars.
BW will however continue welcoming 
readers and writers outside the academic 
world. In this issue for instance we read 
about the proliferation of gated communi-
ties in Poland, human attitudes towards 
wild animals in northern Europe, and hu-
man rights activists in Russia. ≈
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Painting
Cover artIst KG Nilson is 
a renowned Swedish paint-
er who for several years 
was a professor at the 
Royal Swedish Academy 
of Fine Arts. His studios are 
in Stockholm (in the same 
apartment where Anders 
Zorn used to reside) and 
in Bästekille, on Sweden’s 
southern Baltic shore. ≈
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man and Habsburg empires good illus-
trations in that respect? Moving people 
on a mass scale is a costly business; it is 
preferable, at least from an economic 
standpoint, to collect taxes and tributes 
by other means if possible.
But economies differ and scale also 
matters. When Russia, in the final days 
of the Rurik Dynasty, began to conquer 
the lands beyond the Urals, skins and 
hides filled the coffers of the rulers, 
but the territories were so vast that 
relocation of people became necessary 
to pacify these settlements, collect the 
financial profits of exploitation — plun-
der masquerading as trade — and make 
sure the wealth was not spread too lib-
erally in the country, which would cre-
ate a base for competing power centers. 
(This is something which perhaps bears 
comparison to the commodities-based 
state-monopolistic capitalism of today.)
the MIssIon thIs time could be per-
ceived as civilizational, and Mark Bassin 
has compared the pioneer mentality 
with that which prevailed at the North 
American border to the west, towards 
the Pacific Ocean, a few centuries later. 
As Alexander Etkind argues in a new 
book, Internal Colonization: Russia’s 
Imperial Experience (Cambridge 2011: 
Polity), colonization became a good ar-
gument in favor of serfdom, for keeping 
the peasants in the Russian core terri-
tory, and for exile to Siberia to stymie 
political opposition. Genocide took 
place there.
But mightn’t colonization also be the 
rescue of the small nation in times of so-
cial and economic distress? In the Scan-
dinavian border states, the Sami were 
pushed aside and lost ancient grazing 
rights up until relatively recent times. 
And the Inuit are still being squeezed. 
Totalitarian ideologies are probably no 
requirement in dealing with undesir-
able situations — or people. ≈
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Colonialism should not to be a forgotten word. When people say occupation, they often mean colonialization.
olonialism, ladies and gentlemen, is not 
a particularly modern phenomenon, nor 
can one rightly say it is a thing of the past. 
European history is rife with instances of 
both external and internal colonialism. The Crusades 
may be regarded as an example of the former — and 
the crusaders not only went south towards Constanti-
nople and the Holy Land, but also to the east and the 
north.
In his book The Making of Europe (1993), Robert 
Bartlett attempted to bring to light the underlying 
forces at play. He saw the mass emigrations of the 
High Middle Ages as an effect of acute demographic 
pressure in what were then the core territories of 
Europe. The die of demography was cast: there was 
an aristocratic population surplus; noble boys were 
bereft of inherited land and had to seek their fortunes 
elsewhere, plow new ground.
And thus began the conquest operations: the 
founding of new societies and cities, missionary activi-
ties, and the spread of technology. The last pockets 
of heathenism in Europe (Lithuania!) were Christian-
ized. Knightly orders and an early form of commercial 
capitalism (the Hanseatic League!) integrated the pe-
ripheries with the centers, of which there were many 
when imperial power was chiefly an ideological con-
struction. This empire was Roman, but only in name 
— later apostolic, but again mainly titular.
the trade fLows in the Baltic Sea region and hin-
terlands came to comprise mainly furs at first, later 
timber, and as we approach the days of our great-
great-grandfathers, grain became an important export 
commodity from east to west — from the fertile land 
of a still barely industrialized Russia (but where early 
investments were made in expanding the railways 
to create good transportation routes for commodity 
distribution) to a Western Europe where rapid de-
population of rural areas had begun and the industrial 
proletariat needed their cheap daily bread, except, of 
course, all those who sailed across the Atlantic — to 
become pioneers, colonists!
It is odd that the westward expansion of Europe 
is so seldom discussed in colonial terms — after the 
armed uprisings of the colonies against the British 
crown in the late 18th century. For thereafter, the con-
quest of land and the hunting down of the native in-
habitants continued. The Zionist colonization project 
in Palestine also took land, swept away people, eradi-
cated the memory of an earlier culture.
CoLonIaLIsM Is perhaps not a European specialty, and 
it cannot be equated with empire-building. Empires 
can make conquests without changing all that much 
of the demographic, ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
structure in conquered territories. Are not the Otto-
4the most part tame and prefer that state-sanctioned 
bloodletting on a large scale happen outside the bor-
ders of the European Union. And that is, all things 
considered, a good thing. No one in their right mind 
would want to go back to the fear and insecurity of an-
ticipated attacks by Vikings, bigoted religious fanatics, 
or the soldiers of the Axis Powers. The same can be 
said about our relationship to animals. Most aspects 
of the living conditions of pets and farm animals are 
regulated by law in the EU. For wild animals, there are 
special habitat directives.
No one, at least not publicly, wants to see the return 
of stallion baiting, dog and bear-baiting, or the use of 
horses in war (still common in World War II). The con-
sequences of the use of dolphins during the Cold War 
by the Eastern and Western powers are one exception. 
The Russian military is now rumored to have sold its 
dolphin program to Iran; the Americans have retained 
theirs, but deny anti-personnel use, that is, that dol-
phins are trained to attack people. Perhaps the “clash 
of civilizations” will be fought by dolphins standing in 
for people in the Persian Gulf — presuming this has not 
already occurred.
But something has been lost in the advance of 
civilization. In pace with the introduction of the refrig-
erator, hot running water, bathrooms with subfloor 
heating, and cable TV, our relationship to things wild 
has changed, especially our attitudes towards the 
predators among us. The bear, the wolf, the wolver-
ine, the lynx: all have been transformed in our minds 
into symbolic, anthropomorphized abstractions. It is 
human nature to do so, and in a way, one could argue 
that this has been the case for much longer than since 
the end of World War II. Nevertheless, the already sim-
plified traits have become more starkly black and white 
in modern, highly urbanized societies. The bear +,  
the wolf –, the lynx +, the wolverine –. The bear is 
strong, the wolf vicious, the lynx beautiful, the wolver-
ine ugly and cruel. And that is that.
 
Out in the cOuntry, that argument does not hold full 
sway, at least not in the areas where the predators are 
actually found. Country people’s empirical knowledge 
runs deeper and is often — though not always — more 
complex and objective than city people’s. The prob-
lem with European attitudes towards “our” predators, 
however, is that most Europeans live in cities and not 
in the countryside. In Scandinavia and other countries 
around the Baltic, the ratio of urban to rural popula-
tions is now two to one or more. This is no longer a 
strictly European, or even Western, state of affairs. 
According to the UN World Urbanization Prospects, 
which are revised every two years, a majority of the 
total population has been urban for several years now. 
According to UN estimates, the world population is 
expected to be 67 percent urban in 2050.
Yet another predator complication: wolverines and 
lynx do not attack adult humans (at least as long as you 
do not try to lift and carry them, and good luck with 
that!). Bears and wolves can indeed be lethal, but the 
way both animals are generally portrayed in the media 
does not align with how dangerous they really are. 
According to all available statistics from the last two 
hundred years, the bear poses far and away the great-
est danger to humans of all wild animals in the north-
ern hemisphere. Wolves, which ordinarily shy away 
from human contact, are most likely to attack during 
times of famine or war, or when they have become ac-
feature
call of the
wild  
by Pontus Reimers  illustration Moa thelander
ver since systematic agriculture began in 
eastern Turkey around eleven thousand 
years ago, farmers and livestock keepers 
have had an antagonistic relationship to 
wild animals in general and predators in particular —  
a clash reflected in countless myths, legends, and 
fables, many of which survive in modern versions. Of 
northern hemisphere predators, the wolf has been 
ascribed a special position as a killer and the embodi-
ment of evil. In our time, balanced wildlife conserva-
tion has helped secure the predator’s population in 
the Baltic Sea region, but not without friction between 
town and country.
They’re hunting wolves! The hunt is on, pursuing 
The wily predators, the she-wolf and her brood. 
The beaters shout, the dogs bay, almost spewing. 
The flags on the snow are red, as red as the blood.
We are swift and our jaws are rapacious. 
Why then, chief, like a tribe that’s oppressed, 
Must we rush towards the weapons that face us 
And that precept be never transgressed?
From “Wolf Hunt”, a song by Vladimir Vysotsky. 
Translation by Kathryn and Bruce Hamilton, 1987.
We have become tame in Europe, and that is a good 
thing. Europeans are on the whole no longer wild or 
savage, as we certainly were a thousand, five hundred, 
or for that matter sixty-seven years ago. The potential 
for savagery and bloodthirstiness remains within us, 
as shown with such dreadful clarity during the war 
in the former Yugoslavia in 1991−1999. But we are for 
5one wonders whether academics find it more difficult to teach than others. Given that they are reluctant rid themselves of their erudition.
6customed to the presence of humans, such as in zoos 
or other private settings. Children unaccompanied 
by adults, however, are not safe among wolves under 
any circumstances. According to the Swedish Wildlife 
Damage Center, there were 3,221 bears in Sweden in 
2008, while the wolf population was estimated to be 
about one tenth of that.
 
StOckhOlm iS a green city and its proximity to nature 
is still extraordinary, as exemplified by its national 
urban park. Even though I live in the heart of the city 
center, I regularly see wild mammals: hares are com-
mon and I once met a roe deer on the morning walk to 
the daycare center; a year ago, a moose was swimming 
in the lake just outside my neighborhood. Wolves have 
lived in the area for centuries. In 1689, the seven-year-
old Crown Prince Charles (the future Charles XII, the 
victor at Narva and the loser at Poltava) participated in 
a successful wolf hunt at Lappkärrsberget in the north-
ern part of Djurgården, an event he immortalized in a 
drawing preserved to this day. The wolf population de-
clined drastically in the 18th and 19th centuries, and by 
the dawn of the 20th century, Stockholmers hardly had 
to spare them a thought. It thus caused an uproar in 
2001 when a wolf took his evening constitutional right 
through the center of town. In 2008, another wolf was 
seen roaming the eastern suburbs. The wild had made 
its presence felt once more.
Baltic oveRview
The wolf had been exterminated in Denmark since 
1813, but sightings of a single individual were reported 
in 2009 and 2010 in Sǿnderjylland, probably after it 
had crossed the border with Germany, where the last 
wolf was shot in 1904 in Lausitz. Wolves were redis-
covered in the same area, which borders on Poland, 
in 1998. The German population currently stands at 
about 35 individuals, divided among four packs. Cubs 
were discovered in Niedersachsen in July of this year. 
Wolves are a protected species in Germany.
So are to the 700—800 wolves in Poland, except-
ing those that live in Biezczady in the southeast. The 
majority of the 2,000 wolves in Ukraine seem to have 
concentrated themselves in the exclusion zone north 
of Chernobyl. Nearly as many wolves, somewhere 
between 1,500 and 2,000, are found in Belarus. An 
estimated 300—400 wolves are found in Lithuania, 
about 600 in Latvia, and about 200 in Estonia (a steep 
decline from the wolf population of about 500 in the 
1990s). Estonia is the only country east of the Baltic 
Sea other than Finland that pays compensation to live-
stock owners victimized by ravaging wolves.
Even though the “domestic” wolves in Finland 
have never been eradicated and despite the proxim-
ity to the Russian wolf population — about 30,000 
strong — Finland has experienced some problems 
with the estimated 116 to 123 wolves found in its ter-
ritory in 2007/2008. As in Sweden, the wolf presence 
causes controversy between “wolf haters” and “wolf 
huggers”. In addition, there is an ongoing “hopeless-
ness debate” concerning EU regulations, which many 
affected people in wolf habitat areas feel is insensitive 
and high-handed.
An estimated 230—300 wolves live in Sweden and 
Norway (the countries “share” part of the population 
and so are counted together) although the Wildlife 
Damage Center’s preliminary report for 2011/2012 may 
indicate that the number is closer to 400.
The wolf is not an endangered species (an esti-
mated 60,000—70,000 are found in Canada and Alaska 
alone). But in several countries, its right to exist is a 
highly controversial issue, especially in Fennoscandia, 
it seems. Linda Laikre, a professor at the Population 
Genetics division of the Department of Zoology at 
Stockholm University, is a member of the Swedish gov-
ernment’s Scientific Council on Biodiversity. In a radio 
interview in March 2012, Professor Laikre said that the 
wolf populations not only in Norway and Sweden but 
also in Finland need to be connected and should num-
ber between 3,000 and 5,000 individuals — far more 
than the current populations.
hunteRs  
and faRMeRs
The facts of the case are relatively well-known, based 
on research findings. Long ago, when we all lived 
in the woods, or on the plains, we cooperated with 
wolves in the hunt for life-sustaining proteins. This 
proved advantageous to both species. Over the centu-
ries and the millennia, this symbiotic existence came 
to shape not only the relationship between humans 
and wolves, but also the physical form of the latter: the 
wolves who maintained close interaction with humans 
became semi-tame and were ultimately bred under 
controlled conditions in order to accentuate certain 
genetic traits and suppress others. And so arose our 
endless variety of tame dog breeds. Or at least we 
believe it went something like that. The close coop-
eration between nomads and wolves was reflected in 
relatively recent human history by the Greek historian 
Herodotus in the 5th century BCE. Although he himself 
puts no faith in the rumor, Herodotus mentions that 
the Neuri people, who lived beyond the Scythian area 
near the Hypanis River (identified as the Southern 
Bug in present-day Ukraine), were transformed into 
wolves for a period every year. 
The world’s oldest known monumental construc-
tion is a complex of stone structures in concentric 
rings raised at a site called Göbekli Tepe in southeast-
ern Anatolia. The age of the complex, dated at about 
9000 BCE, is not the only amazing thing: the stone 
slabs, which weigh many tons, are not crude and 
unworked; on the contrary, they are evenly quarried. 
As if that were not enough, reliefs are carved into the 
slabs of the predatory animals that existed in the area 
when the complex came about. Not only that: in ad-
dition to the reliefs, certain depictions of animals are 
sculpted three-dimensionally in high relief. And all 
of this was done without metal tools. Excavator Klaus 
Schmidt has identified one of the most prominent preda-
tors as a fox, but he notes that it might just as easily be a 
wolf (or a jackal) — or a dog. One of the most interesting 
things about the site is that it is the first time we see a dif-
ferentiation between the wild and the tame, between 
culture and nature, between hunters and farmers; by 
extension, we also see the division between town and 
country, for at the same time, it seems that the cultiva-
tion of wild wheat began on the nearby Mount Karaca 
Dağ, which has been genetically indicated as the origin 
of all domesticated wheat. We do not know why the 
people who erected the complex chose to depict their 
wild surroundings, only that they were forced to relate 
to it. And so are we, eleven thousand years later. Mod-
ern Turkey, by the way, is home to an estimated 7,000 
wolves. There were surely more back then.
A typical, or perhaps more accurately archetypal, 
modern dog breed is the German Shepherd, which is 
to many a symbol of faithfulness and security in rela-
tion to humans, but also of threat and danger to life 
and limb by reason of the widespread use of German 
7feature
Shepherds as police and military dogs 
in the 20th century. Despite its wolf-
like appearance, the German Shepherd 
is not an ancient breed; it was first 
introduced in 1899 by the German 
breeder Max von Stephanitz. There 
is some information to indicate that 
wolves contributed to the first genera-
tions of German Shepherds. Partly as a 
consequence of its colossal popularity, 
the breed has developed a number of 
problems, ranging from hip dysplasia 
to increased tendencies towards bite 
aggression. And they are very good 
at biting, indeed. In at least one “bite 
test”, the German Shepherd was one 
of the three breeds that bit the hardest 
(the others were a Rottweiler and a Pit 
Bull Terrier). Although it is difficult to 
measure the real bite strength of wild 
animals, some scientific studies have 
been undertaken and the wolf, on the 
other hand, is said to bite twice as hard as the Ger-
man Shepherd, hard enough to break bone. The wolf 
can easily kill a human. But how often does it do so in 
reality?
the nOrwegian wildlife ecologist John Linnell has 
been able to document 94 deaths caused by wolves 
in Fennoscandia, all of them before 1882. Since many 
of the attacks happened in backward rural areas, and 
since the majority of the victims were children, wom-
en, or elderly people, one conclusion of the documen-
tation might be that wolves, or for that matter any 
predatory animals, should not be habituated to living 
near people. In the interests of public safety, wolves 
must thus be taught that people should be avoided 
in general, because they may be armed. In addition: 
19 deaths caused by wolves have been reported from 
North America, Central Asia, and Russia during the 
21st century alone. Naturally, you cannot stop people 
who are passionately interested in wolves, such as 
the French concert pianist Helène Grimaud, from ap-
proaching the animals. But it should reasonably occur, 
as in her case, in a private context.
For many Westerners, the wolf is the most polariz-
ing of animals, a confrontation before which the ratio-
nal tradition of Enlightenment must give way. To this 
day, the wolf is often either called upon to symbolize 
pure evil and the deadly sins of gluttony, greed, and 
wrath, or else its rights are asserted so emphatically 
that innocent people suffer. Since 2012, there has been 
what is described as a “single-issue party” in Sweden 
known as the Nature Democrats. The party’s slogan is 
“for a living countryside”, which should be equated 
with zero tolerance for wolves in Sweden. The party 
justifies its position on the grounds that the wolf is not 
found in its natural distribution area (because it is in-
bred), which is why the party also rejects the EU Habi-
tat Directive. There are thus many parameters to man-
age here: hunters’ eagerness to bring down an animal 
seen as both a pest and an alluring quarry; hunters’ 
fully understandable anger and grief over dogs killed 
by wolves (19 in 2010, 24 in 2011, and 8 so far in 2012; 
statistics provided on the Swedish Hunting Associa-
tion’s website, often accompanied by heart-rending 
“crime scene” pictures); the local population’s more 
or less well-founded fear of predators, and an irratio-
nal hatred that contains elements of both superstition 
and resistance to the governing powers in Stockholm 
or Brussels.
These circumstances most certainly contributed 
to the Swedish government's announcement in 2010 
that it would allow licensed “preventive hunting” 
of its dwindling wolf population the following year, 
a measure that led to the following statement from 
European Commissioner for the Environment Janez 
Potočnik on January 7, 2011:
Several aspects of the Swedish wolf policy 
raise serious questions, for example: the  
unfavorable conservation status of the Swed-
ish wolf population; the set ceiling for the 
number of wolves in Sweden; the licensed 
hunting of a strictly protected species without 
fulfilling the specific conditions for deroga-
tions set out by EU law; the reduced distribu-
tion area for wolves; the fact that the licensed 
hunting occurs before the announced in-
troduction of wolves to improve the genetic 
status has taken place; the erroneous multi-
annual practice that repeated licensed hunt-
ing may lead to.
 
the preventive hunt was cancelled in 2012 in re-
sponse to the threat of being hauled up before the 
European Court of Justice, but the word is that it may 
be resumed in 2013 (though this has recently been 
contested by the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency). If the situation was not embarrassing as well 
as distasteful, one might say that the Swedish govern-
ment is “caught in a wolf trap”. Attitudes, as we all 
know, are hard to decree from above. In a paper on 
the fear of predatory animals published by the SOM 
Institute (Society, Opinion, Media) at the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, 
the authors write:
[T]he tendency is that the proportion of 
people who live in purely rural areas and who 
think the wolf population is too large has in-
creased rather than decreased (from 44 to 48 
percent, not significant). 2. The correspond-
ing figure for people who live in one of our 
three large cities is 16 percent (15 percent in 
2009). Nor is the increase in the proportion 
of urban-dwellers who think the wolf popula-
tion is at the right level (from 28 to 37 percent) 
significant. These attitudinal differences be-
tween urban and rural populations are also 
confirmed by other studies, where the results 
over time indicate stable or increasing differ-
ences in urban and rural attitudes towards 
predatory animals.
Even though wolves are said to be among the most 
thoroughly studied of all mammals, there is still new 
knowledge about them to be gained. To take but one 
example: the American wildlife researcher David 
Mech was involved in introducing the term “alpha 
male” in the 1970s. These days, he and most others 
along with him have abandoned the concept because 
the division of the wolf pack is no longer considered as 
strictly hierarchical as it once was. The preferred term 
is now “breeding male”. The term “alpha” is reserved 
for very large packs with several pregnant females.
To digress only slightly: if there are no longer alpha 
males in the wild, should we not perhaps also abolish 
the term in business and sports contexts?
the PRoud  
PaRtisans  
of the wolves
The constant companions of the chief Old Norse god 
Odin may have been a wolf pair, Gere (“greedy”) and 
Freke (“aggressive”), but there is no exaggerated 
love for wolves to be found in Old Norse mythology, 
based as it is on the presence of settled farmers. The 
“wolf-time” in Völuspá refers to misfortune, war, and 
destruction when the wolf Fenrir and the giant wolf-
hound Garm burst their fetters in preparation for Rag-
narök. Nay, over the ages, wolves have been appreciat-
ed and respected by nomads and mountain people, by 
Relief of the twins Romulus and Remus with the Capitoline Wolf, dated to the reign of Emperor 
Trajan (97–117 AD).
Monolith with relief of canines in 
Göbekli Tepe from about 9000 BC.
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the ancient Italic Sabines, by some Native 
American peoples, by prehistoric Mongo-
lians and Turkish-speaking peoples, and by 
the Chechens: in Chechen mythology, the 
founder of the nation Turpalo-Noxchuo 
was, like Mowgli, raised by a she-wolf. The 
best known Western wolf myth is naturally 
the story of the founding of Rome, in which 
the abandoned twins Romulus and Remus 
were raised by a she-wolf until a human 
took them in hand. In sculptural form, this 
she-wolf was for centuries one of the most 
important field signs of the Roman Army 
and is still today a symbol of the city itself.
Wolf legends have not infrequently 
given rise to ultra-nationalist reflections 
of a predatory nature in our own time 
— in Turkey, for example, in the form of 
the Gray Wolves, a right-wing extremist 
youth organization and the much-debated 
underground power network Ergenekon 
(the name refers to a legendary valley 
from which a wolf helped the first Turks 
to escape). Another manifestation has its 
origins in Lithuania. Sometime in the sum-
mer of 1320, the Grand Duke Gediminas 
was out hunting in the woods near the con-
fluence of the Vilnia and Neris rivers. As 
he slept under the stars that night, he had 
a peculiar dream: a wolf in armor, or perhaps a wolf 
made of iron, stood on a hill and howled. When the 
next morning he asked a high priest who lived nearby 
to interpret the dream, the priest answered that the 
wolf symbolized a fortress that would protect the 
country from foreign invasion and exhorted the Grand 
Duke to build such a fortress on that very place. And 
so, according to legend, the city of Vilnius came to be. 
Whatever the truth of that might be, the legend of the 
iron wolf survived. The Lithuanian fascist movement 
founded in 1927 was named The Iron Wolf (Geležinis 
Vilkas). The organization was officially banned in 1930 
but survived for the rest of the decade. Today, people 
have managed to defuse the name of its extremist past 
in favor of its nationalist connotations. The motorized 
brigade that is the most important unit of the Lithu-
anian armed forces is now called The Iron Wolves.
the wolf you feed
An oft-told Cherokee legend is the story of an old man 
and a boy. The man explains that human nature is 
like a fight between two wolves: one is honorable and 
just, the other hateful and violent. The boy asks which 
wolf will win, and the old man answers: “The one you 
feed.”
The film industry loves good animal stories because 
they are big box office. Since animals are our anthro-
pomorphic representatives, these “animal movies” 
can be categorized into genres in the same way as 
ordinary feature films: drama (Lassie), family comedy 
(Beethoven), horror (Jaws), etc. Bears were depicted 
brutally and semi-realistically in the 1988 French film 
L’ours and as inordinately monstrous in The Edge 
(1997). Both of these wilderness dramas featured the 
trained Kodiak, Bart the Bear, in a leading role.
Wolves in film have appeared mainly in the su-
pernatural genre, that is, in the guise of werewolves. 
One exception is the French Le pacte des loups, 
which in a ludicrous yet entertaining way tells the 
story of a true historical episode involving wolves 
— that of the ravages of the Beast of Gévaudan in 
southern France in the 1760s, in which more than 
a hundred people are said to have been killed. An 
attempt to depict wolves in the modern wild was 
made in the existential wilderness drama The Grey 
in 2011. The wolves in the film, which are presumed 
to be “normal” and not rabid, immediately and 
mercilessly hunt the survivors of a plane crash, a 
plot that triggered protests by nature conservation 
organizations. Matters were not helped when it was 
revealed that the director had purchased four wolf 
cadavers from a trapper, two to use as props and 
two for the cast to eat (to get into survival mode, I 
suppose). The pattern repeats itself in the action 
flick The Bourne Legacy (2012), in which a wolf pack 
about to gorge itself on lamb catches sight of the 
movie’s secret agent hero, whereupon, of course, 
the pack instantly and relentlessly begins to hunt 
him.
One of the few examples of films, other than The 
Jungle Book, in which wolves are portrayed in a favor-
able light is Game of Thrones, HBO’s successful televi-
sion series based on George R. R. Martin’s massive 
fantasy book series. In Game of Thrones, “direwolves” 
— based on a real wolf species that died out in North 
and South America ten thousand years ago, by the 
way — feature as companions and protectors of sev-
eral children of the House Stark, the closest the story 
comes to a conventional “good” side. (As a matter of 
curiosity, there are attempts under way to “recreate” 
the prehistoric dire wolves. The breed is currently 
called the American Alsatian.) In the novels and the 
television series, one of the “bad guys” is a wild boar, 
which kills King Robert in the drama and thus triggers 
an immediate and ruthless struggle for the throne. 
Game of Thrones aside, the dangerous-
ness of the wild boar is not a literary 
invention.
the Pact of  
the wild BoaRs
In the Middle Ages, the wild boar was 
considered one of the riskiest game 
animals, reflected in chroniclers’ sto-
ries of hunting accidents with lethal 
outcomes. In addition to their sharp 
tusks, wild boars use their extremely 
thick skull as a weapon and when they 
run, they can quickly reach a speed of 
45 km an hour. Rather than the spears 
of the past, modern boar hunters use 
single-bore shotguns loaded with slugs 
and Brenneke cartridges — some of the 
heaviest ammunition permitted for 
hunting weapons. The biggest problem 
with wild boar is the destruction they 
cause, which is not particularly selec-
tive: like us and tame swine, they are 
omnivores. During the postwar era, 
the wild boar’s lack of natural enemies 
led to problematically strong growth 
of the population in Germany. They 
are now an established element of the urban fauna 
in Berlin and the surrounding suburbs. A climax was 
reached in October 2008 when one man was killed 
and another injured in a hunt that went terribly 
wrong in the southern suburbs. Thereafter, the city 
appointed licensed hunters to reduce the popula-
tion, which proved easier said than done. In an inter-
view with the Wall Street Journal, Stadtjäger Matthias 
Eggert said: “There is no way that hunting can get rid 
of them all. Ultimately we must learn to share the city 
with the swine.”
In Great Britain, where the wild boar has been 
scarce as hen’s teeth since the days of the Civil War, 
there are now between 500 and 1,000 animals. They 
are hard to count but quick to reproduce, and opin-
ions that they should be contained are already being 
voiced. They were also exterminated in Sweden by the 
end of the 17th century, but escapees from enclosures 
in 1942 and afterwards resulted in the emergence of 
a vigorous population and their “domiciliary rights” 
were established by parliamentary decision in 1987. 
The Swedish Board of Agriculture reported that wild 
boars caused more than 17 million Swedish kronor 
in damage in 2009 — in the province of Söderman-
land alone. A pilot project in which wild boars were 
trapped was begun in 2011, run by the Swedish Nation-
al Veterinary Institute, but the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency has not yet completed its report of 
the outcome and any follow-up measures. One esti-
mate of the Swedish wild boar population in 2010 ar-
rived at a figure of about 150,000 animals. There is no 
reversal of the trend in sight: the population is grow-
ing steadily. Other sources cite twice that number, or 
about 300,000 animals.
In a post on the Swedish Hunting Association’s 
blog about the incident at Kolmården Zoo on June 
17, 2012 when a zookeeper was killed by “her” 
wolves, Gunnar Glöerson, the association’s officer 
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and Such iS the case in other parts of the world. When 
Vilhelm Moberg’s fictional characters Karl-Oskar and 
Kristina emigrated from Sweden, they left a country 
where there were no wolves for a country where the 
creatures still roamed. In Minnesota, the most mark-
edly Swedish settlement in the United States (with an 
area of 225,365 sq km compared to Sweden’s 528,446 
sq km), there were 300 wolves in the 1970s. Today, 
there are about 3,000, more than in any other state 
except Alaska. In January 2012, the state government 
approved the start of a protective wolf hunting season, 
with a goal of shooting 400 wolves in 2012 and a long-
term reduction of the population to 1,500 animals. 
If the 5.5 million inhabitants of Minnesota, a state 
containing a great deal of agricultural and industrial 
land, can accept so many wolves in their territory, 
why should a country like Sweden not have room for 
the estimated one thousand or so wolves that it would 
have had if illegal hunting were not so zealous? Com-
pared to 150,000 to 300,000 wild boars and 300,000 to 
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It seems hardly possible to reestablish the Stone 
Age “contract” between humankind and wolves, nor 
would it be desirable in our increasingly urbanized 
world. But could allowing the wolves to help manage 
the moose and the wild boars, to a greater extent than 
now occurs, perhaps be seen as a move towards rees-
tablishing the balance of nature?
coda
I am in Belgrade over the Christmas and New Year 
season of 2002/2003. In the zoological gardens in the 
middle of the city, the weak winter sun is beginning 
to set and a strange half-light spreads out among the 
cages. Zoos are not my cup of tea, but the children like 
it. The situation in the city is still tense after the NATO 
bombings of 1999 and there are occasional rapid 
deployments to search for Milosević and Mladić. The 
Zemun district is under mafia control and the portraits 
of the wanted men are hung on pub walls like pictures 
of movie stars, to which the recalcitrant patrons raise 
their glasses of rakia while gleaming BMWs wait out-
side. In less than three months, the pro-Western Prime 
Minister Zoran Ðinđić, an old student of Jürgen Haber-
mas, would be shot to death in the street. But the five 
wolves in front of me care nothing for politics. They 
huddle together before my feet and they sing. Only a 
thin fence separates us. The moon glows. The wolves 
howl melodically. Why? Are they trying to commu-
nicate with other wolves, perhaps on the outskirts 
of the city? I do not, cannot know. But the sound is 
ineffably melancholic and I am overcome with rever-
ence for this wild and dignified concert. The wolves 
do not care. They are not interested in me, but only in 
freedom. Being an old gray wolf myself, I do not find it 
hard to sympathize.
There is a wolf in me ... fangs for tearing gashes ... 
a red tongue for raw meat … and the hot lapping 
of blood — I keep the wolf because the wilderness 
gave it to me and the wilderness will not let it go.
       *** 
Oh, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs, 
under my bony skull, under my red-valved heart 
— and I got something else: it is a man-child heart, 
a woman-child heart: it is a father and a mother 
and a lover: it came from God knows where; it is 
going to God knows where — For I am the keeper 
of the zoo: I say yes and no: I sing and kill and 
work: I am a pal of the world: I came from the 
wilderness.
From “Wilderness”,  by Carl Sandburg.
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A few yeArs Ago at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, 
I heard an Indian jurist’s lecture on human rights. He ap-
proached the theme, unsurprisingly, from the viewpoint of 
Hindu tradition. Overall, his interest was in tying the concept 
of rights to that of obligations, and in defining dharma, a con-
cept alien to the conventions of European culture. Individual 
duty is determined in the Hindu context not by the demands 
of others, of institutions, or of immanent laws, but on the 
basis of dharma, a cosmic order in which every entity must 
take part if it is not to invalidate itself. While listening to the 
lecture, I remembered an earlier colloquium on the same 
theme, this one organized by the Arab countries. The collo-
quium ended with the assertion that one cannot speak of hu-
man rights without constantly invoking “the rights of Allah”. 
Europeans present at both lectures were clearly taken by sur-
prise and avoided any reaction. They were familiar with what 
we may call the vulgata of human rights, but they knew little 
or nothing about other civilizations and cultures. What they 
had just learned from the Indian professor did not fit with 
their accustomed concept at all. The Europeans present had 
different opinions born of a philosophy in which metaphys-
ics in the traditional sense and theology no longer have any 
weight. But their natural impulse to discuss the problem was 
hindered by several principles that in recent decades have 
come to be viewed as inviolable: respect for the right to differ-
ence, and tolerance toward other people’s opinions.
The following thoughts originate in my desire to under-
stand this suspension of dialogue and to draw attention to 
the crisis of the concept of tolerance. Tolerance has become a 
commonplace of civilized behavior and, like every common-
place, has come to be accepted blindly and indiscriminately.
It seems that, although we live in a world of globalization in 
which spatial and cultural distances are shrinking palpably, 
this does not rule out ignorance about the intellectual and so-
cial foundations of the other; on the contrary, it increases the 
irrational aspect of this ignorance. One can reach Bangkok 
relatively quickly, one can maintain political or trade rela-
tions with Bangkok, and one can do all of this without episte-
mologically leaving the picturesque scenery of the tourist’s 
world. Paradoxically, globalization is inversely proportionate 
with general knowledge. The easier it is to encounter each 
other, the less we know each other.
A second remArk is that ignorance does not preclude 
cordiality. One can have good relations with other people 
while knowing nothing about their cultural background. At 
first glance, this seems a gain for civilization: communication 
is possible even in the absence of knowledge. But can there 
be genuine communication under such conditions? Or is it 
simply “etiquette”, a pleasant surface choreography? Basi-
cally, we are experiencing a substantial change in the concept 
of “tolerance”. The term no longer denotes the acceptance of 
“being different” or holding a different opinion, but simply a 
friendly and well-intentioned ignoring of the other opinion, 
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the elimination of difference as difference. The results of this 
are (A) I need not understand you to accept you, and (B) I 
need not discuss your views with you before assuming you 
are in the right. In other words, I agree — in principle — with 
what I don’t understand, and I agree in principle with what 
I may not agree with. You have a right to your opinion; I re-
spect your opinion. I have a right to my opinion and expect 
that it be respected. Dialectic is unnecessary. This mutual 
tolerance ends in a universal, peaceful, confidently smiling 
silence — a silence in which dialogue can only be an undesir-
able disturbance.
Under these conditions, the effects of tolerance are more 
than questionable. It curtails our pleasure in knowledge and 
in genuine understanding of difference, and it undermines 
the desire for debate. Why bother, when the result must 
consist in a mutual affirmation of each other’s right anyway? 
In a world governed by such rules, Socrates would have been 
unemployed. There is no truth to be found, and no chain of 
proof is needed. All that is asked of us is that we politely re-
spect our interlocutor’s convictions.
This unquestioned call for tolerance challenges several cat-
egories that were still operational until yesterday: error, guilt, 
the relation of norm and exception, the principles of educa-
tion, the technique of disputation, and, in general, the risky 
problem of the unacceptable and the intolerable. Tolerance 
is transformed from a pure necessity for living together well 
(“L’apanage de l’humanité”, the condition of humanity, said 
Voltaire; “To forbear each other’s foolishness is the first law of 
nature”) into a neutral disposition, a kind of logi-
cal and axiological anesthesia, the symptom of 
a cheerful inner paralysis. Being tol-
erant seems to mean giving up one’s 
sense of orientation. Please 
don’t condemn my 
concern prematurely. 
I’m not calling for 
intolerance and the 
cruelty of the 
geometrical 
mind. I do 
not want to 
re-establish 
black-and-white 
judgments, nor the 
normative sclerosis of 
dichotomies and the unre-
alistic monotony of “either/
or”. All I want to do is point 
out that there is an urgent 
necessity to add the discrim-
inative faculty to tolerance, to 
avoid confounding respect for 
difference with the dissolving 
ethic of “anything goes”.
It is generally agreed that the 
modern debate on tolerance 
begins with John Locke at the 
end of the 17th century. But in 
reality, a concept is probably 
already in crisis if it becomes 
a topic of controversy and 
one feels a need to justify 
it theoretically and assert it 
publicly. (Compare for example 
the contemporary overuse of the 
“European problem”.)
Against the backdrop of brutal conflicts between the 
various religious denominations and factions, which were 
incapable of living together, Locke suggested a philosophical 
justification of tolerance. In this context, tolerance was an 
antidote to the practice of persecution. Thus we should not 
forget that tolerance, in the European sense, was originally 
established with strictly religious connotations. (In this sense, 
incidentally, John Locke, the theoretician of tolerance and an 
outstanding proponent of the separation between civil and 
religious life, is not modern enough to accept tolerance to-
ward atheists; their lack of spiritual engagement made them 
seem to him antisocial beings.) Extrapolating it to other fields 
is a difficult endeavor requiring nuance and reformulation.
But there is a self-evident component of tolerance that is 
part of the behavioral heritage of the human species and did 
not have to wait until the beginnings of the modern age to 
find expression. I refer primarily to tolerance toward oneself, 
which I think has an ancient tradition. Man has probably be-
haved in a “Christian” manner toward himself since long be-
fore the appearance of Christianity. We know our own sins all 
too well, we know unutterable and unavowable things about 
ourselves, and we often do not approve of what we ourselves 
do. But all in all, we regard ourselves with a great deal of sym-
pathy — we understand ourselves, we endure ourselves, and 
we forgive ourselves. What prevails is the feeling that we are 
basically decent people, “good guys”, righteous persons. At 
least, we are not as bad as we would seem and, most impor-
tantly perhaps, we are not as bad as others are.
For this reason I am tempted to assert that “Love thy 
neighbor as thyself” does not mean “Love others as much 
as you love yourself”, but rather “Love others with the same 
forbearance with which you love yourself” and “Be just as 
tolerant of others’ weaknesses as you are of your own.” An 
inconsequential but telling example of the tolerance we 
have toward ourselves is the forbearance we usually exercise 
toward our own habits and idiosyncrasies. No matter how 
ridiculous or compulsive they may be, our idiosyncrasies are 
part of ourselves to such a degree that we never really con-
sider reforming them.
tolerAnce Also seems absolutely natural when we prac-
tice it toward those close to us. Love always expresses itself, 
sometimes irrationally, in tolerance: we are lenient towards 
our children, members of our family, and some friends. We 
accept slip-ups and deviations from them that would appear 
unacceptable to us in others.
Basically, life within small communities is a genuine school 
of tolerance. In larger communities, one can isolate oneself, 
creating clubs based on affinities, and thus avoid contact with 
everything disconcerting or bothersome. But in a family, one 
has to accommodate the peculiarities of each member, like 
a fate that, in the given situation, cannot be escaped. Mar-
riage, for example, demands a tolerant spirit to the point of 
sacrifice. One must come to an agreement and accustom one-
self to the way one’s spouse rolls up the toothpaste tube (or 
doesn’t), to eating habits, to rhythms and idiosyncrasies that 
are completely alien.
But tolerance is an ordinary experience even outside of 
one’s relationship to oneself or to people one is close to. In 
everyday life, what we could call the weak variant of toler-
ance, leniency, is widespread. You know that something is 
going on that is against the rules, you don’t approve of it, but 
you overlook it. You act as if you did not perceive the offense. 
For example, you know that some pupils at school smoke in 
the bathrooms during the breaks. You know that the cleaning 
woman in your office filches your bonbons, that your buddy 
smokes your cigarettes. But you decide that it is not worth 
attributing importance to such trifles. Leniency is thus the 
tendency to tolerate what appears inessential. The little sins 
that we — like everyone — commit or have committed in an-
other phase of life have to be treated with leniency, covered 
up, forgotten. Leniency is the tolerance of grandparents who 
observe — without interfering — their grandchildren’s pranks 
from the corner of their amused eyes.
Another, stronger form of tolerance is also common, if not 
banal: complicity, silent approval. You can no longer overlook 
the violation of the rule, but after pragmatic calculation you 
decide to allow it. We — at least we in Eastern Europe — know 
that “baksheesh” is a very unhealthy matter. We do not ap-
prove of it, but we practice it — whether out of weakness or 
out of strategic opportunism. We prefer to acquiesce in a 
bad habit than to accept the adverse effects of correcting it. 
It seems more profitable to stimulate prompt service or to 
reward the granting of favors than to give futile and senseless 
lessons on correctness. One lacks the courage to intervene 
with moralization, one decides, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of the lesser evil, to take part in the transgression. The 
French expression for a brothel  — maison de tolérance — is 
also to be understood in this sense (“Tolérance?” exclaimed 
a French writer, “Mais il y a des maisons pour cela!”). The civil 
decision to license a brothel, the house of tolerance, has the 
purpose of neutralizing a potential source of uncontrolled 
disorder by setting up a territory of controlled disorder, a dis-
order permitted as long as some rules are respected. In canon 
law, this is called permissio comparativa and is to be preferred 
over unconditional permission, approbatio.
finAlly, on Another level, we sometimes have to do with 
a dismal species of tolerance: resignation. One sees the viola-
tion of a rule and one rejects it internally, but one endures it 
as something unavoidable. As a rule, one chooses resigna-
tion either because one does not believe the situation can be 
changed (hence there is no sense in trying to change it), or 
because, for one reason or another, one wants to keep up ap-
pearances.
In the first case, tolerance has a tinge of discouragement and 
lies close to the boundary of cowardice. The person who is 
terrorized by a dictatorship is slow to react not because he is 
tolerant of the dictatorship, but because he is intimidated by 
its inventory of repressive methods. In the second case, toler-
ance is subsumed in the rhetoric of sanctimony and hypocrisy: 
A husband or wife who knows about his or her spouse’s be-
trayal accepts the situation in order to maintain conventions 
and thus appears to practice tolerance. But in truth he or 
she has merely resigned, for the sake of his or her own or the 
partner’s image.
The situations I have enumerated thus far prove that there 
is an atemporal practice and problem of tolerance that is in-
deed, as Voltaire said, “a condition of humanity”. Even where 
external conditions have drastically narrowed the spectrum 
of its manifestation, tolerance remains the minimum prereq-
uisite for living together, the internal hygiene of a functioning 
group. The fact that today people speak much more and more 
significantly about this topic than before indicates, not a new 
field of reflection, but rather a deviating expansion of the con-
cept, a change of context that brings its definition to the verge 
of explosion.
Before Attempting to describe this development, I would 
like to briefly systematize the cases listed above:
1. Tolerance is an epiphenomenon of communal life. At least 
two different persons are required before the problem of 
tolerance can be posed in proper terms. The psychologiza-
tion of the concept, the discourse of tolerant or intolerant 
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“dispositions”, of “mildness of temperament” (Calvin spoke 
of mansuetudo animi), and the definition of tolerance as an 
autonomous virtue, as a value “in itself”, and thus with abso-
lute legitimacy — all of these are irrelevant, inconsequential 
speculations as long as there is no opportunity for a direct 
experiment, a social test. For Robinson Crusoe, for example, 
living alone on the island, the question of tolerance does not 
arise. I mention this merely to preclude the enthusiastic (and 
utopian) chatter about tolerance in general and to discourage 
the prattle about its angelic, altruistic magnanimity. An abso-
lute “We have to be tolerant” means nothing. The problem is: 
Under what circumstances, at what moment, to what degree, 
and toward whom or what are we tolerant?
2. Tolerance is at issue only when one of two opposing 
sides can exercise power. In other words: only he who has 
the means to be intolerant can be tolerant. Tolerance is the 
rational decision of a coercive power to limit its coercive func-
tion and not to abuse its own power. From the viewpoint of 
power, tolerance is the self-imposed limitation of the right to 
intervene. Note that genuine power, power that has a broad 
basis of legitimization, is generally much more tolerant than 
arbitrary, illegitimate power imposed by its own authority. 
Dictatorships are intolerant because they feel threatened 
by the variety of their subjects. All variegated, colorful life 
threatens compulsive uniformity. Legislative inflexibility and 
a surfeit of regulations are symptoms of a weak organism with 
a limited “range of tolerance”. Strong systems, by contrast, 
afford themselves a much more generous margin of permis-
siveness. Tolerance is thus the expression of a strong political 
organism, a guarantee of the health of the social body. Laxity, 
the abandonment of standards, anarchy, value confusion, 
feeble institutions, and disintegrating relativism are not signs 
of increased tolerance, however, but symptoms of degenera-
tion. Genuine tolerance is the antipode of weakness. One 
cannot be tolerant on behalf of a colorless facelessness, one 
cannot permit otherness when one has no identity oneself. 
One cannot permit everything simply because one does not 
believe in anything.
In brief, one cannot efficiently serve pluralism by resort-
ing to an anemic facelessness. Tolerance is the attention that 
the majority grants to each minority, the understanding that 
the strong show for the weak, and the wisdom of the norm 
not to enforce itself by power and coercion. In a world where 
the principle of equality had won final victory, the ethic of 
tolerance would be obsolete, just as it would be in a world 
of universally accepted freedom of religion. Tolerance is the 
virtue of the stronger party in living together with a counter-
part that is disadvantaged in one way or another. Without this 
structural separation, there can be no real tolerance, but only 
a kindhearted exchange of politenesses. It is a sign of a certain 
social pathology when a minority declares itself “tolerant” 
of a majority, when the exception tolerates the rule. As if the 
rabbit would declare itself tolerant of the elephant.
3. From the viewpoint of society, tolerance is the accept-
able solution of a disagreement. I choose non-discriminatory 
behavior in relation to a situation that I could oppose with 
arguments. Mere agreement with the other cannot be termed 
tolerance; it is merely a form of consensus. The word “toler-
ance” is used accurately and fittingly only if the tolerated ob-
ject retains a negative connotation. For instance, the expres-
sion “I am tolerant toward beautiful women” is absurd, unless 
it comes from a misogynist for whom beautiful women is a 
damnable category. You cannot be tolerant toward an idea 
or fact that you affirm and accept unconditionally. You can-
not tolerate what you are in complete harmony with. There 
must be a mental reservation, a difference of opinion, a de-
termination of critical difference between the one tolerating 
and the tolerated object. Tolerance is the tendency — or the 
decision  — to accept things that, by your own criteria, would 
be defined as unacceptable. Tolerance is shaking hands with 
what actually disconcerts and even exasperates.
All of these remArks lead to the conclusion that toler-
ance is a suitable and advisable behavior, but only because 
the world is imperfect. Tolerance has its place primarily in 
the environment of differences that are difficult to resolve, 
of political and social inequalities, of tension between good 
and evil. Tolerance demands that discernment show flex-
ibility and that judgment refrain from imposing penalties. Not 
excluding that which does not include oneself; allowing the 
other to be different and even, within limits, to err; accom-
modating the unsystematizable diversity of opinions, convic-
tions, and customs; not replacing conviction with coercion 
and extortion — these are the demands of tolerance, this is 
its virtue in the unfortunately impure ambience of everyday 
public life. In Paradise, tolerance has neither sense nor value. 
It is a transitory virtue, a transitional maneuver adapted to 
the promiscuity of the world. Under the conditions of an 
existence marked by traps, temptations, and provocations, 
tolerance aims in a way to rescue the decency of humanity. In 
an ideal world, tolerance would be unnecessary — a world in 
which evil was tamed, power equally distributed, and differ-
ences harmonized. Until the improbable moment when this 
comes to pass, we are, so to speak, condemned to tolerance. 
We must cultivate tolerance lucidly, level-headedly, and with-
out idolatry, and we must keep a watchful eye on the latent 
pathology of its functioning. For tolerance can certainly have 
murky abysses, suspicious motivations, and deforming ef-
fects. Let us look more closely at some of these aspects. There 
are forms of tolerance that, despite attractive packaging, 
contain a poisonous core. For example, there is the tolerance 
born of ambition. From the perspective of an exaggerated 
self-assessment, tolerance becomes a form of condescension 
and patronization, the arrogant marginalization of the toler-
ated object: I move on such lofty heights that I don’t deign 
even to perceive difference. I refuse to lower myself to deal 
with everything that contradicts me or disturbs my serenity.
Under certain circumstances, arrogance decides to behave 
tolerantly out of a kind of strategic consideration: I tolerate 
in order to defuse, I swallow and assimilate what resists me, 
and I thereby integrate resistance in the system, in the over-
powering image of the system. In the 1966 anthology A Cri-
tique of Pure Tolerance, Herbert Marcuse defined this kind of 
tolerance as a “mechanism of integration” and classified it as 
“repressive tolerance”. But condescending tolerance is not 
the only blameworthy form; there is also tolerance “from be-
low” — tolerance as the expression of submissive humility, as 
enduring an offense, or as a sign of weak character or convic-
tions. One can also be “tolerant” out of opportunism or pure 
indifference. The atheist who declares himself “tolerant” in 
religious questions is a fraud: in reality, the whole field of the 
religious is indifferent to him, so that “tolerance” costs him 
nothing.
A lax practice of tolerance and the demagogic exaggeration 
of tolerance bring with them the risk of anarchic develop-
ments. Karl Popper rightly remarked in his book The Open 
Society and Its Enemies that “unlimited tolerance leads to 
the disappearance of tolerance”. In other words, we have to 
reserve “the right not to tolerate the intolerant”. Popper’s 
wording is extremely circumspect. He speaks of the intoler-
ant person, but seems unconcerned with the category of the 
unacceptable, the intolerable. But tolerance is dangerous 
precisely when it minimizes, evades, or simply negates the 
problem of the intolerable.
whAt cAn we sAy about this problem? Are there objective 
limits to tolerance? In the applied sciences, things are simple 
and revealingly obvious and clear. Technicians use the term 
“range of tolerance” to indicate the limits within which cer-
tain deviations are allowed without impairing a given whole. 
The range of tolerance designates the degree of precision 
with which a component must be produced, for example. Ma-
chines can “tolerate” a certain approximation in the diameter 
of a pipe or the weight of a coin, but there is a limit beyond 
which the piece is rejected. The same is true of the human 
body: up to a certain limit, it can withstand physical pain or 
toxic substances, but beyond this limit, the physiological bal-
ance collapses. No system, whether mechanical or biological, 
can survive conditions that exceed its range of tolerance. No 
whole can tolerate principles or situations that undermine its 
raison d’être. For example, a judicious constitution cannot 
contain an article giving every citizen the right to violate the 
constitution.
Another illustration of the intolerable is error. The decision 
to show “understanding” for someone who maintains that 
two and two equal five cannot be regarded as tolerance. Tol-
erance is equally inappropriate in the legal system. One can-
not plead, in the name of tolerance, not to penalize a proven 
crime. Reduced sentences, pardons and amnesty operate on 
completely different principles, and are on a completely dif-
ferent semantic level from tolerance.
In child-raising, too, unlimited tolerance is not a particular-
ly auspicious solution. Of course, brutal methods and narrow-
minded didacticism without any understanding or patience 
are out of the question. But the theory of “identification” with 
the person one wants to bring up, the tendency to find a justi-
fying and excusing diagnosis for all his inadequacies inhibits 
and blocks the modeling impulse. Quite simply, you cannot 
bring up a child whom you “understand completely” by pro-
grammatically putting yourself “in his place”. The place of 
the pedagogue must be unmistakably delimited from that of 
the pupil, even if the pedagogue also has something to learn 
while he teaches.
As the topic of tolerance became more and more “politi-
cally correct” and fashionable in the wake of postmodern 
relativism, its contours began to blur. At the beginning of the 
1980s, the “paradox of tolerance” began to be mentioned 
with increasing frequency. The paradox arose, first, from the 
question, “How should the tolerant spirit respond to intoler-
ance?”, and second, from the difficulty of finding a precise 
argumentation for the claim that “it is good to tolerate what 
is not good”. But to what extent is the tolerant spirit obliged 
to behave permissively toward the intolerant person and the 
intolerable? And how can acceptance of the unacceptable 
be rationally justified? Isn’t the fact that you declare yourself 
tolerant an insult — as Goethe said — to the thing tolerated? 
Should tolerance develop towards an encouraging agree-
ment, toward esteem and respect? Shouldn’t the exception 
“ You know ThaT 
someThIng Is 
goIng on ThaT 
Is agaInsT The 
rules, You don’T 
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You overlook IT.”
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finally be regarded, not as a transgression of the norm, but 
rather as a norm-shaping transgression? Starting from this 
kind of question, a tolerated reality begins gradually expand-
ing and striving for legitimacy by questioning the legitimacy 
of the tolerating authority. In other words, the exception 
becomes tolerant of the rule, and the rule takes on a guilty 
attitude, even an inferiority complex, toward the exception. 
The exception becomes militant and self-satisfied, almost dis-
criminatory and intolerant.
All this confusion is the result of the way we define and 
relate to “difference”. We have noted that tolerance can exist 
only where there is difference. The difference wants to be ac-
cepted and have a right to its identity; it wants validity, which 
would be normal in a pluralistic world that is prepared to give 
difference its due.
BUt the mAtter is much trickier than it appears at first 
glance. For difference, on the one hand, wants to be recog-
nized and confirmed as difference, while at the same time it 
strives for a status of non-difference, integrated, along with all 
other differences, in normality. What is tolerated as different 
does not always want to be considered different, a specimen 
of a peculiar category. Consequently, it does not like to be 
treated differently from others (even if this difference is posi-
tive, a surplus of benevolence). Its discourse has two compo-
nents that, in a way, contradict each other: (A) Respect me as 
I am, no matter how much I differ from you. Let me be differ-
ent! (B) I am basically your equal and don’t want the status 
of a tolerated exception. The difference that separates us is 
incidental when we consider the humanity that unites us. So 
don’t constantly remind me that I am different! Accordingly: 
(A) Accept and bear responsibility for the difference, and 
(B) behave as if the difference did not exist. To unite the two 
demands (A) and (B) in a single, coherent mode of behavior, 
a great deal of social benevolence, psychological sensitivity, 
and metaphysical perspicacity is required. If one emphasizes 
the difference, one will be suspected of a latent discrimina-
tory spirit. If one emphasizes equality, one will be suspected 
of minimizing the difference. Whatever one does, one is 
caught in a vicious circle that provokes general disapproval. 
One takes precautionary measures, but these can turn into as 
many mistakes. It resembles the cases of “sexism” that I my-
self experienced at several universities in the United States: If 
you let a woman into a building before you, you are labeled a 
“macho”; if you don’t, you have no manners.
Another example is the development of a disadvantaged 
community’s relations with a privileged community. In the 
first years after the fall of the communist regime in Romania, 
numerous donations arrived in the country for handicapped 
children. It proved extremely difficult to explain to healthy, 
but equally impoverished children in nearby children’s 
homes why the wonderful presents from abroad did not 
come their way too — especially because the healthy institu-
tionalized children, in their childish innocence, did not see a 
big difference between themselves and the others.
The contemporary tribulations of tolerance make it hard to 
discern who tolerates whom; one no longer knows who is the 
victim of whom. The one tolerated yesterday becomes today’s 
tolerant one, or invents a new kind of intolerance. The fear of 
making a mistake leads to complicated forms of self-censor-
ship, to baroque forms of hypocrisy, and to unprecedented 
social anxieties. The problem of tolerance is developing un-
imagined and unexpected nuances. A passionate discussion 
of this theme can be found in Thomas Nagel’s Mortal Ques-
tions (1979). The author notes that the fear of slipping into a 
condemnable negative discrimination gives rise to a natural 
tendency to practice a positive discrimination. Among equally 
qualified candidates for a particular position, the choice is 
generally for the disadvantaged, black, or female candidate. 
The question now arises whether this decision is just or not. 
Nagel’s opinion is that this is a just decision whose goal is to 
correct an earlier, “traditional”, clearly unjust system.
Yet positive discrimination taken to its extreme points up 
the problem of the right relationship between equality and 
freedom. The need for equality ends in a crisis of the need for 
free competition and free choice. Also, how far can the rule 
of positive discrimination go? Nowadays, racist and sexist 
injustice are minimal and under control in the civilized coun-
tries. But new dilemmas and new predicaments can appear 
on the horizon at any time. Perhaps we would spontaneously 
prefer the better looking of two equal candidates for the same 
TV position and, to avoid negative discrimination, would 
rationally have to choose the one who is not so good-looking. 
We would have to take care not to advantage the slender over 
the fat, the blonde over the dark-haired, and the tall over 
the short. But what should we do when we have to choose 
between an intelligent candidate and one who is not so intel-
ligent? Or between a talented and an untalented actor? One 
could assume that, in our perfidious way, we would tend to 
prefer intelligence and talent. But shouldn’t we have scruples 
and ask ourselves why the less intelligent and less talented 
should be blamed for being the way they are? Shouldn’t we 
prefer them, thus correcting the injustice done them at birth? 
Nagel concedes that proceeding further in this direction leads 
to the boundary of moral utopianism. We will never find the 
perfect dosage of regulative constraint that does not hinder 
individual freedom or the right to make a decision by person-
al criteria and in harmony with a way of living and working 
that is not, in Habermas’s words, “colonized” by an abstract 
jurisprudence. 
we Are moving on UncertAin, dangerous terrain paved 
with prejudices, vulnerabilities, and mistrust. Every radical-
ism can lead to suffering, but every permissive frivolity can 
lead to confusion and disorder. We simply have no solutions. 
So let’s not act as if we had. All we can say is that the reasons 
for our tolerance are more numerous and weighty than the 
arguments for intolerance. We can be tolerant in the name 
of reason and decide that every individual has the right to 
his own opinion and that this principle of law is the original 
rationality of our specific structure. But we can also be toler-
ant in the name of the uncertainty of our shaky reason and 
decide that we have no access to universal truth and thus no 
access to absolute certainty, and that, consequently, we can-
not claim to be right all the time. We can believe the Stoics 
that man stands above truth and that it would thus be unwise 
to limit him geometrically with abstract judgments. Or we can 
be relativists like John Milton (Areopagitica, a Speech for the 
Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, 1644) and note that, on an im-
manent level, there is no chemically pure evil or chemically 
pure good and that we thus lack criteria for categorical and 
radical distancing and separation (“In moral evil much good 
can be mixed”). We can say with John Stuart Mill that toler-
ance is the necessary derivative of freedom, or claim with 
John Rawls that it is the logical correlate of equality.
An extremely important and far too little noted source 
of tolerance is humor. To view the spectacle of the world 
without doggedness, to be able to enjoy the colorful charm 
of the real, to be able to distinguish between the very few 
things that must be taken seriously and the numerous things 
that need not be taken so seriously, and above all not to take 
oneself too seriously, with all one’s pompous opinions, pre-
fabricated certainties, and more or less hypocritical claims 
and demands — all of this together would certainly be a very 
thorough motivation for a spirit of tolerance.
A stimUlAting BAckgroUnd for tolerance, along with 
humor, is genuine faith or — to use a more encompassing 
term — the sense of transcendence. Intolerance is the opposite: 
an exaggeration of immanence, a kind of short-sightedness 
that monumentalizes differences perceived in the undeter-
mined development of the horizontal and that is unable to 
gain elevation to view things from the vantage point of a calm 
timelessness, rather than from the perspective of clamorous 
everyday life. Tolerance imitates or anticipates the sover-
eign justice of God, “for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil 
and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the 
unjust” (Matthew 5:45). Divine “justice” is termed anoché in 
the Greek text. The prefix aná indicates the rising direction. 
Tolerance is the aura of one who rises above differences. 
Anoché also means reserve, tranquility and calm, the suspen-
sion of judgment, the tendency to cease fire, giving the other 
a chance. When I think about it, the biblical terminology of 
tolerance — whether anoché, hypomonè (see Luke 8:15; 1st 
Corinthians 13:7), makrothymia (which in the Old Testament 
designates God’s ability to dominate His wrath at human 
sins), or the Latin derivations (patientia, sustinentia, sufferen-
tia) adopted in the works of the Church Fathers — leaves little 
space for innovation by later speculations. Modern tolerance 
is the worldly version of an ascetic virtue: patience, the abil-
ity to avoid prematurely classifying unclassifiable people 
and uncomfortable situations, the ability to understandingly 
endure difference, hindrance, and hostility, and the refusal 
to institute oneself as a judging authority. Avva Theodotos, 
a rather obscure monk in fourth-century Egypt, summed 
up the entire spectrum of tolerance (which presupposes the 
identification and acceptance of deviation from the norm) in 
the laconic sentence: “He who said ‘Thou shalt not commit 
adultery’ also said ‘Thou shalt not judge others’.”
How Christianity, with such a heritage, could itself become 
intolerant and why some manifestations of Islam, 
whose body of texts on tolerance is even more 
extensive than the Christian one, became fanati-
cal and merciless — that is another story. To tell it 
here and now would go beyond your toler-
ance. ≈
Note: This lecture was delivered at 
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It was almost a standard expression. Berlin 
Jews sizing up a fellow Jew said with a tinge of 
pride, with a recognition of achievement and 
a sense of self-assurance: “Er kam über den 
Schlesischen Bahnhof.” They were referring 
to the main railway station for trains coming 
from the East. 
      “The East” included a good part of the 
province of Posen, which was a kind of res-
ervoir for Jews in the big city. They could re-
plenish their numbers with people who were 
bent on success and yet did not forget where 
they came from. The vibrant Jewish cultural 
life in this part of Germany can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century. In 1838, a set 
of prayer books for the Holidays (machzorim) 
was printed in the province and had subscrib-
ers in no less than forty-five cities and towns. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, in 
the years leading up to the First World War, 
Jewish life was elevated to new heights in the 
small towns of Posen until history turned this 
life to ashes and wiped out all traces of Jewish 
existence.
rno Herzberg looks back on his childhood 
in Filehne, an insignificant small town in 
Netzeland, a forgotten strip of land that 
was a sort of no-man’s-land for a long time, 
one of many disputed historical territories in Central 
Europe. Herzberg was born in Filehne in 1908. As 
head of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in Berlin from 
1934 to 1937, he made a significant contribution to the 
Jewish resistance before he was finally forced to flee 
Germany and settled in New York. In his old age, he 
collected his childhood memories in an article pub-
lished in the Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook for 1997.1
THE prussian prOVinCE OF pOsEn
a rEsErVOir 
FOr MODErniTY
by anders Hammarlund
story
annexation of polish land made Berlin a “central” German city. it hasn’t always been that.
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A small river called the Netze divided the 
town. It was small enough for the big boys in 
our gang to be able to throw a stone over to 
the opposite bank. I could only make it half-
way, but could hit the small steamers and 
freighters floating down the calm waters. It 
was my way of resenting their going into the 
wide world north of the river. To the north, 
German peasantry and a large private estate 
dominated the countryside. To the south, Pol-
ish peasants lived in small villages. In between 
was the town, a meeting-place for north and 
south. Every week the peasants drove their 
horse-drawn carts to market to sell their prod-
ucts. When the day was done, they spent their 
money in the shops that lined the main street, 
Wilhelmstrasse. These shops, mostly owned 
by Jews, sold fabrics, shoes, hardware, cloth-
ing and the basic necessities of life.2
In the 19th century, the town had a population of 
somewhere between three and five thousand, mostly 
German-speaking Lutherans. Around 1900, the Jewish 
population numbered about 800. Jews had lived here 
since 1655 and Herzberg described a flourishing Jewish 
culture, which despite rather strict adherence to the 
rules of Halacha was wide-open to modern influences 
from Berlin and Breslau. One of the cornerstones 
of the multifaceted Jewish life in early 20th century 
Filehne was Frau Abraham’s restaurant, where pa-
trons could read the Berlin papers and discuss worldly 
and political issues. Another was the synagogue built 
in 1787.
There was a minyan every morning and eve-
ning and we did not need to hunt for the tenth 
man. The way to the Temple led through a 
narrow pathway next to our house. The wor-
shipers came, the men in their high hats, the 
women in their Sabbath best. The pathway 
opened onto a wide street and there was the 
Temple, in red brick with high glass windows. 
There was the beautiful interior with its high 
ceiling, and the well-polished wooden seats. 
There was the garden, full of lilac bushes. 
Children could play hide-and-seek under 
them. Close by was the bes hamidrash [house 
of study], a small building with one large 
room.3
Herzberg portrays the Filehne of the early 1900s, but 
he also speaks about the previous generations of his 
family. The special synthesis of tradition and moder-
nity that seems to have been characteristic of Filehne 
becomes apparent in these stories. The dominant fig-
ure in the family history is Arno’s paternal grandfather 
For many centuries,   the strip of land alongside the 
Netze River belonged to the Kingdom of Poland and 
constituted the border with Germanized Pomerania, 
which was part of the German Reich. But when the 
Polish state was erased from the political map in a 
series of “partitions” in the late 1700s, the area was 
annexed by the land-hungry Prussia. Protestant Ber-
lin now became the political and cultural center of 
gravity in place of the old Catholic capitals of Warsaw 
and Krakow, which had been devoured by Russia and 
Austria. The German ethnic presence in these parts 
was, however, nothing new. There had been German 
villages here since the Middle Ages and this should 
not be interpreted as a manifestation of some kind of 
coordinated German imperialism, but rather as an 
offshoot of the structural peculiarities of the old Pol-
ish kingdom. Ethnic diversity, coexistence, mutual 
dependence — and subjugation — were all elements of 
a general Central European pattern.
When Prussia expanded eastwards, it also gained a 
large Jewish population. The conditions of Jewish life 
had been harshly circumscribed in the original elec-
toral core country of Brandenburg. Jewish congrega-
tions were small, scattered, and suppressed. Jews had 
not been given permission to settle in Berlin until 1671, 
while in Poland, a fully developed Jewish community 
had been evolving since the late Middle Ages. In their 
characteristically rational way, the Prussian authori-
ties began administering the Jewish presence: they 
counted and registered Jews and investigated their 
social, cultural, and financial circumstances. Through 
haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment movement, Prus-
sian rationalism won passionate supporters among 
intellectual Jews, who believed the Enlightenment was 
the path to liberation and citizenship.
Filehne (the polish Wieleń)  was, according to 
Prussian nomenclature, a Kreisstadt of the Brom-
berg (Bydgoszcz) Regierungsbezirk, which in turn 
belonged to the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań). In 
the new German Reich proclaimed in 1871, the re-
gion was reorganized as the Province of Posen. The 
little river Netze/Notec still winds through this rural 
landscape in modern-day northwestern Poland, of 
course, and eventually makes its contribution to the 
sometimes all too powerful currents of the Warta and 
the Oder. But the traditional culture of the place has 
been dissolved and its bearers and social structures 
are no more. Very few of the people who live there 
today have family roots in the district that go back 
any further than 1945. As early as the turbulent years 
of 1918—1919, when new states and borders were 
welded together in Europe’s temporarily unclaimed 
Zwischenraum between the Balkans and the Baltics, 
an exodus had begun from the mousetrap of Cen-
tral European politics. The following three decades 
brought the total breakdown of civilization in the 
area. One must summon a great deal of imagination 
to picture nineteenth-century Filehne. Recollections 
of this Städtchen along the Netze have been spread 
across the world, embedded in the family histories 
of Americans, Australians, and Israelis, but most of 
this has remained oral history; little has been put in 
writing, and even less published, beyond Herzberg’s 
memoirs.
From left: Georg Simmel; title page of Abraham Baer's liturgy handbook (1877); Moritz Lazarus.
posen meant territory but also culture. Jewish culture.
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Abraham Herzberg, who achieved a certain level of 
affluence as the town’s Königlicher Spediteur, but who 
was also a traditional observant Jew.
When my grandfather built our house, he 
saw to it that the flat roof was fenced in as re-
quired by the Jewish Law. He built the house 
with a permanent sukkah. It was a unique ar-
rangement. The roof over one of the upstairs 
rooms could be opened by pulling on a strong 
cord attached to a weight. The ceiling of this 
room was thatched with a layer of straw. We 
could see the light through it and, at night, 
the stars. When it rained, we just lowered 
the roof. When it was too cold, a little stove 
gave the desired heat. We decorated the room 
with strings of chestnuts, flowers and lavish 
greenery.4
THE TalMuD anD 
KulTurWissEnsCHaFT
Abraham Herzberg’s relative affluence probably arose 
after Filehne was connected to the rapidly expanding 
Prussian rail network, which likely occurred shortly 
after 1850. During the rapid urbanization process 
in nineteenth-century Prussia — which accelerated 
after the unification of Germany in 1871 — Berlin be-
came one of the spearheads of European modernity. 
Berlin took on this role because of the strong tradi-
tion of Enlightenment (in the minds of German and 
German-Jewish liberals, Prussia was the guarantor 
of political rationalism and progressiveness) and the 
intellectual synergies that arose through the emanci-
patory reforms that created the culture-bearing social 
stratum of Bildungsbürger. This article sheds light on 
the role of the Jewish reform movement in German 
nineteenth-century culture and in particular its signifi-
cance to the establishment of modern Kulturwissen-
schaft — the cultural and social sciences — after 1850. 
There is a wide body of literature on Jewish reform 
efforts, but the phenomenon is often portrayed as an 
internal process within the Jewish minority, with a fo-
cus on changes in liturgy and religious practice. More 
recent research on the epoch, however, emphasizes 
the affinity of Jewish reform with and its impact on 
general social development in Germany and Europe. 
In this context, I would like to mention in particular 
Simone Lässig’s inspiring work on the Jewish minor-
ity’s successful path from exclusion to the educated 
middle class.5
Filehne and similar towns in the province of Posen 
were the jumping-off point for many ascents up social 
and academic ladders. But one must understand that 
the young Jews who took the train to Berlin were not 
only leaving something behind. They also brought 
something important with them to the newspaper 
editorial offices and academic lecture halls of the 
big city. In premodern Europe, two confessionally 
defined traditions of learning had existed side by side 
since the Middle Ages, each with its specific institu-
tions and forms of expression. The university system 
had evolved under the protection of the Church, and 
non-Christian believers were thus denied access to its 
lecture halls and libraries, where Latin was the lingua 
franca. The Jewish system of learning had its own 
network of small beth midrashes (houses of learning/
study) and yeshivas (Talmudic schools) and had — de-
spite the often far-reaching and inconsistent restric-
tions to which communities of the Jewish Diaspora 
were subjected in the Christian states — preserved an 
intense tradition of text interpretation and text pro-
cessing, with Hebrew and Aramaic the languages of 
learning.
in the traditional   Jewish community, social status 
was connected to study and learning. These were 
studies pursued for their own sake, which had inher-
ent value as a mitzvah, an ethical-religious decree or 
duty. It is the story of this special tradition of intellec-
tualism and its social resonance that Moritz Lazarus, a 
scholar of societies and cultures, tells in his memoirs 
of his youth, which are an interesting correlate to Arno 
Herzberg’s slightly naïve and nostalgic depiction.6 
Lazarus, born in Filehne in 1824, came to play an im-
portant role in the emergence of the modern cultural 
and social sciences in German-speaking Europe.7 He 
is in many ways characteristic of the generation of 
Jewish intellectuals born into the old world of Jewish 
learning, but who could, through the offices of social 
change, be “reborn” into the modern academy.
“Die Haushaltung war ausserordentlich chara-
kteristisch”, he writes. Two older ladies, Lazarus’s 
paternal aunts Esther and Gitel (called Esterchen 
and Gitelchen), were the true sovereigns of the large 
household. They were also owners of the property 
and the family’s trading company. The elder of the 
two sisters managed the day-to-day business and dealt 
with customers, while the younger kept the books and 
managed the correspondence. And what did the men 
do? They studied.
Lazarus’s father Aaron was the Dayan, chairman 
of the town’s beth din, the rabbinical court, and a 
prominent Talmudist. As was customary, he brought 
his son into the tradition of learning when the boy was 
only six years old. Every weekday morning, the hours 
between six and eight were devoted to studies of the 
Talmud at home. After the boy’s bar mitzvah his stud-
ies were pursued in the beth midrash in Filehne, where 
Lazarus got to know many bocherim, wandering beg-
gar students.
My occupation was as follows: every morning, 
except for Fridays and Saturdays, studies of 
the later rabbinic texts and codices and their 
commentators between five and seven o’clock 
(six and eight in the winter), together with my 
father and my uncle. Thereafter, until dinner-
time, study of the Talmud, which was usually 
general once a week, otherwise strict. To be 
story
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The name that Lazarus and Steinthal chose for 
their discipline caused some misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations in the 20th century, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. The German word Volk sounds 
rather worrisomely Teutonic to our ears, but to Laza-
rus, it stood only for the collective aspect of cultural 
identity and is entirely liberated from the metaphysi-
cal notions associated with romantic rhetoric on the 
“soul of the people”. If one could speak of individual 
psychology, one should also be able to talk about the 
manifestations of psychological phenomena on the 
collective level, according to Lazarus and Steinthal. 
But it has been difficult to find apt translations of 
the term Völkerpsychologie. It has been called folk 
psychology, national psychology, anthropological 
psychology, and ethnic psychology. Social psychol-
ogy is, however, probably the most adequate English 
equivalent.11
Alongside the general intellectual-historical back-
ground to Lazarus and Steinthal’s endeavors, there is 
also a political impetus. In the atmosphere of increas-
ingly acute national agitation that characterized the 
decades after 1848 in Central Europe, there was a 
need to objectively respond to the essentialist zeal-
ots of purity who spoke of biologically determined 
common destinies. In a lecture entitled “Über das 
Verhältniß des Einzelnen zur Gesammtheit”, which 
Lazarus held in Berne in 1861, he develops his views 
on what we would today call the nature of ethnic af-
filiation:12
meaningful, these studies demanded all of 
these hours of attention. They had to be pur-
sued with the utmost precision. Every aspect 
of the Talmud must be traced through all the 
centuries up to the most recent commenta-
tors. The strict study consisted of Talmudic 
law. Preparations for this began as afternoon 
or evening studies during my early years of 
study, under the guidance of another student 
of the Talmud. On Thursday evenings, we re-
peated the week’s lesson in the absence of the 
teacher; this was how it was usually done at 
all higher yeshivas. These Thursday evenings 
were often rather pleasant assemblies. During 
the breaks, we ate simple meals, or on occa-
sion some delicacy, which were spiced with 
lively and entertaining conversation until the 
walls of the school echoed with laughter …8
In 1833, the Prussian government instituted compul-
sory German-speaking elementary schools for the Jew-
ish population in the province of Posen. The primary 
task of this new school system (beyond imprinting the 
High German language) was to spread the educational 
canon of German idealism: Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, and 
Schiller. This centralized push towards cultural ho-
mogenization was not directed solely at the Jews. The 
goal was essentially the same as that which applied 
in the Protestant (German) and Catholic (Polish) el-
ementary schools also found in Filehne — Hochdeutsch 
und Bildung. One can interject that schooling in High 
German was certainly just as important for Protestant 
children as for Jewish children, as the vernacular of 
the town was very dialectical and Low German, and 
perhaps just as far removed from the standard High 
German language as the Yiddish spoken by the Jews of 
Filehne.
In his memoirs, Lazarus implies that his youthful 
observations of the interplay among the three eth-
nic, linguistic, and religious affiliations practiced in 
Filehne became an important source of inspiration for 
his later work as a scholar of societies and cultures.9 
What was it that created and maintained boundaries 
between different social collectives? What was a na-
tion, actually? Or a religion?
at the age of sixteen,   after ten years of study, the 
young Lazarus had mastered the foundations of the 
Talmudic tradition. A career as a rabbi seemed foreor-
dained, but the family could not afford further stud-
ies. Lazarus secured an apprenticeship in Posen, but 
continued his intensive independent study of the Ger-
man classics. As a consequence of the secularization 
process in the first half of the 19th century, certain Ger-
man universities had been opened to Jewish students. 
Lazarus’s goal now was admission to the University of 
Berlin, founded in 1810 by the linguist and educational 
reformer Wilhelm von Humboldt, which had through 
its modern research profile become an engine of intel-
lectual life in Germany and a model for many Euro-
pean universities.
In 1844, at the age of twenty, Lazarus was able by 
means of philanthropic assistance to secure a place at 
the secondary school in Braunschweig. In his autobio-
graphical notes, he implies that it was because of the 
extensive memory training entailed by his Talmudic 
studies that he was able to complete the secondary 
course in two years, thus opening his path to the Uni-
versity of Berlin.10 The times were characterized by 
feverish development in the field of human sciences. 
A variety of special disciplines were spun off from 
philosophy and history, such as psychology, art his-
tory, ethnology, and musicology. Lazarus, along with 
another Jewish Berlin academic, the linguist Heymann 
Steinthal (1823—1899), became the founder of a new 
discipline, but its subject was not any particular form 
of art or category of object, but rather human interac-
tion itself.
“pEOplE arE asKED  
BY us WHO THEY arE”
On THE naTurE  
OF aFFiliaTiOn
The fundamental starting point was the simple ques-
tion: How is society possible? They called their new re-
search orientation Völkerpsychologie. In 1860, Lazarus 
was offered a professorship in his new discipline at the 
University of Berne, Switzerland, and from this seat of 
learning and through the journal Zeitschrift für Völker-
psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, which he co-found-
ed with Steinthal in 1859, he engaged in a discussion 
about cultural identity that is considered to have laid 
the foundation for the emergence of modern cultural 
and social sciences in German-speaking Europe.
Berlin – the 19th century capital of science. Jewish Bildungsbürgertum thrives there.
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Spiritual or mental closeness or difference 
is independent of genetic kinship. The con-
cept of a people is based on the interplay of 
spiritual and historical circumstances on the 
one hand, and nature-given conditions on 
the other, the intervention of the culture in 
nature. That which first and foremost consti-
tutes a people is not certain objective char-
acteristics, such as origins, language, etc., 
but rather the subjective beliefs among the 
individual members of the people, the indi-
viduals who together constitute a people. The 
concept of a people rests upon the subjective 
understandings of individual members about 
themselves, about their similarity, and affili-
ation. When we study plants and animals, it 
is the natural scientist who classifies and sys-
tematizes on the basis of objective, distinctive 
traits — people, on the other hand, are asked 
by us who they are, among which people they 
count themselves. [Menschen aber fragen wir, 
zu welchem Volke sie sich zählen.] 
      […] One should not be surprised by the 
subjective nature to which we ascribe the con-
cept of a people. The people is entirely a men-
tal entity: it has no corporeal existence, even 
if it is not independent of material conditions. 
A people is a mental creation of the individu-
als that belong to it. They are not a people — 
they continuously create the people.
We see that Lazarus here comes very close to the fash-
ionable concept in cultural anthropology regarded 
by many as an advance of the 1980s: the imagined 
community. His insight into the continuous creation 
of affiliation leads him to an interest in the media and 
forms of this creation and thus to a radically new un-
derstanding of the social relevance of the aesthetic 
phenomena.
iMaGinaTiOn inTO pOWEr
THE JEWisH rEFOrM 
MOVEMEnT
One of the most interesting historic architectural 
sights in Berlin is the Neue Synagoge on Oranien-
burger Straße, consecrated in 1866. The domed front-
age reconstructed in the 1990s is seen by many as an 
expression of a Jewish tradition rooted in the Middle 
East, but the building is actually entirely divorced 
from tradition. The eighteenth-century Alte Synagoge, 
which was located a few blocks away on Heidereuter-
gasse, on the other hand, was a typical representative 
of the traditional European synagogue, a building in a 
very simple, classical style whose design did not in any 
way depart from the surrounding buildings.
The Neue Synagoge was the foremost architectonic 
expression of the Jewish reform movement in Berlin. 
In his design idiom, the architect, Eduard Knoblauch, 
makes a connection to the epoch in Jewish cultural 
history that those striving towards reform perceived 
as the Golden Age of Jewish culture in Europe: medi-
eval Al-Andalus.13 The “rediscovery” and renewed ap-
preciation of pluralistic Muslim rule in Spain is largely 
the result of research by Jewish philologists in the 19th 
century. In the early days, when Jewish intellectuals 
were allowed into the halls of academia, the “Orien-
tal” languages — Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic — often 
became their field of research. They had the Hebrew 
and Aramaic from their Talmudic studies, while they 
acquired the closely related Arabic so that they could 
study and translate medieval Jewish philosophy 
(mainly Maimonides), much of which was written in 
that language. As Jews, they could not expect to gain 
academic positions, but Semitic philology was a good 
qualification in the competition for rabbinic positions 
(for which a PhD eventually became a requirement).
Scholar and rabbi Abraham Geiger (1810—1874) 
became a dominant figure in the field and also came 
to play a central role in the Jewish reform movement. 
Geiger was born in a traditional Jewish milieu in 
Frankfurt am Main, but after his studies at the Univer-
sity of Bonn in the 1830s, he got involved in the Jewish 
identity project.14 The emancipation process had torn 
down many social barriers, but had also problema-
tized the formerly clearly demarcated Jewish iden-
tity. In the old, confessionally and strictly separated 
Europe it was certainly difficult to be a Jew, but it was 
not difficult to know who was a Jew. The difference 
between the Christian and Jewish collectives was fun-
damental to the system and was emphasized through 
segregating decrees and external signs. The emancipa-
tion was euphoric, but it also brought a kind of loss of 
identity, and the reform movement may be seen as a 
reaction to this perception of ethnic vagueness. As a 
rabbi in Breslau and later in Frankfurt am Main, Geiger 
created the paradigm for what would later be called 
liberal Judaism.
Through the long   centuries of confessional op-
pression, rigorous adherence to the national religious 
aspects of Judaism had been an understandable de-
fense mechanism, without which the Jewish people 
would have been vanquished. The radically changed 
conditions brought by the Enlightenment and eman-
cipation had, Geiger believed, fundamentally changed 
the circumstances.15 Jerusalem and the nation of Israel 
were historical phenomena, a kind of finished phase 
in the evolution of Jewish culture as ethnicity: in the 
present, their only significance was symbolic. In con-
trast, the ethical and intellectual core of the religious 
tradition was timeless and universal. The role of Juda-
ism in contemporary social development was to make 
this cultural heritage available to modern nation-
building processes. The identification with the idea of 
progress was fundamental. Some scholars hold that 
traditional Jewish messianism, faith in an age of de-
livery and liberation, was channeled into this secular 
identification with modernity. People had the sense 
that they were living in a time when anything was pos-
sible and when the unchained power of creativity had 
let Andalusia rise again along the Spree.
Geiger was installed as the rabbi of the Neue Syna-
goge in Berlin in 1869. Here he came to work with 
Moritz Lazarus, who had returned to Berlin, where as 
professor of philosophy at the Military Academy he 
From left: Neue Synagoge, Berlin. Oil painting by Emile de 
Cauwer; Neue Synagoge, interior; Göteborg synagogue.
story
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instilled the classical German ideals of Bildung in the 
minds of future Prussian officers. Lazarus and Geiger 
had been interacting for a long time within the emerg-
ing reform movement, for instance in connection with 
a series of rabbinical synods convened in order to iron 
out considerable differences of opinion on the reli-
gious, political, and cultural issues of the day. Lazarus 
initiated the legendary Hochschule für die Wissen-
schaft des Judentums, founded in 1872; Geiger wrote 
the curriculum. Wissenschaft des Judentums may be re-
garded as the scholarly or academic aspect of the Jew-
ish reform movement. The philologist and rabbi Leo-
pold Zunz (1794—1886) is regarded as one of its most 
prominent figures. The concept should be understood 
as “Jewish studies”, embracing every conceivable as-
pect of Jewish culture, but with no specific theoretical 
or methodological aim.16 The new college was a non-
confessional institution. Its primary aim was not to ed-
ucate rabbis and other Jewish officials, but to offer all 
comers (including non-Jews) advanced study in Jewish 
history, religion, linguistics, and philosophy. Many 
people were indeed interested and the Hochschule für 
die Wissenschaft des Judentums became, despite its 
limited financial resources, an important address in 
the intellectual landscape of Berlin. Geiger, Lazarus, 
and Steinthal all taught at the institute.
The founding of the Hochschule must be seen in 
the context of nineteenth-century national strivings 
towards unity. Geiger and Lazarus considered the 
creation of a unified German state on liberal grounds a 
progressive project. In this sense, they were dedicated 
German nationalists. Lazarus’s professorship at the 
Prussian Military Academy is an eloquent example of 
this dedication. Doing away with the relics and privi-
leges of feudalism and the emergence of a sound and 
secularized educated middle class were seen as un-
questionable emancipatory advances. For these liber-
als, there was thus no conflict between intense cultiva-
tion of the Jewish tradition of learning and dedicated 
participation in German culture. They were shaped 
by the ideas of the liberal revolution of 1848, but the 
German unification of 1871 was, as is known, accom-
plished with blood and iron, not Kultur und Bildung. 
Populist, anti-Semitic propagandists saw their chances 
in the Wilhelmian empire, and the establishment of a 
Jewish institution, incorporated into the German aca-
demic system, was thus seen as an important marker.
as professors   and lecturers at the University 
of Berlin, Lazarus and Steinthal also taught several 
prominent students who would later make significant 
contributions in the social sciences and humanities. 
Perhaps the most important among them was Georg 
Simmel, who is considered one of the founders of Ger-
man sociology. Through Simmel (whose parents had 
arrived a generation before at Schlesischer Bahnhof ), 
the ideas of Lazarus and Steinthal were spread to 
other important thinkers, including Max Weber, Leop-
old von Wiese, Alfred Vierkandt, and Karl Mannheim. 
In his legendary lectures and essays, Simmel takes 
up and elaborates on many of the central arguments 
of Völkerpsychologie. In Simmel’s thinking, Lazarus’s 
concept of objektiver Geist, which referred to the 
legacy of symbols and beliefs inherited from foregoing 
generations to which every new member of society is 
inevitably socialized in the creation of his individual 
identity (subjektiver Geist), developed into Kultur,  
that is, the broad, anthropological concept of culture. 
For Simmel, media and aesthetics became keys to 
understanding the social. In the process of gathering 
material for his thesis, Psychologische und ethnogra-
phische Studien über die Anfänge der Musik, Simmel 
was already engaged in ethnomusicological fieldwork 
in 1879, most likely inspired by Lazarus. Simmel had 
intended to defend this thesis for his doctoral degree, 
but as he had ventured into such an untried academic 
borderland, his professors became doubtful and re-
jected the work.17 Instead, his doctorate was conferred 
in 1881 for a thesis on Immanuel Kant’s understand-
ing of the essence of matter. The ethnomusicological 
study was published the following year in Lazarus 
and Steinthal’s Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft.18
Lazarus/Steinthal, and later Simmel, became well-
known outside the German language sphere early on 
and their thinking influenced other scholars including 
the French sociologist Celestin Bouglé (1870—1940), 
who had studied in Berlin, and the American William 
Isaac Thomas (1863—1947) of the Chicago School. But 
the scholar who was informed most strongly by Völk-
erpsychologie was the founder of American cultural 
anthropology, Franz Boas (1858—1942), who grew 
up in a liberal Jewish home in Germany. In his paper 
“The History of Anthropology”, published in Science 
in 1904, Boas refers to “folk psychology” as his most 
important source of inspiration for linguistic-anthro-
pological study, research that must include language 
as well as myths, religion, and aesthetics. Students 
of Boas who went on to become prominent scholars 
include Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, and Ruth Bene-
dict.19
pOsEn in sWEDEn
The small towns in the province of Posen, seemingly 
backwaters in an eastern border province, thus be-
came a nineteenth-century intellectual reservoir that 
fed German modernization. A new cultural interface 
had arisen where the Jewish tradition of text interpre-
tation could, in a way never before possible, interact 
with Enlightenment thinking and the new Bildung 
ideal in the spirit of von Humboldt. The result of this 
cross-pollination had, as we have seen, international 
reach. The lively communication via Schlesischer 
Bahnhof had a powerful influence on the emergence 
of Swedish modernity, for example. Jewish Göteborg 
of the 19th century, with the synagogue consecrated 
in 1855 as its foremost monument, stands out in cul-
tural respects as something that can be most closely 
likened to a suburb of liberal Jewish Berlin. Several 
of the congregation’s leading figures in the latter half 
German map of Posen, 1905. Colors represent ethnicity. Pre- 
dominantly German areas are white, Polish are yellow.
if sweden sometimes was regarded an additional German province
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of the 19th century had roots in the province of Posen: 
the president of the congregation and patron of the 
arts Isaac Philip Valentin, the rabbi Moritz Wolff, and 
the cantor and musicologist Abraham Baer. Valentin 
came from Inowrocław in the vicinity of Bromberg, 
Wolff from Meseritz/Miedzyrzecz in the western part 
of the province, and Baer from what can be called, in 
this context, the emblematic town of Filehne. They 
maintained their connections with family and col-
leagues in their area of origin and acted as connecting 
links between the peripheral and provincial — from 
a European standpoint — Göteborg milieu and the 
seething intellectual landscape of Berlin and the sur-
rounding countryside. Their roles as communicators 
of culture were not confined to the Jewish context. In 
Göteborg, they were heavily involved in the emerging 
cultural public sphere of the city and were part of the 
social circle of the publisher, politician, and advocate 
of popular education S. A. Hedlund. Moritz Wolff’s 
expertise and writings in religious studies became an 
important source of inspiration to the writer Viktor 
Rydberg’s politically important stances on the issue of 
religious freedom. This milieu was of vital importance 
to the development of Swedish cultural studies and 
social sciences because, at an early stage, it conveyed 
new insights into the social and political relevance 
of the aesthetic media. Its foremost describer (and 
virtual archetype), the literary scholar Karl Warburg, 
is considered one of the founders of modern Swedish 
literary studies.
One result of this Swedish-Jewish collaboration that 
received international attention was Cantor Abraham 
Baer’s remarkable book Baal t’fillah oder der practische 
Vorbeter (1877), a grandiose documentation of the 
traditional Jewish liturgy and its music based on Baer’s 
experiences as a wandering apprentice cantor in the 
province of Posen around 1850. The incentive for the 
book project was the intense debate in Göteborg in the 
1850s and 1860s on the aesthetic form of the Reform 
Jewish service. The work, whose publication was ulti-
mately made possible through Hedlund’s support, is a 
milestone in Jewish cultural history and is still used as 
a manual in the education of cantors in the US. While 
he was working on the book, his congregation sent 
Cantor Baer to Germany for further education, where 
he interacted with the circles around the Hochschule 
für die Wissenschaft des Judentums. As a surprisingly 
professional, for its time, documentation of the oral 
musical tradition of a world religion, Baer’s collection 
must also be regarded as a milestone in Swedish eth-
nomusicology.
While the texts of the Jewish service have been 
fixed in scripture for millennia, its musical format 
(melodies, recitatives, etc.) has long been a flexible 
and orally transmitted medium of communication 
that allowed the individual Vorbeter (the person lead-
ing the prayers) to put his personal stamp on liturgical 
song. Interest in this liturgical expression as Jewish 
music arose in the 19th century. Unlike his contempo-
rary folkloristic and ethnological chroniclers, Baer 
rejects all too far-reaching conclusions about the eth-
nic symbolism of aesthetic expressions. His primary 
intent was not to parade the ancient, unique, and eth-
nically specific; he wanted to show what was actually 
used and how it was used. His interest is thus directed 
at the medium, at the communication itself and its 
mutable forms, in the spirit of Lazarus, Steinthal, and 
Simmel.20 ≈
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EriC  J.  HOBsBaWM 
(1917–2012)
Finally, the growth of 
direct communication 
between the socialist 
sector of the globe and the rest, 
if only in the form of journalism, 
tourism, cultural exchange and the 
creation of significant bodies of 
emigrants from socialist countries, 
influenced developments in Marxism inasmuch as it 
swelled the body of information about them accessible to 
Western Marxists, which could only be overlooked with 
increasing difficulty. If such countries were nevertheless 
still turned into models, sometimes almost utopian, of 
what Western revolutionaries aspired to, it was largely 
because Western revolutionaries knew little about them, 
and sometimes were in no position, or did not care, to learn 
more. The idealisation of the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
by many Western revolutionaries had about as little to do 
with China as Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes had to do 
with Iran, or the eighteenth-century ‘Noble Savage’ with 
Tahiti. All used what purported to be the experience of a 
remote country for the social critique of another part of the 
world. Nevertheless, with the growth of communication 
and information, the tendency to seek utopia under some 
already fluttering red state flag diminished markedly. The 
period since 1956 is one in which most Western Marxists 
were forced to conclude that existing socialist regimes, 
from the USSR to Cuba and Vietnam, were far from what 
they would themselves had wished a socialist society, or a 
society in the process of constructing socialism, to be like. 
The bulk of Marxists were forced to revert to the position 
of socialists, everywhere before 1917. Once again they 
had to argue for socialism as a necessary solution for the 
problems created by capitalist society, as a hope for the 
future, but one only very inadequately supported by practi-
cal experience.
Conversely, the migration from socialist countries of 
‘dissidents’ reinforced the old temptation to identify Marx 
and Marxism exclusively with such regimes, and espe-
cially with the USSR.  It had once served to exclude from 
the Marxist community anyone who failed to give total 
and uncritical support to whatever came from Moscow. It 
now served those who wanted to reject all of Marx, since 
they claimed that the only road which led forward from 
the Communist Manifesto, or could lead forward, was that 
which ended in the gulags of Stalin’s Russia or their equiv-
alent in some other state governed by Marx’s disciples. 
This reaction was psychologically comprehensible among 
disillusioned communists contemplating ‘the god that 
failed’. It was even more comprehensible among intellec-
tual dissidents in and from socialist countries, whose rejec-
tion of anything to do with their official regimes was total 
– starting with the thinker to whose theory these regimes 
appealed. Intellectually, it has about as much justification 
as the thesis that all Christianity must logically and neces-
sarily always lead to papal absolutism, or all Darwinism to 
the glorification of free capitalist competition.”
From How to Change the World: Marx and Marxism 
1840–2011. london 2011: little, Brown.
‘‘
– then, as Hammarlund argues, the city of Göteborg was perhaps a suburb of Jewish Berlin.
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each had his unique mode of expression. Lewczyński 
showed “anti-photographic” pictures of handwritten 
notes, broken objects, and posters as well as his surreal-
ism-inspired series “Wawel Heads” (Głowy wawelskie) 
— images of lifeless bodies and people with no faces. 
One of the most famous pictures in that series — in-
cluded in the retrospective exhibition here in Kraków 
— depicts a worker covering his face with a shovel. The 
picture stands for an alternative truth opposed to the 
idea of the worker hero the state wanted to propagate. 
The photograph lays bare the human condition under 
communist rule and may be interpreted to mean that 
there are no individual heroes, only a faceless mass of 
people who work to survive.
When i later   spoke to the president of the Photo-
month, Tomasz Gutkowski, he called Lewczyński the 
most important thinker among Polish photographers 
since Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz. Witkiewicz made 
pioneering contributions as a photographer before 
the outbreak of World War II, but is best known as a 
writer and philosopher. “People in Poland have real-
ized that Jerzy Lewczyński is a genius, but unfortu-
nately he is not as well known in the rest of the world”, 
Gutkowski said.
Lewczyński’s photography and his thinking about 
photography have steadily evolved over his artistic 
career of more than sixty years. Following the anti-
photography period, Lewczyński delved into what he 
calls the archeology of photography. In the book pub-
lished in conjunction with the festival, Memory of the 
Image, Lewczyński writes: “Archeology of photogra-
phy is what I call activities whose aim is the discovery, 
examination, and interpretation of events, facts, situa-
tions that have taken place earlier in the so-called pho-
tographic past.” One of his central ideas is that without 
photographs, we lose our history, without pictures 
we have no history. Remembering and preserving the 
past through pictures is something deeply human, 
something he has found in ancient cultures like that of 
Egypt in the Age of the Pharaohs.
The photographs   hanging on the walls in the Na-
tional Museum are from the period when he took pic-
tures of large collections of things like spoons, shoes, 
or grenades; dating from his surrealist period, the im-
ages are pure and distilled portraits or reproductions 
of photographs taken by others that came his way 
by chance. The retrospective is a collection of many 
seemingly contradictory techniques and aesthetic ap-
proaches: documentary, artistically creative, concep-
tual. In an interview printed in the exhibition catalog, 
Lewczyński explains: “I use all the means I feel are 
appropriate to convey what I wish to express. I don’t 
reflect on classification of pictures into different types 
in the moment when I am taking them.”
The festival’s artistic director Karol Hordziej be-
lieves it is a huge problem that photographers like 
Lewczyński, and Hordziej’s personal favorite, Zofia 
Rydet, are unknown outside Poland. When the festival 
focused exclusively on Polish photography in 2008, 
Zofia Rydet’s social-anthropological documentation, 
mainly of the Polish rural population 1978 to 1990, was 
one of five major exhibitions of Polish photography. 
A German collector of photographic works was asked 
at the festival why he owned almost no Polish photo-
graphs. The answer was that Polish photography is an 
unknown world. Hordziej said:
“I can understand why he thought that, and that 
is something we are trying to change, by making our 
photographic history known not only abroad, but 
also here in Poland. That is why we published a book 
last year, Historie fotografii w Polsce 1839–2009 [The 
histories of photography in Poland, 1839–2009], in 
collaboration with the historian of photography Adam 
Mazur. It is the first book ever published on the history 
of Polish photography.”
T
he Kraków Photomonth Festival was held 
for the first time in 2002, and internation-
ally renowned photographers from many 
countries have been represented from the 
very start. Exhibitors in 2012 included Sally Mann (US), 
Viviane Sassen (Netherlands), Jason Evans (UK), and 
Sergey Bratkov (Ukraine). The main program has a 
new theme for each year. In some years, the theme 
has been photographs from various countries, such 
as the United Kingdom or Hungary, and one year the 
entire festival was devoted to Polish photography. The 
biggest attraction in 2012 is without a doubt the first 
major retrospective of the work of 88-year-old Jerzy 
Lewczyński.
Lewczyński, who was scheduled to personally in-
troduce the show at the National Museum in Kraków, 
is in failing health. The organizers were unsure for a 
long time whether or not he would be able to attend. 
As late as the day before the show, I was informed 
there was only a 60 percent chance he would be 
there. But when the exhibition opened, there he was, 
escorted by an assistant and supporting himself with 
a cane. He sat down in front of the video cameras, 
photo flashes, and the festival audience. A book of 
Lewczyński’s images (Memory of the Image) was pub-
lished in conjunction with Kraków Photomonth and 
a queue of people wanting their books signed quickly 
formed in front of him. When he later gave a short 
speech to the audience, the speaker was alert and hu-
morous. He said:
“I still take pictures. If I see something interesting, I 
take out my camera and shoot. And I want to give you 
all a little advice. Try to see the real meaning in what 
you are thinking about photographing. Don’t photo-
graph the surface — always look twice and always look 
carefully.”
in 1959, he joined   Zdzisław Beksiński and Bronisław 
Schlabs in organizing what came to be known as the 
“Anti-Photography Show”. The exhibition did not 
receive much attention then, but over the years it has 
taken on great significance in the history of Polish pho-
tography. The three photographers all were opposed 
to the official aesthetic of the Communist Party, but 
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Giving young Polish photographers a chance to 
show their works is very important to the festival 
arrangers. This year, out of 600 applicants, 10 pho-
tographers were selected to exhibit at galleries all 
over the city. The first show I went to see was Martyna 
Rudnycka’s at a photographic gallery in the Kazimierz 
district. She is showing only a few pictures, some of 
which depict people with their faces turned away from 
the camera. Other images look at details of interiors or 
express motifs taken from nature, such as two straight 
tree trunks, one light and one dark. “I leave it up to 
the viewer to decide how to interpret the pictures”, 
says Rudnycka. “Photographs should be seen only 
as impulses that can make people think.” Her biggest 
concern was how the pictures should be presented. 
She finally settled on what she calls the light box tech-
nique, where the negative is illuminated on a framed 
backlit panel.
A couple of hundred meters down the road, I vis-
ited the next show. Mateusz Sarello, 34, was educated 
in Warsaw, has exhibited previously, and has won 
awards including the Prix de la Photographie de Paris 
and the International Photo Award. He is showing 
pictures from a series first intended as a documentary 
project about the Baltic Sea. The images are displayed 
in the form of large, grainy paper photocopies, small 
unframed color photocopies, framed Polaroids, 
and black-and-white photocopies stapled to the 
wall. The presentation is playful, but the pictures of 
deserted beaches, seabirds, lonely fishermen with 
lined faces, bodies of water, and skies convey a sense 
of desolation. Sarello mused, “Well, no, this is not a 
documentary project about the Baltic Sea; it’s about 
my ex-girlfriend. It’s about loneliness, memories, and 
shattered love.”
The shows are hung   at about twenty museums 
and galleries, most of them spread around downtown, 
but a few are located a bit outside the city center. The 
show I visited two days later of the works of Laura 
Makabresku, a 25-year-old philosophy student at the 
University of Kraków, was in a gallery only a block 
away from Rynok Glawny, the main square in the old-
est district of the city.
Unlike all the other young photographers who ex-
hibited during the festival, Makabresku is self-taught. 
Her color photographs of people and taxidermically 
stuffed animals have strong undertones of eroticism 
and violence and have garnered attention. She was 
interviewed by the Oxford journal Trinity Arts Stack, 
for instance.
The images are striking. When I asked her where 
she found her inspiration, she told me that it all began 
with the stories her mother told her when she was a 
little girl. “I started writing poetry at a very young age, 
and the photographs are just another way to express 
the mood of the poems. I feel no hope; I can only ex-
press what I feel”, she said.
When I went to the Photomonth Festival in 2011, 
the pictures that seemed to abide in my body the 
longest were taken by a young man — Piotr Zbierski  — 
whose images are also disturbing. His artistic path 
differs from that of Makabresku: several years of pho-
tography school in Łódź, grants for photographic proj-
ects abroad, a stark, black and white aesthetic, and 
the use of a special but very simple plastic camera, the 
Holga, to get the effect he is after.
Two photographers with utterly different tech-
niques and subjects. And yet, of all the young Polish 
photography I have taken in while attending two fes-
tivals in a row, it is the art of Makabresku and Zbierski 
that still resonates most deeply.
Karol Hordziej believes that a typical national pho-
tograph is a thing of the past:
“Contemporary Polish photographers rarely join 
together in groups, but Sputnik is one well-known 
example.” ≈
The author is a Swedish freelance 
journalist and photographer.
Starting in the mid-1950s, Jerzy Lewczyńsky started taking pictures of text in various forms. Under 
one of those pictures he sits down and expresses his ideas about photography with considered, 
precise words.
During the festival, visitors could vote on the “photo icons”. One of  
the most famous images in Poland is from the liquidation of the Warsaw  
ghetto in 1943.
Photographer Mateusz Sarello on his pictures with a sea motif: “I’m scared of a few 
days of thinking only about Her, and here I’ll have the Baltic. My Baltic. Instead.”
representations of the Baltic sea might possibly be the tale of an ex-girlfriend. Of these, there are many.
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Magdalena Drobczyk graduated in 2010 as the first student at the Academy of Fine Arts in Katowice with a street art project. In this year’s festival in Katowice she painted a wall in a road tunnel.
in KaTOWiCE & KraKÓW
sTrEET arT 
T
he southern Polish cities of Katowice and 
Kraków have both made walls and public 
spaces available to street artists.
Michał Kubieniec is the art director of 
the second street art festival in Katowice. He says: “I 
like Polish street art for its diversity. To me, Polish 
artists like Goro, Brems, and Pikaso are among the 
most interesting because they are at the same time ex-
perimental and very street and dirty. But on the other 
hand I like Nawer, who makes great geometrical stuff, 
and Otecki whose art is inspired by Polish folk tales. 
In the future I think a girl from Katowice, Magdalena 
Drobczyk, with her surrealistic and abstract work, will 
be one of most important artists.”
Łukasz Kałębasiak, one of the festival arrangers, 
works at a cultural institution, Katowice — City of Gar-
dens. He explains, “Katowice is a gray industrial town 
that just a couple of years ago did not even have any 
graffiti to liven up the walls. We decided to bring color 
to the city, and thus the first street art festival came 
about.”
The fesTival was given permission to allow street art-
ists to paint certain walls and pedestrian underpasses 
in the city. The event was a success and festival num-
ber two was held in April of this year.
There is a vibrant graffiti culture in Kraków, one 
that comments on social and political issues in a 
completely different way than in Katowice. Several 
galleries in Kraków have opened their doors to street 
artists, even as illegal street art continues to flourish in 
the city. The words ANTIFASCIST Kraków are sprayed 
on many walls; sometimes the ANTI has been tagged 
over. A picture of Che Guevara has been given a Hitler 
mustache; slogans like “stop gentrification” and “fuck 
the police” appear here and there. Painting graffiti 
on the walls is prohibited in Poland and it is removed 
sooner or later. But as in Katowice, there are legal 
walls in Kraków. ≈
The author is a Swedish freelance 
journalist and photographer.
by per Eklöf
political propaganda mustn’t be replaced by commercial advertising only. Graffiti might be a solution.
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“Street art is the easiest way to communicate in a city”, 
says Magdalena Drobczyk. Here, we see one of her works 
in Katowice.
There are reminiscences of Ferdinand Leger in Zbiok’s 
wall paintings, it has been said. This is painted legally on a 
wall in Kraków.
Art by street art artists that is in galleries is not street art, 
according to Iga Urbanska and Aga Pudelko, who work at 
Nova Art.
Martin Gobiewski exhibits works by Zbiok and Nawer in 
his gallery Nova Art in Kraków. In the 1980s, a painting of 
Lenin in a mohawk got him interested in graffiti.
In the central districts of Kraków there is a lively graffiti milieu that has no equal in Katowice. It is especially in the old Jewish quarter, Kazimierz, and in the neighborhood 
that the Germans transformed into a Jewish ghetto during the World War II, Podgórze, that political graffiti is common. For about a year there has been a Facebook page, 
Krk:Loca(r)tor, with pictures of street art in Kraków. It contains information about where the pictures were taken and sometimes even who did the graffiti.
Mona Tusz and Raspazjan both come from Silesia and 
sometimes work together – as in here, on a wall opposite 
the railway station in Katowice.
Raspazjan’s esoteric aesthetic includes cats, female 
nymphs, and angels – and crafts such as this.
Anonymity is common in the world of street art. The iden-
tity of Vera King, who made a colorful debut in this year’s 
street art festival in Katowice, is known only to a few.
sTrEET arT 
Of course it’s forbidden. Forbidden art exists anyhow, everywhere.
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arina Mokotów is on the outskirts of one 
of the most famous districts of Warsaw. 
After the war, high-rises were built here, 
most during Gomulka’s time in power. 
They are characterized by the frugality of the five-year 
plans, with low ceilings and windowless kitchens. The 
new development included an industrial area just 
south of prewar Mokotów, but no heavy industry was 
located there, as in the northern part of the city.
Marina Mokotów covers part of the old industrial 
property. There are 1,800 housing units, single-family 
homes and apartments, on an area of 30 hectares. 
They were ready for occupation in 2006. The entire 
area is enclosed by walls or fences. There are two 
gated entrances that are guarded round-the-clock by 
uniformed guards in a sentry box next to the gate. 
The community is home to a restaurant, a couple of 
small grocery stores, a bank, hairdressers, a spa, and 
a few other businesses. There is an oblong lake in the 
middle. Water flows in from a manmade waterfall and 
then is pumped back again. A couple of bridges cross 
the narrow “lake” and there is a little playground on 
an island. It is this body of water that inspired the 
name — verging on the ironic — Marina Mokotów.
If you want to visit someone who lives in Marina 
Mokotów, you have to tell the guard at the gate whom 
you intend to see. The guard usually calls the person 
to ask whether the guest is expected or welcome. 
Once inside, you walk along streets that all have names 
shown on every city map and are posted with ordinary 
municipal street signs. But none of the city maps in-
dicate that these streets are inside a private enclave. 
The street names were chosen to instill a sense of 
security and nearness to a maritime realm: alongside 
Storm Street and Frigate Street, there are Paradise 
Street and Quiet Street. Every house or small group 
of houses is surrounded by a fence about two meters 
high. The gate is locked and CCTV-monitored. Behind 
the locked fence is a playground for the kids who live 
in the houses.
The streets in   Marina Mokotów are nearly desert-
ed, and even though it was a weekend when I visited 
the area, there were no crowds around the artificial 
lake. The residents are far from chatty. “Yes, we like 
it here”, they say and hurry on. One of the store own-
ers, who does not live in the neighborhood, is more 
outspoken:
“Not only do they have a wall around the whole 
place and guarded gates and locked fences around 
their own houses, when they park their bikes inside 
the second fence, they lock them with heavy chains!”
Sociological studies show that Poles on the whole 
are better off and happier with their lives than they 
were twenty years ago. In one survey undertaken 
by CBOS, an opinion institute, only 12 percent of 
respondents stated that they live in bad conditions, 
compared to 40 percent in 1993 and 30—35 percent 
throughout the 1990s. In the same survey, 39 percent 
said they live in good conditions and 48 percent said 
they have no complaints.1
When one of the first gated communities was 
built in Warsaw in the late 1990s — a neighborhood of 
single-family homes in the bedroom community of 
Piaseczno — the houses arrived from the United States 
ready to assemble. The Gazeta Wyborcza newspaper 
crowed that “an oasis of luxury and a slice of America” 
had now landed on Polish soil. The houses came from 
America for one reason: the contractor, Zbigniew 
Niemczycki, was a Polish businessman who had re-
turned to his native country after a successful career 
in the US and founded Curtis International, a com-
pany that built one of the first commercial skyscrapers 
in Warsaw.
The flight from the central parts of the city and tra-
ditional outlying areas to newly developed bedroom 
communities — classic suburbanization — started in 
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as soon as the wall in Europe had fallen, walls once again began to be built.
Guarded neighborhoods 
in the Bielany district.
Illustration: Magdalena Górczyńska/ 
Articulo – Journal of Urban Research
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the 1980s. The trend was fueled when 
free market forces were unleashed and 
foreign capital began flowing into the 
country. Capitalism created new oppor-
tunities for the building industry. State, 
municipal, and private lands quickly 
became the targets of speculation and 
substantial investments.
south of the   historical Mokotów, a 
large neighborhood called Ursynów 
had been built in the 1970s on hitherto 
virgin land. In the first phase, ten-story 
high rises were erected. Further south, 
three- or four-story buildings are the 
norm. The buildings are of uniform 
architecture, defined by prefabricated 
concrete slabs. Large green areas, foot-
ball fields, and playgrounds were laid 
out between the buildings, and they 
are still there. Schools, libraries, and 
cultural centers were included in urban 
planning. What they did not have was 
enough parking: the neighborhood was 
built with no thought for the surge in 
car use that happened in Poland in the 
1970s and took off again after 1990.
In the early 1990s, private entrepreneurs started 
buying farmland between Ursynów and Las Kabacki 
(the Kabacki Forest) nature reserve. New houses 
popped up like mushrooms on this land over a period 
of twenty years. Architecture was varied and concrete 
slabs nowhere to be seen. Instead of unrelenting gray, 
the façades were in various colors. Parking was built 
into the projects, usually in the form of underground 
garages with elevators up to the building stairwells. 
There were no green expanses, but the narrow strips 
of grass that often surrounded the buildings were neat 
and tidy and the sidewalks smoothly paved. Debates 
raged in the newspapers and trade papers as to what 
should happen to the old neighborhoods: Were they 
carcinogenic? How long would it take before the con-
crete slabs started to crumble and the buildings fall 
like houses of cards?
The new district that grew quickly south of the 
“communist” Ursynów was named after the nature re-
serve: Kabaty. It took a while for sociologists, anthro-
pologists, and geographers to realize that what was be-
ing built often added a new element to the cityscape: 
the gated community.2
During the initial phase, according to Jacek Gądecki, 
this was seen “as the logical outcome of undefined 
events and [...] the advent and existence of this type of 
community was regarded as something normal and not 
ascribed any particular significance”.3
A few years into the 2000s, some professional 
analysts began to draw attention to the negative con-
sequences of this trend. A critical breakthrough in the 
national discussion happened, Gądecki argues, when 
Henrik Werth, a German architecture student from 
Berlin, arrived in Warsaw in 2004 and drew a map of 
gated communities. There was one such at home in 
Berlin (Arkadien), but here he found more than 200, 
almost three times as many as in all of France, where 
there were 72 of them at the time according to the 
statistics.4
Although most gated communities are located in 
the south, where available farmland and the absence 
of industry have made it natural for the city to expand, 
later cartography has complicated the picture. Magda-
lena Górczyńska has shown a substantial increase in 
gated communities in Bielany in the northwest, which 
was formerly regarded as a working-class neighbor-
hood. Two thirds of the housing built in Bielany in the 
2000s has been either gated or guarded. Górczyńska 
reports that old neighborhoods in this district have 
also been fenced in.5
At present, there are probably more than four hun-
dred gated communities in Warsaw and an estimated 
75 percent of all new homes on the market in Warsaw 
are in gated communities. No other European capi-
tal has numbers this high. The tendency is the same 
in other larger Polish cities. Dominika Polanska has 
investigated the tri-city area of Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia 
and Paulina Tobiasz-Lis has studied the traditional 
working class city of Łódź. And there is a similar trend 
in other countries in the former Eastern Bloc.6
How should this   strong need to lock oneself in and 
build walls around one’s home be explained?
References to the United States are common. Most 
Polish studies cite Setha Lowe’s Behind the Gates and 
Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder’s Fortress 
America. Interestingly, the rapid development of gated 
communities in the US is also associated with the 1990s 
and 2000s. Lowe states: “The number of people esti-
mated to be living in gated communities in the United 
States increased from four million in 1995, to eight mil-
lion in 1997, and to sixteen million in 1998.” A study per-
formed in conjunction with a census in 2001 showed 
that 6 percent of the US population then lived in such 
settlements, or almost 20 million Americans. In several 
US states, current estimates are that at least 40 percent 
of new housing units are in gated communities.7
Blakely and Snyder, like Lowe, differentiate be-
tween three different types: lifestyle communities, 
prestige communities, and security zone communi-
ties. Lifestyle communities are neighborhoods that 
appeal to people who want to live near or with people 
who have a similar lifestyle and who enjoy roughly 
the same things. The first gated communities in the 
US arose in the Sunbelt and were often connected to 
resorts or golf courses. When gated communities first 
crossed the Atlantic, this is the type established in 
southern Europe. According to Blakely and Snyder, 
prestige communities are now the fastest-growing 
type in the US:
Their gates symbolize distinction and pres-
tige and create and protect a secure place on 
the social ladder. They lack the recreational 
amenities of the lifestyle communities, often 
differing little from a standard residential sub-
division except for their gates.
Security zone communities have arisen due to “fear 
of crime and outsiders”. Lowe’s study undertaken 
in the US in the mid 1990s was based on interviews 
with residents of a gated community on the outskirts 
of New York and three communities in San Antonio, 
Texas. Respondents said that fear of crime and a 
longing for safe surroundings were the primary rea-
sons they had chosen to live behind walls or fences.
peter stoyanov and   Klaus Frantz have analyzed 
a corresponding development in Bulgaria — mainly 
Sofia — and noted that gated communities, as in the 
Soviet Union, existed for a select group of the com-
munist nomenklatura. It is difficult to correlate this 
to Poland. While it is true that certain streets in cen-
tral Warsaw like Aleja Przyjacioł and Aleja Róż were 
mainly the preserve of high-ranking party officials, 
The gated community Marina Mokotów in Warsaw is built around a water reservoir.  Photo: www.apaka.com.pl
Ghetto, or fortress – protective wall, or enclosure.
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munities in Poland, and they are usually based on 
relatively limited interview material and discussions in 
the press and social media. In these studies, residents 
readily report fear of crime and the desire for personal 
safety for themselves and their children as reasons 
for choosing to settle there. Opinion polls show that 
the proportion of Poles who believe “Poland is a safe 
country to live in” declined drastically in the early 
1990s, from 75 percent to about 20 percent, and began 
to rise again in the middle of the decade. According 
to a 2008 CBOS study, a full 87 percent of Poles feel 
safe in their neighborhoods.9 Crime statistics indicate 
that Poland is a safe country compared to most other 
countries in Europe. That includes Warsaw, where 
the burglary rate per 1,000 inhabitants does not differ 
from other capital cities in Europe.10
Safety as a motive for settling in gated communities 
must be critically examined:
Although many researchers maintain on the 
basis of surveys that the main incentive which 
motivates people to reside in gated communi-
ties is the threat/insecurity factor, it seems 
that this slightly exaggerated assertion should 
be commented on and corrected taking into 
account other analytical data and tools focus-
ing, among other things, on the semantics of 
signs in space and discourse analysis.11 
 
The wall or the fence [...] is also perceived as 
a boundary, in the sense that in the minds of 
residents, it connotes new norms and consti-
tutes protection of privileges. [...] The bound-
ary often cited as a security requirement is 
actually an attempt to separate the space in 
order to gain complete control over reality, 
a flight from chaos, and a foundation upon 
which to build personal identity.12
these streets were also home to art and culture work-
ers and the intelligentsia, who could not be associat-
ed with the machinery of power. The streets were not 
closed off and there were no walls around the build-
ings. An enclosed house was indeed built on Parkowa 
Street under Gomulka, which is still the prime min-
ister’s residence. In the adjacent building at Sulkie-
wicza Street 3, apartments were reserved for govern-
ment and politburo members and security guards. 
The first party leader to use the house on Parkowa 
Street was not Gomulka, but his successor Edward 
Gierek. Gomulka preferred his house on Frascatti 
Street, a pattern that was more the rule than the 
exception for high-ranking politicians and officials 
in those years. Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław 
Kiszczak lived — and still lives — in his relatively mod-
est house in Mokotów. So did General Wojciech Jaru-
zelski, whose house is in another part of Mokotów. 
As a rule, high-ranking officials had single-family 
homes with fenced-in yards and some kind of secu-
rity monitoring, and government and party leaders 
had enclosed holiday resorts at their disposal. There 
were special — strictly delimited — neighborhoods for 
military personnel near places regarded as strategic 
objects. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see any direct 
connection between these phenomena and the gated 
communities currently being built in Poland.
Certainly, some areas of Warsaw are more attrac-
tive than others, and thus gated communities are 
more common there. But “despite the existence in 
Warsaw of areas with a relatively uniform social struc-
ture, the nature of the city is not one of social-spatial 
zones characteristic of Western European cities; the 
picture of Warsaw is instead ‘mosaic-like’.” As Anna 
Gąsior-Niemiec, Georg Glasze, and Robert Putz have 
noted, the “city as a whole is being transformed into a 
field of complex mazes in which buildings are isolated 
from their surroundings”.8
There have been few field studies of gated com-
If the strong growth of gated communities in Poland is 
closely associated with the new middle class created 
since the fall of the old regime, sociologists argue that 
the explanations of the phenomenon must be sought 
in what is constitutive of this class or social group. In 
this context, Bohdan Jałowiecki makes reference to 
globalization and the transformation of Warsaw into a 
genuine metropolis.
At the end   of the 1980s, about a third of the labor 
force in the capital was still employed in industry. To-
day, that proportion has been cut in half. In its place, 
a number of new occupations have developed in Pol-
ish society and given rise to a “metropolitan class”. 
Jałowiecki refers to Alain Bourdin’s idea that the 
metropolis is constantly in motion, it splits and it frag-
ments: while the city created “freedom”, the metropo-
lis is creating “a world of isolated individuals”.13
This new class   is well-educated and its members 
have relatively high incomes, but they generally lack 
the property that was the hallmark of the traditional 
bourgeoisie. It is more mobile and thus has looser ties 
to its home districts than the old middle class. It is con-
sumption-oriented to a great extent, and “new kinds 
of individualism, self-actualization, and creativity are 
essential characteristics of this class”.14 It has, accord-
ing to Jałowiecki, deliberately set itself apart from the 
rest of society behind walls and fences. His explana-
tion draws a parallel to postmodernist theories of the 
current phase of development of Western civilization. 
One of the prominent theorists is sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman:
Originally constructed to provide safety for all 
their inhabitants, cities are associated these 
days more often with danger than they are 
with security. [...] The war against insecurity, 
and particularly against dangers and risk to 
personal safety, is now waged inside the city, 
and inside the city battlefields are set aside 
and front lines are drawn. Heavily armed 
trenches (impassable approaches) and bun-
kers (fortified and closely guarded buildings 
or complexes) aimed at separating, keeping 
away, and barring the entry of strangers, are 
fast becoming one of the most visible aspects 
of contemporary cities.15
Bauman finds the cause in the adverse consequences 
of globalization — in what he calls “the passage from 
the solid to a liquid phase of modernity”, where “so-
cial forms [...] can no longer keep their shape for long, 
because they decompose and melt faster than the time 
it takes to cast them”, and therefore cannot “serve as 
frames of reference for human actions and long-term 
life strategies”. In this “liquid modern” era, power 
and politics have been separated and “community 
[...] sounds increasingly hollow”. This is a world that 
“promotes division, not unity, and puts a premium on 
competitive attitudes, while degrading collaboration 
and teamwork”.16
This fragmented, individualized, liquid time en-
genders, by extension, what Bauman has called liquid 
fear — fear of failure and fear that the foundations of 
life will crack. A great paradox of liquid modernity, 
Bauman writes, is that people in the west are living in 
A gated community in Bielany, in the northwest of Poland. This area was formerly regarded as a working class neighborhood.
 Photo: www.ugk.hom.pl
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the safest, most comfortable and benign world that 
any human being has ever experienced, yet feel more 
threatened, unsafe, and afraid than people have in 
most historic societies.17 Once again, he finds the cause 
in the negative consequences of globalization:
Both the village and the city are an arena for 
forces that reach far beyond their borders 
and the processes set in motion by these 
forces cannot be understood and cannot be 
controlled by the inhabitants of the village or 
the city and not even by those who initiated 
them.18
The local   “cannot be regarded only as an answer to 
global processes”, writes Jacek Gądecki. Looking at 
the process that produces, reproduces, and consumes 
the space and especially the social interpretation of 
these as global phenomena is “certainly justified, but 
also dangerous”, he argues in an indirect polemic with 
Bauman.19 Gądecki uses four components to address 
the Polish discussion of gated communities: fear and 
safety, prestige, aesthetics, and class identity.
He also finds that the safety of gated communities is 
important to their residents, although it never seems 
to be connected to any direct fear of what is going on 
in society as a whole. The matter of prestige is related 
primarily to how the communities were marketed, 
often with intimations that they are peaceful areas cre-
ated for and/or populated by people who belong to a 
certain social class.
In the first phase, the aesthetics were the domi-
nant element of the discourse: the architecture, the 
building materials, the planning of the immediate 
surroundings including the sidewalks; everything that 
definitively set the new neighborhoods apart from the 
gray and often dilapidated buildings in the “commu-
nist” neighborhoods. In the second phase, aesthetics 
first gave way to the issue of safety, but later returned 
as a dominant element. The aesthetics in a “well-
organized community are one of the most important 
factors that separate it from the surrounding urban 
chaos”.20
Gądecki contends that the aesthetics of the living 
environment are part of the identity of the new middle 
class. He uses the concept of the visualized landscape 
— which encompasses architecture, natural surround-
ings, amenities, beauty, and peacefulness. The visu-
alized landscape not only distills the “composition” 
itself, but also the individual’s subjective relationship 
to it.21
If sociologists like Jałowiecki have emphasized the 
fluid and weak ties of the metropolitan class to their 
local milieu, Gądecki gives a different and more con-
tradictory picture of the identity of the new class. Like 
other analysts, he emphasizes the mobility of this class 
as a distinctive element of the new lifestyle. Without 
an understanding of the implications of mobility, 
Gądecki argues, it is impossible to understand what 
gated communities mean to this new middle class:  
“[I]t is primarily this mobility that gives the separation 
meaning”.22
Life to a large extent is realized outside the gated 
community. The mobility covers work, leisure, the 
whole lifestyle. In that light, it is difficult to overesti-
mate the importance of a seemingly banal thing like a 
garage. Paradoxically enough, according to Gądecki, 
the other face of mobility is that people seek out their 
new identity in relation to the place in which they 
live. In this way, the visualized landscape becomes a 
spatial manifestation of social relations. One can go so 
far as to say that the visualized landscape “constitutes 
an ideology, concentrated to the degree that it can be 
seen in materialized form”.23
The visualized landscape is a product in a change-
able market, but it is a product that when consumed is 
transformed by the consumer: “Under circumstances 
in which identity is strongly associated with owner-
ship of products and consumption, the visualized 
landscape becomes a way to express personal identity; 
the kinship with a concrete visualized landscape may 
thus become one of the most important markers of 
class identity.”24 When Gądecki summarizes the sig-
nificance of gated communities to the emergence of 
Poland’s new middle class, he refers, not surprisingly, 
to Pierre Bourdieu and his concepts of milieu and 
habitus.
Jacek Gądecki has pointed out fundamental local 
factors for the transformation of housing that began 
in Poland in the second half of the 1980s and was 
given a huge push forward when free market forces 
were unleashed in the early 1990s. The significance 
of the aesthetics and the visualized landscape to this 
transformation of Polish society is not limited to the 
new neighborhoods or gated communities. It can 
be seen in the countryside and can be applied to the 
significant “landscape change” that large parts of the 
old high-rise neighborhoods have undergone: few 
high-rises in the vast Ursynów with its 130,000 inhabit-
ants now boast gray concrete slabs. The buildings have 
been insulated, plastered, and painted; the elevators 
have been replaced along with the entrance doors, 
alongside which one now finds entry phones, some-
times with video, just like in the new neighborhoods.
Jacek Gądecki argues that applying the American 
pattern to Polish reality was not easy or even possible. 
However, one fundamental question remains: Why 
are gated communities so popular in Poland? The new 
middle class could very well create their own milieu 
and their differentiating habitus without building 
walls and fences.
The results of   the first more comprehensive field 
study of gated communities were not published until 
the autumn of 2011. The study, led by Dominik Owcza-
rek, was based on a survey of 415 people, of whom 265 
live in gated communities and 150 live in open com-
munities in Warsaw. The nine gated communities as 
well as the open communities were selected to ensure 
the representation of widely varied city districts. In 
brief, the study showed that those who lived in gated 
communities were “younger on average, had lived for 
a shorter time in their neighborhoods, perceived a 
higher degree of safety, were less active in the commu-
nity, possessed less local social capital, had a stronger 
connection to their apartments but were less strongly 
connected to the city, and finally, had a more favor-
able attitude towards gated communities than the 
people who lived in open communities”.25
Average age in the respective areas did not differ by 
much. The 22—31 age cohort was exactly equally repre-
sented, at 32 percent, in both types of community. Not 
unexpectedly, the 32—41 age cohort was proportion-
ately somewhat larger and the 52—61 cohort smaller in 
the gated communities. There was no marked differ-
ence in level of education: 58.5 percent of those in the 
gated communities and 52.3 percent of those in the 
open communities had university degrees.
To be sure, people who lived in the gated com-
munities earned more than those who lived in open 
communities, but income disparities were significant 
in both cases and the proportion of low-income resi-
dents — people with wages of less than 2,000 zloty per 
month — was essentially the same (12.8 percent in the 
gated communities and 15.5 percent in open commu-
nities). The biggest difference between the two types 
of areas had to do with those at the top of the pay 
scale. In the gated communities, 18.2 percent earned 
between 7,500 and 10,000 zloty per month, while only 
10.0 percent in the open communities were in this 
income bracket. The study unfortunately does not 
report income differences between the same age co-
horts in the different types of communities. Nonethe-
less, these figures take the wind out of a commonplace 
assertion that the people who have partitioned them-
selves off from the rest of society are a uniform and 
affluent group in terms of income and education.26
The study further shows that it is difficult to make 
any claims of animosity between the groups in the two 
Fenced green space in front of a building in a gated hous-
ing estate in Bielany.
One of the gates in the housing estate in Bielany. 
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He who is placed outside the wall must accept that it has been erected. How does the person who lives inside react when it is demolished?
31
group in Polish society carries with them throughout 
their lives. In other words: Are there other and more 
fundamental structural changes? Must one actually 
look back in history to understand this Polish pattern 
and behavior?
If one were to set off on a journey through Polish 
terrain, visiting small towns and villages, it would be 
hard to avoid noticing that virtually every house and 
its plot of land are surrounded by a high fence or wall 
with a gate that can be locked. One sees this pattern 
even in villages where every villager knows everyone 
else. Remarkably, there are also many undeveloped 
plots of land that are carefully enclosed. 
Several studies confirm that Poland is a country 
whose people have little trust in the authorities. In the 
aforementioned EU study of crime which made it clear 
that Poland is a relatively safe country, Poland ended 
up at the bottom of the statistics when it came to trust 
in the work of the police.30
Other studies indicate that Poles have little trust in 
their fellow citizens. The sociologist Piotr Sztompka 
states that “in countries characterized by a high level 
of trust (Norway, Sweden, Holland, Japan, the US, 
Germany), people act according to the motto that 
‘you should trust others as long as they are not proven 
fraudsters,’ while in low-trust countries, people act ac-
cording to the motto that ‘everyone else is a potential 
thief, swindler, taker of bribes, or secret agent unless 
he or she has proven otherwise’”. These differences 
are inscribed in the “collective memory of the given 
culture”, Sztompka argues. The level of trust or 
distrust in a society is usually dependent upon how 
deeply rooted democratic values and democratic 
traditions are in each country. Sztompka talks about 
“cumulative social trust”, but also says that sudden 
types of communities. A tiny minority in both said 
that they felt rancor or resentment against residents 
of the other type of community. One third of the re-
spondents in the gated communities had a favorable 
attitude towards the open neighboring communities, 
while 64.4 claimed a “neutral” attitude. Twenty per-
cent of those who lived in the open communities had 
a positive view of the gated neighboring communities, 
while 51.3 took a neutral position. A full 30 percent of 
the respondents in the open communities had a favor-
able attitude towards the gated communities in gen-
eral. Only 20 percent believed that gated communities 
are a bad thing.27
Dominik Owczarek   concludes that “the actual 
physical separation may not be an important factor in 
people’s evaluations of their own housing”.28 This field 
investigation thus undermines the findings reached 
earlier by several Polish sociologists that there is a 
strong opposition between the residents inside and 
outside the “walls”, perhaps most clearly formulated 
by Anna Gąsior-Niemiec, Georg Glasze, and Robert 
Pütz:
[I]n the analyzed discourse the dichotomy as-
sumes the shape of aggressive, mutual exclu-
sion, verging on negation of the right of the 
other to exist.29
The Polish reality appears to be somewhat more com-
plicated, and if such a large proportion of the popula-
tion in Poland has a positive attitude towards gated 
communities, perhaps this visualized landscape is the 
hallmark of the ideology that a significantly broader 
upheavals in society can lead to further 
declines in already weak trust: “a typi-
cal example of this is the situation in the 
post-communist countries, where we 
can note several types of trauma.”31
Kazimierz sowa,   professor of soci-
ology at the Jagiellonian University in 
Krakow and head of the Department of 
Studies of the Civil Society, is attempt-
ing in a series of lectures on the public 
space and Polish civil society, entirely in 
the spirit of Sztompka, to find historical 
roots for both the lack of trust in Polish 
society and the general weakness of the 
civil society. There has never been any 
fundamental trust in public institutions 
or representatives of power in Polish 
society, Sowa argues. Nor has “civil 
society” created in Poland from time to 
time ever resembled civil societies that 
characterizes modern Europe, where 
they early on became part of a function-
ing social organism. In Poland, civil 
society “arose and was organized either 
in parallel or in opposition to the exist-
ing state”.32 Cooperation in this version 
of civil society was not based on any 
trust in public institutions or fellow citi-
zens. Trust was reserved for individuals 
who were part of the family, the circle 
of friends, or otherwise reliable people. This “dual” 
society was even a constitutive element of the social 
economy in the former regime, when people had to 
get things done through private networks.
On my way   to the airport, passing one gated com-
munity after another, the taxi driver unknowingly 
makes a connection to Kazimierz Sowa and Piotr Sz-
tompka:
“My dear man, last week I had a customer who lives 
here and complained that he has been fenced in. It 
was, he said, a company that manufactures fencing 
that had persuaded the chairman of the housing asso-
ciation to put the question on the agenda of the annual 
meeting. My customer voted against it, but a majority 
of the members at the meeting were for it. They let 
themselves be persuaded by the chairman.
“You understand what it was all about”, says the 
driver, and rubs his thumb and forefinger together: 
money, money, money.
There is no simple answer to the question of why 
gated communities are so infinitely more widespread 
in Poland than in any Western European country. 
Each of the theories recounted probably contains part 
of the answer. Nor — however difficult it might be to 
see anything positive for Polish society in this develop-
ment — is there any simple answer to the question of 
the long-term consequences for modern Poland.≈
Marina Mokotów in Warsaw was constructed between 2003 and 2006.
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The united states is a pioneer in gated communities. There are also  plenty of prison walls.
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In addition to its rich corpus of content, the Stalin Digital 
Archive uses technology to enhance the process and 
impact of scholarship. The SDA allows users to conduct 
advanced searches, save searches and documents in per-
sonalized workspaces, and create tags and annotations. 
Users can also engage in discussions and share annota-
tions and tags with one another.
T
he disaster has etched itself in our memory. 
It was monumental and it became a monu-
ment: 852 dead in a single hour — a terrible 
toll in peacetime. When the Estonia foun-
dered at about ten after two in the morning in late Sep-
tember, eighteen years ago, time stopped for a while. 
For so many, it stopped forever. A flora of stories be-
gan to take root; the stuff of legend became vast, indef-
inite. An experienced ethnologist, Wolter Ehn, died in 
the waves. He is remarkably anonymous on the web. 
I did not know him and would have liked to ask him 
so much. He had published village ordinances, legal 
statutes of sorts, from the central Swedish provinces — 
rules for how the community should be organized to 
give the individual tiller of the soil more latitude, as 
private initiative was to stimulate the growth of produc-
tion. And what then does one find? That the body of 
regulations expanded. This was not deregulation, there 
were new and more regulations, replacing older ones. 
An agrarian revolution was on its way. The transition 
from feudalism to capitalism was to be completed, a 
formidable system change in the countryside.
The Estonia sank on the verge of another system 
shift. I had sailed the Stockholm—Tallinn route just a 
few weeks before the ship went down, accompanied 
by my children. We had sat at a diner downtown, 
which still smelled of scouring powder from the era 
of real socialism, sharing a table with a young cultural 
geographer who had begun digging around in the 
estate archives. She wanted to study the land reforms 
and how the latifundia economy successively broke 
down: first the well-to-do farmer class arose when 
serfdom was eradicated; later it was the smallhold-
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ers’ turn after the First World War in an Estonia that 
was to be purged of the German landed nobility and 
become ethnically homogeneous, to a certain degree.1 
The central features had been grasped for a long time, 
of course, but how did this play out at the level of the 
village? I got a foretaste of the massive research explo-
sion that the end of the system conflict between some 
form of socialism and some form of capitalism would 
set off. Curiosity, a certain intellectual obtrusiveness. I 
got the young woman’s card, but I never got in touch. 
The disaster intervened; it built a mental wall.
The waters of the Baltic have always been busy — 
and dangerous, because this inland sea is so shallow, 
so exposed to high seas and storms. Peasant fishermen 
and other ordinary people preferred to sail through 
the archipelagos where they could seek lee and safe 
haven. As we know, peasant navigation was a huge 
historic project. It spawned the shipping partnerships 
of Åland, as well as the Ålandic sailing fleet, which be-
came a master of the oceans in the latter half of the 19th 
century and some way into the 20th, an economic en-
gine of rare power. It made the Ålanders independent 
and cocky; they still do not want to call themselves 
Finns, nor Swedish-speaking Finns, after they only 
against their will joined the Republic of Finland after a 
century or so as subjects of the Russian tsar, and even 
though Swedish is their mother tongue. That the Baltic 
Sea is difficult to navigate has not stopped the shipping 
trade between Helsinki and Stockholm from being the 
busiest in the world in terms of passenger numbers 
(apart from short daily commuting routes, such as that 
over the Bosporus). For a long time, Finnish shipyards 
lived high on compensation trade with the Soviet 
Union, a leftover of the reparations and compulsory 
supply after the Second World War.
Later during the Cold War, the Baltic was split in 
two: the graveyard of sailors and soldiers and civilians, 
refugees, and garden-variety criminals became a po-
litical grave. The spy planes flew high above the water; 
beyond the east coast, armed desperados fought in 
the woods for a decade or so in what was regarded by 
the new rulers as pure terrorism, triggered by the se-
cret services in the not-so-neutral neighboring states.2 
In the final phase of this epoch of rival superpowers, 
the Estonia came to be regarded as a lifeline by many 
Estonians on both sides of the invisible border. Border 
between what? Between good and evil? Between the 
law, meek and mild, and unreasonable privation? 
How many such borders must we not cross before the 
sailing is over! Good and evil are found in the fabric of 
everyone’s existence, in all varieties of life. Now that 
we have once again embarked upon a journey in the 
Gulf of Finland, for a pure and noble purpose, a small 
band of artists, writers, journalists, poets, and actors, 
the memory of the disaster is burned into every retina. 
We know where we were when we heard about it (the 
kids were just about to be driven to school), just as we 
Swedes know what we were doing when Prime Minis-
ter Olof Palme was murdered, a little more than eight 
years earlier. Now the wall has cracked, networks have 
been established, and plain words have begun to be 
spoken.
The shipwreck was not adequately investigated. Ac-
cident investigation boards lost papers and prohibited 
diving expeditions. In some picture series saved for 
posterity, one sees holes in a damaged hull, as if it had 
blown open by a detonation. It has never been pos-
sible to dismiss the attack theory (since it has not been 
disproven).3 And so it has been loaded with material 
content: gun-running, secret agents, corruption in the 
ports. Salvage was the initial official policy, promises 
were made. In Sweden — the Estonia, once a Finnish 
ship, was jointly owned by the Estonian state and a pri-
vately owned Swedish shipping company, and Swedes 
were an overwhelming majority among the dead — the 
coalition government of Carl Bildt was on its last legs. 
And then the tide turned. The policy reversal had ele-
ments of Staatsräson and public lies. If attackers were 
Part of the city wall 
of Old Tallinn.
Neutrality (for some) was a choice, not a reality. The border was the reality, not a choice (for anyone).
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involved, it would deeply overshadow that Norwegian 
mass murderer, who also preferred to operate near 
open water. But can one make such comparisons? En-
gage in victim counting. Hitler versus Stalin. Numbers 
speak their own language. Is it our language? Do we 
have any special reason, all our own, to defend our-
selves? Fact against fact, myths against counter-myths. 
If the West had dropped an atom bomb on China in 
the Fifties, a few hundred million Chinese would have 
perished — and there were plans to make that hap-
pen.4
It is a beautiful, cloudy autumn evening. The risk 
of rough seas is very real. A number of decided opin-
ions accompany us on the journey. It will take us a full 
working week, they will gather around the dinner ta-
ble. I decide early on to keep a sort of ship’s log. There 
is no one to report to. The map is familiar to us who 
live in northern Europe: skerries and sunken rocks are 
the constant unknowns.
T
he dark is never as dark as on the water, 
noise never as noisy as on the lower deck, 
the prostitutes never as obvious as in a 
shipboard bar. They cannot be kicked out, 
where would they go? The bar is the only place I can 
smoke a Montecristo. The mild fall night shows off its 
best features once we have left Kapellskär, one of the 
ports of departure to Mariehamn on Åland and then 
Nådendal, north of Turku. During the interwar years, 
Greater Finland politicians had intended to build a 
major international port in that city. The plans came 
to naught and the sea approach has been essentially 
protected from industrial land and wasteland. It is 
surrounded by a deep, verdant inner archipelago that 
we now turn our backs on, since we are heading for 
Tallinn. The autumn warmth is particularly sweet be-
cause the mosquitoes — the particular seasonal plague 
of northern peoples — have not bothered to come 
along. The menu is not reliable, it turns out, and even 
in Old Town Tallinn near the parliament building and 
the main Orthodox cathedral we will find restaurants 
that cannot serve any meat, fish, or vegetables listed 
on the menu and so, as an ethnographic observer, one 
can seriously question the sanctioned truth that the 
shortage economy was a logical consequence of the 
planned economy and general dictatorial commando 
politics.
Lack of organizational talent is found in many 
systems. The crux is the human weakness for doing 
one’s share with the least possible effort. Max Weber, 
standard-bearer of rational bureaucracy, exerted him-
self to the edge of exhaustion, became mute, unpro-
ductive, impotent — but as the first Russian revolution 
approached in 1905, he began studying like a madman 
again, learned Russian at an advanced age, as Marx 
did, became furiously active, and acquired a wealthy 
mistress (however that might have happened), and, 
after the First World War, was making plans for a 
political career but was struck down by a common 
illness.5 Weber would have become apoplectic if he 
had seen the real, existing market economy in all its 
anarchistic irrationality, the “freedom revolution” 
of the Eastern European ilk. And one has to wonder 
how he would have applied his theory of charismatic 
leadership to the no-longer-new yet still young states 
in the former Soviet empire. The multiparty regime 
under the Weimar Republic would certainly not have 
been to the liberal Weber’s taste. What would he have 
recommended? How would he have felt about Hitler? 
His documented contempt for Poles, at any rate, did 
not bode well.
Now we make our way through Old Town Tallinn, 
still unspoiled, like so many other town centers in old 
Eastern Europe. It lies on a hill, Cathedral Hill, as in 
so many other old Hanseatic League cities like Tartu 
and Vyborg, for instance. The ring wall is relatively 
intact, unlike the one in Visby on Gotland and, also 
unlike the one in Visby, its primary defense faces the 
sea, from which invasions could be expected. In Visby 
the defense faces inland and the peasant population 
the Hanseatic merchants did their best to exploit, the 
peasants who saw their greatest enemy in this foreign 
merchant capital and not the Danish or the Swed-
ish crown. A globalization before globalization: the 
merchants’ chief competitors were knightly orders of 
various denominations. Centralized nation-states put 
a stop to this widespread smash-and-grab for a time. 
It was, if you like, a peace project aimed at the robber 
baron system, the northern European version of the 
Camorra.
The noble houses here are of modest size, in har-
mony with the surrounding buildings, mainly the 
homes of the middle-class. A few stand out, like Sten-
bock House. Like so much else, it was nationalized 
after 1919, and after 1991, relatives of the last German-
Baltic family to own it tried to get restitution. On quite 
a few plaques one sees other “Swedish” noble names, 
including that of Wrangel, which became infamous 
in Central Europe after Marshal Carl Gustaf Wrangel 
stormed and devastated Prague in the final phases of 
the Thirty Years’ War. If he had lived today and stood 
on the wrong side of the showdown between good and 
evil, between Washington and its enemies, he would 
have stood trial in The Hague. But at that time Stock-
holm was trying to be a Washington, albeit in minia-
ture. And so he is honored to this day. An Obama type, 
unimaginably ruthless.
K
arl Martin Sinijärv sports an 
amazing goatee. He is a well-
known TV personality and 
chairman of the Estonian 
Writers’ Union. He welcomes us to the 
union building, a black box from 1962. 
Jaan Kross lived here for many years, 
as did Jaan Kaplinski before he moved 
to Tartu. Now all the writers have been 
evicted from their homes, the apart-
ments privatized, the union has lost 
its state grant and collects rent from a 
restaurant owner and an antiquarian 
book dealer to survive. Sinijärv hems 
and haws when asked about the current 
language law, which strips countless 
Russian-speakers of rights accorded 
to citizens of the Republic. Personally, 
Sinijärv is considering putting his son in 
a Russian school where, however, most 
subjects can also be studied in Estonian, 
the official language. People who are 
fluent in both Estonian and Russian are 
in a much better position in the labor 
market, Sinijärv assures us, so there is 
little to indicate discrimination against 
Russian-speakers. This does not prevent a fundamen-
tal incongruence in relations between the population 
groups: Russian-speakers who do not have a long fam-
ily history in the country must take a language test to 
be granted citizenship, while Estonian-speakers can 
be illiterate.
Small languages are always threatened and Russia 
has a massive territory — which is one way of looking 
at it. But the relative loss of a language can also have 
an impact. German was the lingua franca in the Baltic 
region for a very long time: Catherine the Great was 
a German princess and the coats of arms of imperial 
generals and diplomats were often German. After the 
First World War, not only Germans but also the Ger-
man language began to be pushed back in the Baltic 
States and the language is no longer accepted cur-
rency in the crowded streets of the capital cities, nor 
to any appreciable extent in the academic seminar 
rooms. Purity was an ideal not only among the master 
races, but also among the subdued, the unheard.
Some districts held out longer and in return the 
memories of centuries-old settlements were all the 
more effectively obliterated, as Max Egremont has 
most recently reminded us through his elegiac tour of 
the historical province of East Prussia.6
T
here is an unobstructed view over the Uni-
versity Quay from the Bronze Horseman 
in St. Petersburg. So admirable to separate 
wisdom from frivolity, one might think. 
Through the leaves, I glimpse a wedding party, a 
monkey dressed in a camouflage uniform, a drunk 
humming to himself, although the red-nosed and 
shabby are otherwise not a prominent feature of the 
street scene. St. Isaac’s Cathedral is closed on Wednes-
days, except for the galleries. It is all very capitalist 
with money saved by cutting back personnel and the 
maintenance budget; the faithful must pray some-
where else in the middle of the week. Rush-hour traffic 
From the 
Russian 
Museum, 
St. Petersburg.
Small languages may survive, though not all of them. Large languages can be threatened; some disappear where they were once rooted.
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outside is surprisingly thin. You cannot call this city 
cramped and crowded.
Having formerly enjoyed its own building on the 
fashionable Nevsky Prospekt — which burned down a 
few years ago, fittingly enough, such official behavior 
seems to be system-neutral — the Writers’ Union is 
now relegated to a backyard on the outskirts of down-
town, next door to a factory that once upon a time 
designed nuclear submarines. Back then there was a 
luxurious restaurant at street level; these days, boiled 
sausage, cheese, and Russian cognac are offered in 
an office setting. I am sure as many speeches are held 
as they were back in the day, but no one smokes any-
more. The writers hand over their works, issued in 
poor, unlovely bindings. A book about diabetes has 
been published in 42 editions, sold a half million cop-
ies, but the author preferred to publish not under his 
Jewish surname, he chose a Russian-sounding pseud-
onym instead. A poet recites. The female interpreter 
speaks flawless Oxford English. She has written a fami-
ly saga about an unlikely princely house. The whispers 
are that she is related to the Romanovs.7 True or not, 
she wears a signet ring, at any rate. L’ancien régime 
sticks up its head in a sometimes hilarious, sometimes 
harrowing way. The Russian Museum is once again 
named after Grand Duke Mikhail, a brother of Alex-
ander I, and in the stairwell, Lenin has been replaced 
by Alexander III, a switch of doubtful quality. A glass 
of chardonnay of the worst kind costs 30 euros in the 
lobby bar of the Grand Hotel Europe, a sum that will 
make even the most hardened tourist’s jaw drop. He 
can no longer entertain the belief that the New Russia 
is a consumer’s paradise, after having been a purga-
tory of shortage.
We cruise the waters plied by Vikings and crusad-
ers. My reporter’s notepad is an Apple, my drawing 
pencil my companion. Dauntless, the museum guide 
Dr. Olesya Turkina jumps from icon writers to su-
premacists, from Andrei Rublev’s magnificent men of 
God to Kazimir Malevich’s mathematical visions. Vas-
ily Surikov’s vision of how Ermac and his men slaugh-
tered Siberian tribes shows the brisk awakening of an 
empire, Ilya Repin’s oil Ceremonial Meeting of the State 
Council (1903), the entire ruling class assembled in one 
place and intended to adorn the Mariinsky Palace,8 is 
a sunset picture. The gallery of social realism has been 
purged of all hagiography — full of emptiness, sur-
rounded by icy rage.
F
inland is the land of the muikku. The muikko, 
the vendace — the little freshwater fish that 
is part of kalakukko, a traditional dish of fish 
baked inside a loaf of bread, far from univer-
sally beloved among Finns. This begs the question of 
national characters, of the soul of a people, of collec-
tive identities. The question that Herder wrestled with 
and which was taken over by Hamann. Isaiah Berlin, 
who wrote his last book about Hamann and was born 
in Riga, stripped them of their national disguises.9 Not 
men of the Enlightenment, perhaps, but inquiring 
minds, later distorted by Romanticism. Not a rectifier 
among them. No people, no artifact was ranked higher 
than others. This is still a legacy to discover for those 
who want to build new communities.
Obviously, a Russian on a crossing like this one 
ends up the underdog. Boards the boat last and is the 
last to get off. Citizens of other nations more easily 
navigate the Gulf of Finland. And why is that? Is he less 
well-behaved? Does he still reek of garlic? Is he, after 
all, just a rustic black-bread eater beneath a glittering, 
impenetrable façade? In The Adolescent, Dostoyevsky 
opined that the Russian was condemned to crawl in 
the gutter, absent the restraining hand of the state. 
No reasonable individual believes this notion to be 
anything other than a compensatory metaphor for the 
writer’s own rootlessness and alienation. The Finns 
have long since shelved their Russian aversion. In 
Helsinki and other cities, Russian is becoming a third 
native language alongside Finnish and Swedish, the 
official ones. The point is continuities. Once upon a 
time, a Swedish city lay on the fens of St. Petersburg. 
In Turku in the late summer of 2012, a monument 
was raised to the two Nordic princes, Alexander I 
and Karl Johan, Napoleon’s field marshal and newly 
elected heir to the Swedish throne, who met in the 
city two hundred years ago and agreed that the Baltic 
Sea would be a sea of peace.10 Things did not work out 
entirely as planned. The Crimean War intervened, the 
British Navy trespassed upon these waters and there 
are signs to indicate that it has been there much later.11
The balance of terror made us forget much of the 
pain. Now that it is gone — the balance, that is, not the 
terror, not the state terror — the pain nevertheless lin-
gers. Like the aches and pains of old age, perhaps. ≈
Anders Björnsson is editor of Baltic Worlds.
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a hundred  
years later 
a young geographer by the name of sten de 
geer mapped the cities around the baltic sea in 
an article published in 1912. as an attempt to cap-
ture the urban structure of baltic region cities, 
his paper is unique. in this article, we comment 
on his meticulous descriptions of these cities, 
with a century-long perspective.
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n recent years, Sweden has once again begun to cast its 
glance towards the countries east and south of the Baltic 
Sea, if only in the interests of trade and traffic. The cities 
surrounding the Baltic are again becoming neighbors to 
Stockholm, increasingly able to command our attention.
This up-to-the-minute summary was written in 1912 by a 
26-year-old newly minted doctor of geography, Sten De Geer. 
De Geer grew up in a Swedish noble family with roots in the 
Walloon duchy of Brabant. The De Geers had been heavily 
involved in the mining industry since the 1600s. His father, 
Gerard De Geer (1848—1943), was one of the most celebrated 
geologists of his day and undertook, together with his wife 
Ebba Huldt De Geer, epoch-making studies of the ice reces-
sion. It is perhaps no coincidence that the geologist’s son was 
named Sten (“stone”), and that his first works and doctoral 
dissertation dealt with physical geography.
The introduction to De Geer’s article “Storstäderna vid 
Östersjön” [Cities on the shores of the Baltic Sea] addresses 
general perspectives in urban geography:
Anthropogeography is the modern name for the 
branch of geography that studies how man has 
adapted to conditions on the surface of the Earth. 
This study leads to applied geography, which is of 
the greatest common interest to all mankind, as it 
must often pass the final judgment in matters con-
cerning traffic, trade, and policy — provided, that 
is, that it works with scientific clarity and methodi-
cally.
He then discusses the problem of describing a city, especially 
its functional boundaries with the countryside. Using ex-
amples from the United States, he shows how the political/
administrative division can provide an utterly misleading 
picture of what is urban and what is rural. In Sweden, urban-
ization had led to often uncontrolled suburban sprawl outside 
the formal city limits. Based on an explanatory map of Stock-
holm from 1910, he shows how uneven the distribution of the 
city’s population was and how it began to concentrate outside 
the city limits. The new and extremely densely populated 
workers’ streets and industrial city districts can also be seen 
on the map as a crowded “fly swarm”.
 
We must recall   the state of society and technology in the 
early 1900s: powered by steam and electricity, heavy industry 
had been able to move in towards the large cities. Tramlines 
and local railways were essential to the relation between 
home and workplace:
Cities whose populations have exceeded one hun-
dred thousand are usually regarded as large cities. 
The figure is often characteristic: the rapid popula-
tion rise has begun. The area built upon has become 
so widespread that local transport has acquired a 
greater significance. The tramlines converge with 
increasing clarity on a city center. 
     In connection herewith, the distribution of work 
among city districts has become increasingly de-
fined. Commerce is concentrated in a small, central 
district, where the population is declining. 
     A ring of the most densely populated city districts 
arranges itself around the city center. Outside it, the 
newer districts follow with wide streets, and fur-
thest out the sprawling suburbs, which take on the 
character of the residential enclaves of the rich only 
in one particular quarter.
This is an early description of what later came to be called the 
spatial differentiation of the city. A description follows of the 
spatial growth of the large city:
The zonal growth of the large city is an interest-
ing and impressive geographical phenomenon. It 
shows a tendency to obey its own laws, despite all 
obstacles. 
     The city always strains towards circularity. The 
development of a radiating network of tramlines 
and local express railway lines results in the star 
shape, with finger-like suburbs extending along the 
transport routes. Secondary growth centers often 
arise near the local railway stations. Suburbs will 
then appear in clusters, or at least in rows. 
[. . .] 
The normal growth of the large city is thus concen-
tric; compact nearest the periphery of the inner 
city, more sparsely populated and linear or dot-like 
outside this. The regularity of growth, the very 
shape of the city, may to a certain degree and at a 
given point in time be determined by disrupting fac-
tors. These are either natural barriers, such as steep 
plateaus, rivers, marshy ground, and ocean bays, or 
else the doings of city councils, civilian or military 
authorities, or large companies. 
     Ultimately, however, the expansive force of the 
city is victorious and new city districts break out 
in formerly neglected areas, filling out the circular 
shape of the zones.
In language whose old-fashioned flavor may not be as evident 
in translation, De Geer puts into words some of the most 
important factors in urban growth: how physical, transport 
technical, economic, and political possibilities and con-
straints steer development towards a spatial structure.
De Geer notes in particular that “the innermost and small-
est zone is the nucleus of the large city, from which it has 
grown out, and its heart, where the main daily traffic flows in 
and out. In terms of interest and importance, no other city 
district is comparable to the commercial center”.
How should the extent and change of the central business 
district be measured? De Geer examines various measure-
ments. In 1890, at least 80 percent of all space in Stockholm 
was used as housing, but the proportion was 67 percent in the 
“City Between the Bridges” (Gamla Stan/Old Town), which 
was the central business district of the day, while the propor-
tion of housing in the Klara district, the nascent central busi-
ness district, had declined to 77 percent. Gas consumption 
was another measure, where the outcome per inhabitant 
was even more striking: consumption was high in areas with 
many retail stores and offices and few residents, and the new 
central business district near Central Station had taken the 
lead by 1907. Land prices also provide input, but statistics are 
more difficult to obtain for Baltic region cities.
[L]and in the urban centers is extraordinarily pre-
cious. It is therefore desirable to save space and 
make the streets as narrow as possible. Likewise, it 
is necessary for banks, offices, and many other com-
mercial enterprises to be concentrated so tightly 
that one can traverse the commercial center in a few 
minutes during the brief working day.
This concentration can be achieved in various ways, depend-
ing upon historical and physical conditions. Older European 
cities, in particular those in the Baltic network of the Hansa 
League, often have an Altstadt (Old Town) surrounded by 
a city wall, which exacerbates the need for density. If this 
area is central, the transformation leads to new construc-
tion and densification within the existing street network. 
The American solution, unconstrained by an old street and 
property network, is to build skyscrapers: “While Europeans 
have mainly sought to extract the most possible out of both 
horizontal dimensions in the city center, Americans have to a 
greater extent resorted to the third, the vertical dimension.”
After this discussion, De Geer moves on to discuss how the 
spatial differentiation of the city should be described in map 
form. The most important aspects are the boundary between 
the commercial center and the rest of the city, and the city’s 
functional boundary with the countryside, regardless of the 
political division. De Geer encounters certain problems in 
data collection: “Even in our time, there are cities whose 
governments are so little interested in the city’s development 
tendencies that it is actually difficult to obtain maps showing 
administrative boundaries with corresponding population 
figures, which are needed to produce a statistical representa-
tion of the outer limits of the city.” Making use of available 
maps, statistics, and personal observation, De Geer was still 
able to draw the maps that illustrate his texts about the spatial 
structure of the larger Baltic region cities.
 
the maps are clear   and simple. Central business districts 
are delineated in bright red. The stock exchange and main 
post office, two key elements in early twentieth-century cit-
ies, are marked. Boundaries have been drawn for the city 
area outside the center based on various urban activities like 
factories, rail freight yards, and ports. Railway lines and tram 
lines, like port approaches, are clearly marked, although it 
was difficult to discern the importance of the individual lines. 
At this time, the tram lines were probably experiencing the 
peak of their importance before the more versatile buses be-
gan to fill in the gaps.
And so De Geer transitions from the realm of the theoreti-
cal to the examination of the urban Baltic region map. Cities 
with populations of at least 100,000 are very different in 
“location, size, building style, social status, language, and 
religion of the population, and in respect of the cities’ com-
mercial, industrial, and administrative tasks and overall 
character”. At that time, no cities north of the Stockholm-
Helsinki line had attained the lower limit for designation as 
a large city. Those two cities, however, were surrounded by 
old trading cities within a distance of 200—300 km: Gävle and 
Norrköping for Stockholm, and Turku and Vyborg (Finnish: 
Viipuri) for Helsinki. De Geer discusses the cities’ locations 
in relation to the hinterland. St. Petersburg, with its sparsely 
populated hinterland and “this population’s low position”, 
would probably only be able to count about 300,000 inhabit-
ants, but as the gigantic capital of the Russian realm, it rapidly 
approaches a population of two million, plus the military 
suburb of Kronstadt with its more than 60,000 inhabitants. 
Reval’s hinterland is intersected by Riga and St. Petersburg, 
but may function as an outport for the capital. Riga, on the 
other hand, with its large and populous hinterland in the Rus-
sian realm, is seen as enjoying the best location of all cities on 
the Baltic.
The cities of Memel, Königsberg, and Danzig on the bor-
ders of the German realm lie in the southeastern gulf of the 
Baltic, cut off from the Russian-controlled Polish inland. The 
coastal cities near the southern estuaries of the Baltic enjoy a 
better position with proximity to Berlin and busy ferry traffic 
towards Scandinavia. Stettin benefits from an inland location 
that makes the city a railway hub in all directions. Lübeck is 
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mentioned as the “historic point of attachment of the Baltic 
region countries in Europe”, while Kiel benefits from the 
canal to the North Sea and the presence of the German Navy 
stationed at the Kiel fjord. Copenhagen is in a better position 
than Malmö in relation to population and transit traffic, as 
well as in its role as a capital city.
Despite all the dissimilarities in economic and political 
status, all of the larger Baltic region cities demonstrate similar 
demographic trends. Around 1850, a state of near stagnation 
transitioned into growth, which after 1870 reaches an “almost 
explosive rate of expansion”, and De Geer predicts that the 
upturn will continue “over the next few decades”, unaware of 
the upheavals that would soon change and damage the geo-
political and economic situations of the Baltic Sea countries.
De Geer then provides a description of each of the cities, 
moving clockwise around the Baltic Sea, starting in Stock-
holm.
For stockholm,   he begins with a few defining topographi-
cal elements, an east-west fault scarp and a north-south 
boulder ridge, which at the time still had a strong impact on 
the expansion and spatial variation of the city. Three hoists 
at the fault scarp are even noted on the map. Building good 
approach roads was a necessity, given that street grades 
higher than 6 percent were insurmountable for horse-drawn 
carriages and trams (Lundén 1999:38). The topography of the 
southern city districts also explains why “since days of old, 
Stockholm has [...] had an easier time expanding northwards. 
The focal point of the city is constantly moving in a north-
westerly direction”. The northeastern inner city districts 
“are mainly wealthy residential areas”, bordered by large 
military grounds and parks. North of these, there is an afflu-
ent residential zone, connected to the inner city by an electric 
express rail line. In the northwest, the city is growing with 
compact residential blocks, very densely populated. De Geer 
mentions the “Siberia” district, given its sobriquet as a refer-
ence to the miserable housing conditions in Eastern Russia.
“Despite its regular, concentric growth, Stockholm is still 
split between two lakes, Mälaren and Saltsjön, in two sepa-
rate halves. The large and salubrious city center in a setting 
of great natural beauty, however, makes the city an organic 
whole. One can within this significant central part discern a 
remarkable division of labor”, with separate centers for bank-
ing, newspaper publishing, rail and mail services, shipping, 
and public administration.
A great deal of attention is devoted to rail, tram, and ship-
ping facilities, along with their impact on the structure of the 
rest of the city. “Characteristic of Stockholm is the previously 
noted circumstance that completely undeveloped and even 
uncultivated land takes over immediately outside the unusu-
ally compact built-up zone of the most densely populated city 
districts.” The developed agglomeration has an estimated 
median population density of 21,100 inhabitants per square 
kilometer.
Upon leaving Stockholm, De Geer begins his review of the 
other Baltic region cities. The descriptions are uneven, partly 
due to poor statistics and varying availability of maps, but he 
analyzes all cities with total populations around 100,000 or 
higher, including Libau (Liepaja), Lübeck, and Kiel, which are 
not discussed in this article. For the other cities, I have asked 
urban geographers and sociologists with local expertise to 
comment on De Geer’s writings and share their views on the 
most important developments during the intervening 100 
years.
Helsinki resembles Stockholm in its situation on an Archae-
an flatland, but it lies on a peninsula near the coastline. The 
formal and functional center of the city is on and adjacent to 
Senate Square. De Geer sees the city’s location on a peninsula 
as unfortunate in view of rail connections. The city is grow-
ing very rapidly, concentrically, and the former equilibrium 
between Swedish-speakers and Finnish-speakers is chang-
ing to the advantage of the latter. Remarkably, De Geer does 
not mention the drastic change that occurred in the late 19th 
century from idealistic planning to market-adjusted growth, 
a subject explored in a thesis by Sven-Erik Åström about the 
Helsinki of the tsarist epoch.
helsinki: Mari 
VaattoVaara 
About the maps — it is interesting to see not only how the city 
has grown to become a pocket-sized metropolis, but also the 
focal point — the CBD of Helsinki — has moved. Within the 
very limited possibilities on the peninsula, the former govern-
mental center has gained a business and shopping center that 
has moved towards the central or even western part of the 
city center. The administrative center has not changed; the 
buildings are the same, as are the institutions (government, 
church, and university). But urban planning has fostered ad-
ditional centers to the city.
Finland remained a poor country dominated by agriculture 
and forestry up until the 1950s, as structural change had been 
hampered, especially by the wars. An economic upswing 
related to rapid urbanization can be seen from the 1950s 
onwards. At first, public industrial investments were promi-
nent, but the 1960s saw spectacular structural change in the 
form of urbanization and suburbanization. Not only Helsinki, 
but also its urban region, experienced a substantial influx of 
migrants from the countryside as the fastest urban growth 
ever was predominantly channeled into suburbs in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Over two decades, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the 
share of the regional population found in the neighboring 
cities of Espoo and Vantaa grew from 8 to 20 percent, from 
around 40,000 inhabitants to over 170,000. Today, the fastest-
growing areas in the region are located in the surrounding 
municipalities. After the realization of the extensive suburban 
developments in the 1970s, a new wave of suburbanization 
came about. Many of the surrounding municipalities have 
had spectacular growth rates and their aggregate population 
is now more than 300,000. If they were amalgamated, they 
would be Finland’s second-largest municipality. In the mean-
time, Helsinki proper’s share of the regional population has 
fallen from 73 to 43 per cent. Our city region is growing into 
a metropolis. Several studies have shown how — in this pro-
cess — important changes take place in the structural devel-
opment of city regions. From the point of view of structural 
development, one of the crucial development features then is 
a shift from a monocentric metropolis towards a network of 
city centers. As a part of the relatively late but rapid — by in-
ternational comparison — urbanization process, the Helsinki 
region has become a city region or metropolitan area that by 
virtue of its growth has begun to be differentiated in terms of 
social and spatial structure.
st. Petersburg:  
Zhanna kraVchenko
De Geer focused primarily on population density. His main 
conclusion about Saint Petersburg was that “the need for con-
centration of modern city life” had not arrived by that point. 
Otherwise, he discusses the geographical features — which 
remain essentially the same. But his argument about concen-
tration no longer applies. The Soviet government considered 
high population density to be a serious problem and all city 
planning after World War II was aimed at limiting the inflow 
of workers and localizing industry and housing outside the 
city limits.
st. Petersburg:  
thoMas borén
In broad strokes, one could say that over the last 100 years, 
St. Petersburg has gone from being the center and capital of 
an empire and arena for one of the watershed events of the 
20th century — the October Revolution of 1917 — to being 
an important but peripheral city in a country that has lost at 
least some of its global claims to power. The city lost its func-
tion as capital to Moscow in 1918. During the Soviet era, St. Pe-
tersburg’s political influence was far below its ranking in the 
Russian city hierarchy, despite major industrial production, 
numerous seats of higher learning, a high level of education 
among the populace, and several large and important cultur-
al institutions. Nevertheless, the city is still by far the largest 
around the Baltic, with an official total population of just un-
der four million. When it comes to these population statistics, 
however, “official” is the operative word: it is likely that many 
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tallinn: 
Michael 
gentile
Sten De Geer por-
trayed Reval as a 
relatively small and 
technically backward 
city that had been relegated to an in-
creasingly peripheral role, overshadowed 
by the rapid growth, favorable location, and 
higher connectivity of Saint Petersburg and Riga. The city 
was small in terms of population (albeit large in area) and 
its buildings lacked the characteristic hallmarks of the other 
Baltic region cities. After a hundred years of experience as 
a capital city, a half-century under Soviet rule, and twenty 
years of post-communist revival, the city has undergone mas-
sive expansion, even though its relative importance has not 
appreciably changed.
During the interwar years, Tallinn expanded in all direc-
tions in relation to De Geer’s Reval; nevertheless, the spread 
was characterized mainly by small-scale development with 
large elements of wooden buildings. Of particular note is the 
rise of the garden suburb of Nõmme southwest of the city, 
which was built according to the accepted precepts of the 
time, in keeping with trends around and beyond the Baltic 
Sea region, especially in Stockholm but also Riga, Danzig, 
and Stettin. Nõmme is still a prestigious neighborhood in the 
Tallinn housing market, despite its long period of decline 
during the Soviet era, when the city underwent major expan-
sion driven by a wave of industrialization. The population 
increased markedly, pulled by the locomotive of immigration 
from elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The ethnic dimension of 
population growth entailed a dramatic change in the makeup 
of the city; by the end of the Soviet era, the population was 
composed of roughly equal numbers of Russian-speakers and 
Estonians.
The population explosion of the postwar era created a cry-
ing need for housing space, something which was not priori-
tized by the Soviet powers, who saw housing as a consumer 
good unable to contribute to the nation’s (future) prosperity. 
Consequently, Tallinn became an increasingly overcrowded 
city, even as the overcrowding was exacerbated by the munic-
ipalization of the housing stock. As a result, several families 
sharing one apartment was the norm. The situation gradually 
improved in connection with the “Khrushchevian Revolu-
tion” (“Khrushchevian” is used to designate a certain type of 
apartment building characterized by low construction quality 
combined with modern conveniences like private kitchens 
and bathrooms). A striking transition in thinking about the 
role of housing in the national economy began in the late 
1950s, triggered by the insight that worker productivity was 
not promoted by the prevailing — and extreme — over-
crowding. The Khrushchevian Revolution was made perma-
nent and its building paradigm was replicated for the rest of 
the Soviet era, with gradually improved housing plans. At the 
same time, the city was expanding rapidly in various direc-
tions. The first branch spread towards the southwest with the 
construction of the Mustamäe district, which was followed by 
the Väike-Õismäe district to the west. With its conspicuously 
circular form, this district came to be distinguished inter-
nationally (within the socialist bloc). Last but not least, the 
Lasnamäe district was built to the east. It was never finished 
and thus suffered from inadequate infrastructure far into the 
post-Soviet era; over time, it became home to about one third 
of the population of Tallinn, the majority of them Russian-
more people live in the city, considered as an administrative 
unit or as an urbanized country's main population center. 
Apart from this, St. Petersburg is one of the largest cities in 
Europe.
World War II, yet another of the earth-shattering events 
of the 20th century, had a wide-ranging impact on the city. 
In terms of urban geography, large areas of low wooden 
buildings were destroyed, but so were the palaces of the old 
nobility when the front line was dragged over them — first 
when the Germans attacked and again when they were 
pushed back. Today, there are only small areas of wooden 
buildings left in St. Petersburg, partly due to the devastation 
of war, partly due to Soviet urban planning policy, especially 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which strongly discouraged 
housing in private, single-family dwellings. During the post-
war era, the priorities of the planned economy were, more 
than before, aimed at resolving the housing shortage and 
providing for other basic living conditions. Large housing 
developments of high-rise apartment buildings now define 
the peripheral areas of the city. Since the buildings are char-
acteristic of the time they were built, it is easy to distinguish 
areas developed in the 1950s from those built in the 1960s 
and 1970s. The same applies to housing developments built 
during the Stalin epoch before and after World War II. Also, 
developments of the 1990s and especially the 2000s are 
characterized by high-rises built very closely together in 
both old and new housing areas. Private homes and palatial 
residences for the affluent have been built on the outskirts of 
St. Petersburg since 1991.
 
the subway whose   construction began under Stalin is 
one of the city’s most important modes of transport. It goes 
under the Neva, which means that it lies deep underground. 
Commuter trains are routed to various main stations around 
the city, and there is still no central station. There are tram 
lines, but they have declined in relative importance and 
must jostle with buses, trolley buses, and a minibus system 
on the streets of the city, where the use of private cars has in-
creased markedly in the last twenty years. In short, the con-
gestion on the streets means the subway is often the fastest 
way to get around town. The bridges over the Neva and its 
various tributaries in particular are bottlenecks for car traf-
fic and, although more bridges have been built since 1912, 
they still lack the necessary capacity. In addition, traffic is 
stopped for a few hours every night to let through the ships 
moving up or down river and further inland or out into the 
Gulf of Finland. The open bridges during the white nights 
of summer are today something of a symbol of the city. 
Construction of a motorway bypass has begun outside the 
city center, which may also connect the southwestern and 
northwestern areas of the city across the Kronstadt district 
on the island of Kotlin and the embankments built in the in-
nermost part of the Gulf of Finland to prevent flooding in the 
city. Just south of the city lies Pulkova and the international 
airport, which must be regarded as small in relation to the 
size of the city, although the airport has been modernized in 
recent years.
St. Petersburg is still an important port, but it does not 
have sufficient capacity for current flows of goods. A new 
port, primarily for passenger traffic, was recently completed 
on Vasily Island, nearest the sea. This must be considered 
an investment in international tourism. The city center is on 
the UNESCO World Heritage list and many of the buildings 
mentioned in De Geer’s article still stand, some with the 
same names, such as St. Isaac’s Cathedral, while the names 
of others have been changed.
speakers. This was (and still is) the case because 
access to modern housing often depended upon 
employers. The industrial companies that participated 
in the building of Lasnamäe — and many other city dis-
tricts — imported much of their workforce from Rus-
sia. Mustamäe and Väike-Õismäe, on the other hand, 
have more ethnically diverse populations.
Vanalinn (Old Town Tallinn) lost its commercial 
functions during the Soviet era and was gradually 
transformed into a capitalist relic whose main function 
was housing. The area was not targeted for any apprecia-
ble renovation until it was confirmed that Tallinn would host 
the maritime events of the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980. 
An attempt at comprehensive renovation was begun, but for 
the most part efforts were concentrated on the most visible 
milieus in the city. At the same time, isolated flagship projects 
were built that would put Tallinn on the global architecture 
map. The most prominent of these was the city hall (Linna-
hall), an all-purpose groundscraper of unbelievable propor-
tions that connected, or rather disconnected, Vanalinn from 
the sea. With just a little imagination, the outlines of Linnahall 
might be likened to a Mesopotamian ziggurat.
The city’s commercial functions were thinned out; con-
sequently, there was for all intents and purposes no central 
business district during the Soviet epoch. If one were nev-
ertheless to try to identify a commercial center from that 
time, it would doubtless be the single large department store 
Kaubamaja (a classic example of a Soviet univermag, a com-
munist high-class department store with a limited selection). 
Spread out behind Kaubamaja were the elite neighborhoods 
where prestigious homes built during the Stalin era were in-
terspersed with buildings that housed the republic's and the 
city’s political, economic, and judiciary institutions.
The area that circled the inner city during the interwar pe-
riod gradually turned into a slum as a result of Soviet policy, 
which was almost never to tear down buildings in order to 
maximize the net production of housing space. This had two 
all-pervading consequences. First, these valuable environ-
ments are preserved to this day, albeit in poor condition.
Second, a socio-ecological landscape was formed of a kind 
that could be found in the United States, where the less afflu-
ent population lived in poorer conditions closer to the inner 
city, while the more fortunate could enjoy the more modern 
housing stock found in outlying areas and the most attractive 
neighborhoods in the inner city (with the difference being 
that both groups had to settle for a considerably lower stan-
dard than their transatlantic counterparts).
 
the post-soviet epoch   entailed a dramatic break with 
the past. Municipal and state property was privatized or 
returned to former owners or their descendants. Foreign 
stakeholders created demand for certain types of urban 
environments that brought a powerful functional change 
of the central parts of Tallinn within the space of only a few 
years. Vanalinn gradually lost its housing function in favor of 
commercial interests, rooted partly in the strong upturn for 
tourism (especially short visits from Finland). The port area, 
closed to the public during the Soviet era, was opened and 
gradually deindustrialized, beginning with the area next to 
the passenger terminal where there is great need for border 
trade retail stores (in particular purveyors of alcoholic bever-
ages to highly taxed Scandinavians).
Other than the port area in particular, most of the changes 
in the 1990s had to be incorporated within the Soviet-built or 
pre-Soviet environment. This was due partially to the severe 
financial crisis that followed the collapse of central planning 
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among other things. Housing construction was not permitted 
before the fifth, outermost, zone. Thus we are talking about 
an inner, fortified Riga (controlled by the German-Baltic 
nobility) and an outer built-up Riga with a vast empty space 
in between. During the first half of the 19th century, the fifth 
zone was more rural than urban in nature. At that time, the 
building of stone houses was prohibited outside the moats 
and earth embankments. The lifting of this restriction in 1857, 
along with several other restrictive statutes that were thought 
to be passé and obstructive to Riga’s development, was the 
starting shot for a thorough and dramatic change of the city’s 
spatial structure.
De Geer’s fieldwork in Riga coincided with the epoch in 
which the city was in the midst of what the Latvian architect 
Andris Roze has called the city’s first widespread metamor-
phosis. Around 1910, both production and the labor force 
had doubled in only a decade or so, creating a cosmopolitan 
environment as well as one of the most vibrant industrial cit-
ies in northern Europe. When the First World War broke out, 
internal combustion engines for battleships, tanks, rail freight 
and passenger cars were produced in Riga, along with mo-
tor vehicles like tractors and automobiles. In addition, Riga 
was the world’s largest port for timber exports: the Russian 
realm’s exports via the Port of Riga went mainly to Germany, 
Great Britain, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, 
and the United States. One fourth of Russia’s imports came in 
the same way. But it was the Baltic-German and Jewish busi-
nessmen who controlled most of the city’s leading trading 
companies. Riga also had a British mayor during the years of 
1901—1912 in the person of George Armistead, which itself was 
proof of the city’s cosmopolitan identity.
In the period leading up to the First World War, Riga was 
an autonomous Baltic-German city situated within the Tsar-
ist Russian Empire. It is interesting that all city districts and 
street names in De Geer’s text are in German. In the years 
around 1910, most street signs in Riga were trilingual and it 
was no coincidence that the German name was at the top of 
street signs, followed by the Russian and finally the Latvian 
names. If De Geer’s ambition was to make some kind of con-
temporary diagnosis of Riga, he should perhaps have men-
tioned the intensive Russification campaign that started in the 
late 19th century. The Tsarist Russian rulers’ primary aim here 
was to break down the Baltic-German influence in Russia. Be-
yond switching the official language of public administration 
and education from German to Russian, attempts were made 
to induce Russians from other parts of the empire to move 
to the city. A chauvinist attitude developed and the Russian 
population was guaranteed privileges: the consequence was 
a rapid influx of a Russian population to Riga in the bridge 
period between the 19th and 20th centuries. Several conflicts 
were lurking around the corner: between the Baltic-German 
aristocracy and Russian authority and between the Baltic-
German aristocracy and the Latvian population. There was 
an emphatic increase in the proportion of Latvians in Riga in 
the latter half of the 19th century, which brought unequivocal 
demands for reformation of local administration, Latvian par-
ticipation in the affairs of the city, basic education in Latvian, 
and stronger linguistic rights for Latvian-speakers. By the 
middle of the 19th century, the ethnic composition of the city 
had undergone a striking change, primarily due to the rural 
denizens of Livonia and Kurland, along with other nearby 
Russian provinces, who had made their way to Riga in hopes 
of a better life. What makes Riga particularly interesting is 
that the city’s development after 1850 can be divided into four 
distinct periods in which each transition has entailed a rejec-
tion of the preceding period, which in turn influenced (and 
still does to a great extent) the urban space (see Table 1).
Riga’s past is characterized by irregular balances of power 
wherein various constellations laid claim to the city in differ-
ent epochs. During period two, there were distinct efforts to 
make Riga a Latvian city, partially as an antithesis to the pre-
ceding German-Russian-Jewish cosmopolitan epoch. In pe-
riod three, there were concerted attempts to erase all things 
Latvian and make Riga a Soviet city. The efforts in period four 
have been aimed at erasing everything Soviet and creating 
something new, which may be seen as a hybrid between pe-
riod one (the cosmopolitan or global, as it is now called) and 
period two (the first Latvian period of independence).
As a result, every new epoch has led to a revision of the 
urban space and a new perspective on how the city should be 
built. In Soviet housing policy of the 1960s, Stalin-era cities 
were considered overpopulated and thus disproportional. 
Since 1991, Riga has once again come to be understood as 
disproportional, albeit from the opposite angle: the city’s 
structure and scope are considered too comprehensive and 
overgrown. To put it another way, the urban renewal plans of 
fifty years ago that were intended to make Soviet cities more 
proportional have resulted in Riga again being considered 
far too disproportional, which has led to a new disorder that 
must be managed. Different epochs are being renegotiated 
in both a Latvian and global context in post-Soviet Riga. The 
city has undergone several dramatic changes — or perhaps 
turnarounds would be more apt — since De Geer was there 
100 years ago. There is however one commonality between 
De Geer’s visit and my own: the city still seems disjointed and 
irregular.
Exactly as in De Geer’s day, the city is still defined by its 
duality, with the global (cosmopolitan) and the Latvian (pro-
vincial) as thesis and antithesis. This makes Riga a singular 
and complex case which, with a nod to Marshall Berman, has 
come to engender a “unity of disunity”. The autonomy that 
characterized Riga in the late 19th and early 20th centuries also 
distinguished the post-Soviet epoch. The difference is that 
Riga is now Latvian, at least officially — but many Latvians 
still see Riga as a city for foreigners.
königsberg/kaliningrad: 
tatiana chekalina 
It is difficult to find errors in De Geer’s description of Königs-
berg, since the city changed so tremendously during the 20th 
century, during both the subsequent German period and the 
Soviet and contemporary Russian periods. I would rather 
focus on the most important changes in the spatial structure 
of the city.
First of all, in 1910 the city administration decided to elimi-
nate the old fortification walls along with three of the ten city 
gates. The remaining seven gates were preserved as historical 
monuments. After reconstruction in 2005, the King’s Gate be-
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
1850—1918 1918—1940 1945—1991 1991—2011
Riga is 
part of an 
autonomous 
Baltic-Ger-
man noble 
republic 
under Tsarist 
Russian 
hegemony.
Riga is the 
capital city of 
the Republic 
of Latvia.
Riga is the 
“capital city” 
of the Soviet 
Republic of 
Latvia.
Riga is 
once again 
the capital 
city of the 
Republic of 
Latvia.
and partially to the lack of modern credit institutions. Sig-
nificant changes occurred at the end of the decade. To begin 
with, the economy definitively threw off its dependence on 
Russia in connection with the August Crisis of 1998, which 
attracted investments from the West. The banking system 
was modernized and the availability of long-term home 
mortgages improved for people of average or better income. 
Within just a few years, the cityscape inside the ring (a street 
called Liivalaia) was dramatically altered. In developments 
spearheaded by the controversial Italian property magnate 
Ernesto Preatoni, the Tallinn skyline, formerly defined by 
Vanalinn’s thicket of church spires, began more and more to 
resemble that of Frankfurt.
At the same time, there was highly conspicuous develop-
ment on the outskirts of the city. With the spread of private 
car use and access to home mortgages, the 2000s became the 
decade of suburbanization. New housing developments are 
sprawling, virtually uncontrolled, in almost every direction, 
along with a North American lifestyle in which most things 
revolve around life in suburbia. The retail trade has arrived, 
with a vengeance, while the geography of the labor market 
is becoming increasingly “wreath-like”. At first, the new 
construction consisted only of single-family homes, but these 
have recently been joined by terraced houses and apartment 
buildings. The latter are aimed at the group of relatively well-
off Estonians who want better quality than they can find in 
a typical apartment in Lasnamäe but cannot afford a single-
family home.
The impact of suburbanization should not be overstated: 
even though it makes a strong visual impression, it does not 
involve very many inhabitants. The population of Tallinn, 
currently about 400,000 people, is despite everything rela-
tively stable.
The city’s market for residential and other types of real 
property has utterly collapsed since late 2007, especially in 
suburbia. This is manifest in the huge numbers of unfinished 
buildings that can be seen everywhere. At the time of this 
writing, the market has yet to rebound. Recovery will not 
happen without a change in attitude among foreign banks, 
especially Swedish banks, which have moved from easily 
available euro-denominated mortgages to a severely restric-
tive lending policy.
To sum things up, Tallinn in the 1900s and early 2000s has 
begun to assume the shape of a North American city with a 
medieval city center and three large Soviet concrete islands, 
in what might be a new — and definitely hybridized — con-
tribution to the global urban typology.
riga: Jonas lindströM
De Geer emphasizes the importance of the Düna (Daugava) to 
Riga’s geography and expansion in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries and notes that Riga seems irregular and rather dis-
jointed. He leads one to believe that this created a certain dis-
connection between city districts, even though Riga already 
had eight electrified tram lines by 1910. Why did he perceive 
Riga’s urban space as “fragmented”?
He ignores the strict zone division in effect in 
Riga until the removal of the moats and the city 
wall in the late 1850s. Until then, the areas out-
side the old city center (the present Old Town) 
were divided into five distinct zones. The zone 
nearest the moats and earth embankments 
could be used only for walking. The sec-
ond zone was for vegetable farms. Zones 
three and four also had strict restrictions 
and were set aside for military purposes, 
Table 1: Four periods of urban development 
policy in Riga since 1850.
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came one of the main historic attractions in Kaliningrad (for-
merly Königsberg). While De Geer compares Königsberg and 
Stockholm in terms of spatial structure, contemporary Kalin-
ingrad has very little in common with the capital of Sweden. 
The historic city center was destroyed by the British RAF in 
1944 and the Soviet Army in 1945. As a result, the only build-
ing left on the previously densely built island of Kneiphof is 
the cathedral, which was recently partly restored. Demolition 
of buildings of the German epoch continued in the Soviet 
period when, most notably, the castle was destroyed. These 
days, however, there is widespread opinion in favor of at 
least partial reconstruction of the castle. Nevertheless, the 
city thus far lacks a traditional city center, that function being 
fulfilled by the major avenue of Leninsky Prospect. The street 
begins at Victory Square (Ploschad Pobedy) in the northern 
part of the city and continues through the southern part of 
the city down to the main railway station (Juzhny Vokzal).
Revitalization of the city’s waterfront areas on the banks 
of the Pregel River has recently begun. The complex of the 
World Ocean Museum and the Fishing Village are examples of 
these developments. The old residential areas of single-family 
homes mentioned in the article have been largely preserved. 
In the northern and western parts of the city, these areas have 
become popular as luxury neighborhoods. Some renovated 
German buildings in these areas have also been converted to 
commercial premises for large corporations. While the old 
industrial areas mentioned by De Geer still fulfill their func-
tion (the contemporary Baltiysky District), nowadays most 
new businesses established in Kaliningrad are located in the 
southern and southeastern districts near the city bypass. In 
addition, a number of industrial businesses that make profes-
sional equipment and home electronics are located in the 
central parts of the city in premises built in the Soviet era.
danZig/gdańsk:  
doMinika V. Polanska  
De Geer’s map is highly detailed. I do not think there is 
anything superfluous in his description; he made use of the 
information that was available about the city at the time. One 
can see that the Dolne Miasto fortifications have impeded 
the city’s growth towards the east, and that remains partially 
true today, as the neighboring district of Olszynka is still in 
a rural phase. With regard to the two elevations mentioned 
(Bischofsberg, now Biskupia gorka, and Hagelsberg, now 
Grodzisko), both have been urbanized as far as possible 
(primarily green areas, but also residential). The Langfuhr 
district of the city refers to modern-day Wrzeszcz, which 
extends alongside the busy Aleja Grunwaldzka road and is 
now mainly a residential area with some commercial func-
tions (Galeria Baltycka, the largest mall in northern Poland, is 
there, along with other smaller shopping centers). Wrzeszcz 
is also the most densely populated city district in Gdańsk. The 
Ohra district is the one in Orunia to the south, which is now a 
fairly rundown residential neighborhood. The Schidlitz dis-
trict is probably what is now called Siedlce and lies alongside 
the Kartuska road that extends westward from the city center. 
As De Geer observed, the city and its center were growing to-
wards the west and have done so ever since. Parts of the rail-
way tracks still remain, in addition to the parts that cross the 
present shipyard and the tracks in Dolne Miasto, which are no 
longer in use. Urbanization seems to have followed the main 
thoroughfares, and this is also true today: they are the same. 
The road network has, however, significantly expanded and 
branched out. De Geer’s red line around the city center aligns 
with what is now called Glowne Miasto (the central city), but 
the central area is not as distinct as it was then.
Otherwise, the estuary is still used today, but the shipyard 
is considerably larger. I discuss the planned development and 
partial decay of the shipyard in my doctoral thesis. Deindus-
trialization has left its mark here and new plans call for the 
area to be converted to a “waterfront development” of offic-
es, homes, shopping centers, and other services. The project 
is called Gdańsk Mlode Miasto: The Young City.
 
stettin/sZcZecin:  
Péter balogh
In his analysis of urban development, De Geer’s preoccupa-
tion with the topography and the relevance of physical dis-
tance is hardly surprising, considering that he wrote before 
the age of civil aviation. That De Geer sees Germany as the 
center of Europe may seem geographically determinist at first 
glance, but gains legitimacy if we remember that this was a 
time when the balance of power in Europe had begun to shift 
from Great Britain towards Central Europe. It is against that 
backdrop that one should consider Stettin’s rapid develop-
ment over four decades.
Stettin experienced explosive population growth from 
75,000 inhabitants 
in 1870 to 235,000 
in 1910 — a devel-
opment that ran in 
parallel with the 
demographic trend 
in Berlin. De Geer 
writes that “The Oder 
interest encompasses 
Silesia and Berlin es-
pecially”, and Stettin 
functioned precisely 
as the port city of 
the capital until the 
Second World War. 
In 1945, the city and 
its eastern environs 
were annexed to Po-
land, which sharply 
constrained con-
tacts with the west. 
Szczecin, however, 
maintained its role as 
a hub between north 
and south: cellulose 
and coal from Silesia 
were exported to 
several countries via 
Szczecin, and in the 
other direction, iron 
ore was imported to 
Central Europe. Along 
with the shipyard, 
Szczecin became the 
most important port 
city in Poland after 
the Gdańsk-Gdynia ag-
glomeration.
The peripheral location, only 12 km from the East German 
border, combined with West German revisionism led the Pol-
ish administration to put off investments in Szczecin until the 
1970s. One of the key projects at the time was the building of a 
bridge straight through the Old Town and eastwards over the 
Oder, as confirmation of the city’s affiliation with the rest of 
Poland. Whether deliberately or not, this made it impossible 
to rebuild the old inner city as it looked during the German 
era. After the system change and recognition of the border 
with Germany, some attempts at reconstruction have been 
made with varying results, more successful in some places, 
less so in others.
The same applied to the resumption of the city’s contacts 
with its western hinterland and Berlin, which these days has 
better links to the port cities of Rostock and, increasingly, 
Hamburg. Residents of Szczecin use the Berlin airports 
frequently, however, and some of them have moved to the 
increasingly sparsely populated German villages across the 
border. Today’s Szczecin can, however, be characterized as 
an economically and demographically stagnating city (with 
a population of about 400,000). After protracted hemor-
rhages, the shipyard was recently shut down. The port of 
Szczecin-Świnoujście is well-linked with Copenhagen, Ystad, 
and Rønne, but traffic volumes cannot be compared to the 
German ports. De Geer noted that the city “has been made 
accessible to the large ships plying the Baltic Sea by dredg-
ing the Oder, Papenwasser, and Haff, as well as by building 
the Kaiserfahrt canal through Usedom to the coastal town of 
Swinemünde” (today’s Świnoujście), but such measures are 
costly and may be unrealistic for modern large ships.
coPenhagen: christian 
WichMann Matthiessen
From the 584,000 inhabitants of De Geer’s time to the 
almost 1.8 million of today, Copenhagen has become a 
metropolis that also encompasses the old neighboring 
cities of Helsingør, Hillerød, Frederikssund, Roskilde, 
Køge, and Dragør, and which has a functional connection 
with the Swedish neighboring cities of Malmö, Lund, and 
Helsingborg. Combined with these cities, the area is home to 
about 2.3 million people.
Copenhagen’s structure mirrors the old terminals: the 
port and the central station. The port is no longer a signifi-
cant fixed point, even though it still handles cargo and pas-
sengers. The city has, however, especially since the Second 
World War, seen a new terminal develop into a significant 
infrastructural fixed point: the international airport in Kas-
trup. Taken as a whole, Copenhagen and Southern Sweden 
combined make up a vast junction for the Nordic countries: 
essay
,occupation, but its imperial luster was recreated as a freezing-
in-time of the revolutionary era, although with an expansion 
of concrete suburbs at the expense of the picturesque but 
wretched wooden settlements. The same can be said of the 
Sovietized cities of Tallinn and Riga, whose brief interwar 
periods as capital cities never left any major impression on 
the urban landscape. The three South Baltic cities of Königs-
berg, Danzig, and Stettin underwent a total demographic and 
national territorial change, paradoxically enough with the 
retention — or in the case of Gdańsk, restoration — of an 
exterior form that was nearly obliterated during the Second 
World War.
De Geer’s analysis of the Baltic region cities is limited in 
part by the inconsistent availability of facts, but also by the 
undeveloped social science of the time. His emphasis is on the 
city as an economic phenomenon, which results in a concen-
tration of urban market functions. What is forward-looking 
in De Geer’s work are the attempts to analyze this economic 
structure and its impact on the situation and topography of 
the city. He was a contemporary of the social ecology of the 
Chicago School and often makes comparisons with develop-
ments in North American cities. As an attempt to capture 
the urban structure of the Baltic region cities, his article is 
unique.
De Geer continued his academic work in urban geography 
with articles about Swedish and American cities. In one 
noted article, he described the subject of geography as “the 
science of the [...] distribution of phenomena on the surface 
of the earth”. In an attempt to blend scientific and humanist 
aspects, he characterized the geological Fennoscandia and 
the anthropogeographical Baltoscandia as “a penetrating dis-
tinction between an anthropogeographical and a geognostic 
province”. Lithuanian geographers and historians have taken 
up his interest in Baltoscandia in recent years. As a newly ap-
pointed professor at Göteborg University in 1928, he sought to 
open the institution towards the world, with particular focus 
on the English-speaking countries, but he died in 1933 at the 
age of just 47. In an American obituary, it was said that his 
work had “won for him a unique place in the geographic sci-
ence of the twentieth century”. ≈
Note: All essays are scholarly articles and have been peer-
reviewed by specialists under the supervision of Baltic 
Worlds’ editorial advisory board.
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motorways, railway lines, air traffic, and maritime transport 
make possible prodigious flows.
The internal structure of the city has developed via the new 
traffic lines and the major terminals. The “tram city” along 
with the rail connections with neighboring cities shaped 
development until the 1930s. The city grew in layers, with the 
formation of suburbs near stations outside the compact city. 
A new rail system was introduced in 1934 according to the 
Berlin model: S-trains. These lines lead from the city center 
towards the neighboring cities, and the S-train network even-
tually structured the major growth of suburbia starting in the 
1960s: suburbanization, first of housing and later commerce. 
As of 2012, S-trains and commuter trains reach all of Sjaelland 
as well as Malmö and Lund. The internal railways have been 
augmented with metro lines in the inner city since 2000. 
Motorways have been expanded since the 1950s in a ring road 
between the neighboring cities and beyond over the Öresund 
Bridge (in 2000) to Sweden.
The so-called “finger plan” came about in 1949 and has, 
in various versions, set the direction of development. The 
palm of the hand — the compact city — extends 10—15 km 
out from the old city center and holds government, business 
services, cultural activities, entertainment, retail trade, uni-
versities and research, and transport and traffic terminals. 
Compared to 1912, the city center has grown outwards into 
adjacent districts, but Copenhagen is still a monocentric city. 
Outside the palm of the hand, the fingers reach out to nearby 
neighboring cities within a radius of about 40 km from the 
city center. There are city center formations that function as 
parts of Greater Copenhagen and others that are indepen-
dent. Between the fingers, there are green wedges, divided 
between agriculture and recreation. Wide swathes of vaca-
tion homes are laid out along the northern coast of Sjaelland, 
which are also part of urban life.
conclusion
De Geer's article concludes with a few comparisons of the 
demographic and economic development of the Baltic region 
cities. Largest in population and even more so in area were 
the major cities of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg and 
Riga, with their sparse but overcrowded wood-built suburbs. 
Helsinki showed the fastest population growth by far, while 
the German Baltic region cities (Königsberg, Danzig, Stettin, 
and Lübeck, though not the maritime city of Kiel) were char-
acterized by stagnation. Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Malmö 
were the leading merchant ports figured in tonnage, followed 
by St. Petersburg, Riga, and Stettin; De Geer, however, notes 
that Lübeck probably had more valuable cargo than the large 
bulk ports.
How has time treated De Geer’s cities? The researchers’ 
comments show how development has impacted the cities 
to varying degrees. Three of 
the cities — Stockholm, 
Helsinki, and Co-
penhagen — have, 
despite occupation 
and bombings of 
the latter two, main-
tained and devel-
oped their positions 
with no major upheav-
als. St. Petersburg was 
stripped of its capital 
city function and sub-
jected to devastating 
civil war and German 
essay
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he horses are ready, the grand carriages 
fully loaded. Anna Bering wraps her sables 
more closely about her. The two children 
are bundled up in the rear of the carriage, 
only their noses peeping out of the thick woolen blan-
kets. The cold wind defies the brave March sun. “God 
help us”, she thinks. “Is it really right to set out like 
this with the children?” Anushka was only three and 
Anton four. “But”, she continues arguing with herself, 
“I could not again endure the long months of loneli-
ness without Vitus.”
The woman is married to the Danish naval officer 
Vitus Bering, the man about to lead a second Russian 
expedition 8,000 km to the east. This venture, the 
brainchild of Peter the Great, will become known as 
the Great Northern Expedition. The year is 1733. An 
advance guard has been sent out in February under 
the stewardship of Martin Spangberg, another Dane. 
The men are shipbuilders, smiths, farriers, and ban-
ished prisoners who are to lay roads and build shelters 
and boats. Now, a month later, the leaders of the expe-
dition are making ready for departure, in the company 
of naval officers, soldiers, and long columns of ser-
vants. They will be mapping the land and the coasts, 
especially the Northeast Passage. The expedition will 
culminate in a voyage from Kamchatka to America, 
where Russia anticipates opportunities for trade and 
territorial acquisition.
Six months later, the scientific arm of the expedi-
tion begins with 600 men: an assembly of mainly 
foreign scientists who, assisted by artists, interpret-
ers, and instrument makers, will study the natural 
environment, the bedrock, the people, the language, 
and the fauna as they make their way east. Many of 
the men on the expedition have their wives and chil-
dren with them — just like men in the great wars. The 
women are valuable resources, but unseen in the of-
ficial reports.
Anna Bering comes from a wealthy family in Vy-
borg. Her father, Matthias Pülse, is a German business-
man and her mother, Margareta Hedvig, born in Lund, 
is presumed to be of Swedish extraction. Anna knows 
roughly what lies ahead. Five years before, she had 
traveled deep into Siberia to meet Vitus on his way 
home from the first expedition to the east. That time, 
she left her two little boys at home in Vyborg with 
their grandparents. Now the boys are nine and ten and 
have been sent to boarding school in Reval (Tallinn), 
where they will study German and Latin, and live with 
Professor A. F. Sigismundi.
The Berings move in fashionable society. Vitus 
has contacts within the highest levels of the Russian 
Navy and largely due to Anna’s charm they have made 
friends in government circles and the diplomatic 
corps. One of their closest friends is German-born 
H. J. F. Ostermann, who had been vice-chancellor of 
Russia in 1723—1725 and is for all practical purposes the 
leader of Russia while the expedition is away.
A collection of 
letters and customs 
documents were 
found in the past year 
or so which have lain 
in Russian archives 
since the Great 
Northern Expedition 
through Siberia in 
1733–1740. The cache 
has brought to light 
a hitherto unknown 
woman in polar 
history. Annagreta 
Dyring sketches the 
woman’s life based on 
official reports and the 
recently discovered 
archival records.
ANNA BERiNG
ThE DyNAmic
by Annagreta Dyring illustration Karin Sunvisson
Discovery is hardship. At times as hard for the discoverers as for the discovered.
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Now Anna sits and worries about whether she has 
told the servants to pack the right things. Has she 
brought enough linen? Are the candelabra and table 
silver safely stowed? And her beloved clavichord, 
how will it survive the jostling and the cold? The long 
journey ahead suddenly feels hard to grasp. She dozes 
a while, the jogging of the horses increasingly somno-
lent.
It takes more than a year for the expedition to reach 
Yakutsk. The winter has been fierce. Week after week, 
month after month, they live out of portmanteaux, 
stopping intermittently — only to journey on, often by 
boat for long stretches along the rivers. The children 
play as if the traveling life is all they have ever known. 
The city of Yakutsk has recently celebrated its centen-
nial. Anna quickly settles into the beautiful wooden 
house the Bering family have been allotted. Maids 
are hired; the work involved in the couple’s elegant 
social life is too much for Ivan and Jagan, the servants 
who accompanied them, to manage alone. The tailor 
stitches away every waking hour; the children are 
learning to read.
A steady stream of German scientists arrive. Johann 
Georg Gmelin is a young botanist of 26. According to 
Linnaeus, Gmelin will collect “more plants than all 
other botanists combined” and publish a vast Flora 
Sibirica. Another is 30-year-old Gerhard Friedrich 
Müller, whose job is to describe the history of Siberia, 
its people and language. Müller becomes the first eth-
nographer in history. The Frenchman Louis de L’Isle 
de la Croyère, age 50, devotes the bulk of his time to 
plotting longitude and latitude, with varying success. 
His section of the caravan is the longest, with measur-
ing instruments alone filling ten carts.
the years In yakutsk become the best of the expedi-
tion for Anna Bering. She holds parties and musical 
entertainments. Some of the officers play oboe, 
violin, and balalaika, Gmelin has a fine singing voice, 
and Anna herself improvises on the clavichord. The 
repertoire is mainly folk songs, but she also plays a 
couple of chorales by the Dutch composer Smeelinck. 
Food and drink are lavish and there is no shortage of 
vodka. Anna eventually begins producing her own 
cognac and trading it for furs. She acquires a huge col-
lection of furs — sable, fox, ermine, and marten — and 
buys entire rolls of Chinese silk as opportunity arises. 
Gimlet-eyed members of the expedition take note of 
the couple’s incessant sleigh-ride parties and question 
Captain Bering’s priorities. The atmosphere of the 
expedition gets fraught. Gmelin and Müller refuse to 
take orders from Bering, who they feel should not in-
terfere in their scientific work. They also feel slighted 
in matters of housing and service. Finally, an open 
crisis breaks out when Gmelin and Müller refuse to 
accompany the expedition to Ochotsk. Instead, they 
make sure the industrious theologian and natural 
scientist Georg Wilhelm Steller and his entourage are 
ordered to go in their place. Still, life in Yakutsk is on 
the whole good for Vitus Bering and his Anna, at least 
with regard to their private life. The actual mission is 
the troublesome thing, so beset by internal conflicts, 
and the expedition to the North Coast encounters di-
sastrous setbacks.
Vitus is ordered to Ochotsk in 1737 to prepare for 
the voyage to America, while Anna and the children 
are meant to turn homewards. But when he arrives 
in Ochotsk, nothing has been done and utter chaos 
prevails. Vitus must arrange everything from the 
ground up, including building a house and getting the 
shipbuilding under way. In the midst of it all, he falls 
ill. Rumor of his illness reaches Anna in 1738 and she 
does not hesitate. She travels to Ochotsk through the 
feared Amur Valley, one of the harshest, most inhospi-
table mountainous areas on earth. The horses starve, 
sustain injuries, and bolt. As if by a miracle, Anna and 
the children finally reach Ochotsk.
Dreary and deserted Ochotsk also tries Anna’s 
patience. And it seems letters have come from home 
with not always welcome news, including that their 
19-year-old son Jonas seems not to be destined for a 
brilliant future: he has joined the infantry. It had taken 
ten months for the mail to arrive. In February 1740, 
Anna and the family write the replies that, instead of 
reaching their destinations, end up in the archives.
The letters are mostly about the prospects of the 
children at home. “If only Jonas had at least chosen 
the cavalry”, write both Vitus and Anna in distress to 
the two men with the power to shape their sons’ fu-
tures: Professor Sigismundi and the Austrian diplomat 
Nikolai Sebastian von Hohenholz. Their son must go 
into the civil service, they say in a mixture of supplica-
tion and insistence.
anna sends maternal admonitions to 17-year-old 
Thomas: “You must practice assiduously on your viola 
da gamba so that you can play a masterpiece for me 
when I come back.” And then she instructs him: “Fear 
God, be peaceable, adaptable, soft-spoken, pure, and 
clean; waste not, seek out company better than your-
self; disdain not your inferiors by reason of their sta-
tion; be kind and humble towards all men; avoid bad 
company. You may then be assured that Our Father 
the Almighty God will bless you and keep you.” In a 
postscript, Anna writes that she has not forgotten her 
promise to bring furs to Professor Sigismundi and his 
wife.
Vitus writes to von Hohenholz: “As my son sees 
poorly, could not be expected to make any progress 
in literature, and is not academically inclined, you 
have kindly allowed him to join the army. . . .” (The 
indications are that Bering asked Hohenholz to ar-
range Jonas’s future career.) “But”, continues Bering, 
“since soldiers in the army must not only be healthy, 
but also observe decorum and good conduct, which 
my son by reason of his youth lacks, and since he will 
now have many opportunities to mix with the ruffians 
among the musketeers, it would have been better if he 
had been able to stay in St. Petersburg for a while so 
that he could have pursued studii civili and practiced 
politeness and decorum.”
Even little Anton, age 10, writes to his older brother 
Jonas. He is worried about him because he never gets 
letters from him. The tone is formal and polite: one 
senses his mother’s dictation behind the words.
Vitus Bering will soon set off for Kamchatka and 
points further east on what is to be his last journey. 
Anna heads home with Anton and little Anna. She 
brings valuable cargo along: a great many furs, mainly 
sables, six leopard skins and about ten fur coats, 
countless rolls of silks and brocades, about 20 kilo-
grams of silver, porcelain services, Chinese decorative 
items, her dear clavichord, and much more.
A stay in Tobolsk along the way is a trial for the 
exhausted Anna. Customs procedures are strict and 
everything is declared. A zealous customs official 
records Anna’s baggage in minute detail. She must 
pay a duty of 10 percent of the value of her goods and 
five soldiers are ordered to accompany the carriage 
to Moscow to guard the 11 sealed trunks. After more 
than a month of travel, the retinue reaches Moscow 
in March 1742. Once there, she goes to stay with her 
favorite clergyman and, by hook and by crook, is able 
to circumvent the anticipated goods inspection at the 
Moscow Customs Office.
more than a year will pass before Anna finds out that 
Vitus has died. Sven Waxell, the Swede who has been 
with the expedition the entire time, notifies her of 
the circumstances. Bering’s property in Ochotsk is 
auctioned off and the money used to pay the crew. A 
huge collection of Bering’s belongings change hands in 
Ochotsk: countless caftans, a Turkish shotgun, a pack-
et of tea, glass beads, nine books, furs, piles of textiles, 
and five wigs. A few silver and gold objects, 18 books, 
and two white wigs are sent to Anna, but Vitus’s be-
loved blue nightcap embroidered in gold, which she 
had particularly requested to have back, was sold for 
two rubles to a captain in the Russian Navy.
After she came home, the letters Anna wrote about 
Bering’s estate in Ochotsk revealed her dire financial 
straits. She now had four children to support on her 
own and likely a debt to pay for her older sons’ living 
costs. Her care and concern for her sons and their 
careers likely continued and the results are known. 
Thomas, in accordance with her wishes, became a civ-
il servant for the “tax agency”. Jonas, receiver of the 
anxious letters from Ochotsk, stayed in the army, and 
the youngest son Anton became a cavalryman. Her 
daughter Anna married a high-ranking military officer.
The passion of Peter the Great for foreign com-
petence was not sustained after his death. The new 
Russian trends moved instead towards suspicion of 
foreigners, pointedly so of German immigrants. The 
Great Northern Expedition, led mainly by German 
experts, became the stuff of wild fantasy and rumor 
as the official reports were not forthcoming. Vitus 
Bering’s achievements were not praised to the skies 
and nor were his friends particularly generous in their 
posthumous estimations. Nonetheless, the scientific 
discoveries of the expedition were eventually set in 
concrete terms, shedding light and appreciation upon 
past events — but no mention was made of women 
and children on the expedition. It is only through 
contemporary scholars’ in-depth explorations of Rus-
sian archives that we have opened the doors to the 
Bering family history. For the first time, we can see the 
contours of Anna Bering, wife and mother, whose fate 
deserves our belated admiration and respect. ≈
The author is a science writer and holds an 
honorary doctorate from Stockholm University.
German and Latin – the languages of science. Tsar Peter certainly knew to appreciate their bearers.
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Free speech on retreat in a liberated country – when denying crimes has become a crime.
s freedom of speech threatened in Lithuania as it 
is in Russia?
The politically correct answer in Vilnius is, “Of 
course not!”
But not everyone in Vilnius is politically correct. 
The well-known Lithuanian journalist and commenta-
tor Artūras Račas has likened verdicts against Pussy 
Riot in Russia to verdicts against Algirdas Paleckis in 
Lithuania: both involve criminal sentences for insults.
Earlier this year in Vilnius, the Socialist People’s 
Front leader Algirdas Paleckis was fined 10,400 litas 
(about 3,000 euros) for denying and grossly downplay-
ing Soviet aggression against Lithuania the night of 
January 13, 1991.
This is about modern Lithuania’s most cherished 
historical narrative. The whole of Europe has seen the 
photo of the young woman throwing herself in front 
of the iron caterpillar treads of Soviet armor. Fourteen 
unarmed civilians were killed and hundreds were 
injured when they bravely stood up against Soviet 
army forces and special units that tried to take control 
of Lithuanian radio and television in Vilnius on that 
legendary night.
ThaT all fourTeen were killed by Soviet troops was 
self-evident, until Algirdas Paleckis shocked the na-
tion. While the evidence is obvious in some cases, 
like that of the young woman in front of the military 
vehicle, it is lacking in others, according to Paleckis. 
As a former MP and former journalist, he has made 
his own investigation and claims to have found indica-
tions that secret snipers were present on rooftops and 
fired into the civilian crowd on the January night in 
1991. Paleckis refers to witnesses, and he quotes bal-
listics expertise saying that the lethal bullets could not 
have been fired by Soviet troops on the ground.
So Paleckis claims that, in January 1991, Lithuanians 
shot at Lithuanians.
In Russia, Pussy Riot cursed in the church. In Lithu-
ania, Algirdas Paleckis’s words are sacrilege against 
the nation’s holy of holies. To make things worse, 
Paleckis was already a hated man. His name in itself 
is enough to provoke antipathy, to put it mildly. Algir-
das’s grandfather Justas Paleckis was the Lithuanian 
Quisling, heading a puppet government in 1940, when 
the Soviet Union took control of Lithuania. The one 
and a half months that Justas Paleckis served as Prime 
Minister was enough to besmirch the family name for 
generations to come.
The son of the late Justas Paleckis is today an MEP 
History on 
trial in Vilnius
by arne Bengtsson
in Brussels for the Lithuanian Social Democrats, a 
fairly respectable role, while the grandson, Algirdas, 
has fallen under the nation’s wrath.
Algirdas Paleckis claims that Lithuania’s ruling 
party Homeland Union instigated the trial against him 
by writing to the state prosecutor. Paleckis was first 
acquitted in a lower court, which ruled that he had 
quoted sources rather than stating a personal opinion. 
State prosecutors appealed, and the Vilnius district 
court convicted Paleckis in June of this year.
Paleckis was prosecuted under a 2010 amendment 
made to Article 95 of the Lithuanian criminal code, 
which bans the denial of crimes committed by the 
Soviet or Nazi regimes in Lithuania. The law also states 
that whosoever “grossly underestimates” aggression 
or crimes carried out by the USSR or Nazi Germany 
against Lithuania “in a threatening, hostile or insult-
ing manner” shall be punishable by up to two years in 
prison.
This law is in fundamental conflict with international 
treaties protecting freedom of speech, claims Paleckis. 
Even people opposing Paleckis’s political views and 
describing his version of the events in 1991 as “non-
sense” support his right to state a diverging opinion on 
the historical narrative.
But Justas Paleckis is at odds with much of the 
common historical wisdom in Lithuania. His reputa-
tion has not been strengthened by his criticism of 
the downgrading of Holocaust memory in Lithuania. 
Paleckis spoke out against official laxity towards the 
right-wing extremist marches during the Lithuanian 
national holiday, March 11, when neo-Nazis were 
heard chanting “Juden raus”. He has also, together 
with others, condemned the ceremonial reburial in 
June this year of Juozas Ambrazevičius-Brazaitis, head 
of the Provisional Government of Lithuania in 1941, 
proclaimed by some a national hero, and known by 
others for his links to the Nazi-led extermination of 
Jews in Lithuania.
The government of Lithuania supports the effort 
by MEP Vytautas Landsbergis and other Baltic and 
Central European MEPs to establish a “reunification of 
European history”. In the Prague Declaration of 2008, 
they stress “substantial similarities between Nazism 
and Communism in terms of their horrific and appall-
ing character and their crimes against humanity”.
This double genocide approach is seen by Jewish 
representatives as a denial of the uniqueness of Holo-
caust and downgrading the role played in it by Lithu-
anians and other Balts. Some Lithuanian Social Demo-
cratic politicians, including Algirdas Paleckis’s father, 
have signed a counter-declaration, the Seventy Years 
Declaration, which rejects “attempts to obfuscate the 
Holocaust by diminishing its uniqueness and deeming 
it to be equal, similar or equivalent to Communism”.
The liThuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis 
accused those Social Democrats of being pathetic 
and echoing Kremlin ideologues. But when Ažubalis 
claimed that the only difference between Hitler and 
Stalin was the size of their moustaches, one Social 
Democratic MP reminded the Foreign Minister that 
people used to come back from deportation, but usu-
ally not from the gas chambers.
Later the Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Ku-
bilius said there had been “misunderstandings” over 
his minister’s words, and in an interview with the New 
York Times Kubilius declared that “Holocaust crimes 
are unique”.
What the historian Timothy Snyder named Blood-
lands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin has become 
an ongoing political and cultural war in the Baltic and 
Central European countries of the EU. Who suffered 
the most? Who was the worst perpetrator?
It has turned out to be a fatal battle, where free 
speech seems to be on the retreat in the face of strong 
nationalistic forces. ≈
Arne Bengtsson is a correspondent 
for the Swedish News Agency TT and the author 
 of books on present-day Baltic societies.
Exhibition commemorating those who died at the Vilnius 
TV Tower on January 13, 1991, in the Lithuanian indepen-
dence movement against Soviet rule.
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he 1980 strike at what was then the Lenin Shipyard 
in Gdańsk is often described as a milestone in 
recent European history, especially that of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The documentary film Chil-
dren of Solidarność depicts the strike as the starting shot for 
the fall of communism throughout Eastern Europe. The same 
historiography is found in the permanent exhibition Roads to 
Freedom, next to the Solidarity headquarters in Gdańsk, near 
the shipyard and Solidarity Square, where the monument 
to the workers killed in the 1970 uprisings stands. In photo-
graphic displays, commemorative albums, tourist brochures, 
and other depictions of the events in 1980, texts recur again 
and again about how the strikers in Gdańsk and the activists 
of Solidarity proved that non-violence and civil disobedience 
were successful strategies in the struggle for a life of greater 
human dignity — for themselves and the generations to come.
The strikers knew the struggle for democracy would take 
time, but hoped that their children would someday be able 
to grow up in a free country. A song written during the strike 
became the movement’s unofficial anthem. It was called “A 
Song for My Daughter”.
I have no time for you;  
your mother hasn’t seen you for so long. 
Wait a little longer, until you’re grown,  
and I’ll tell it all to you. 
The story of these hopeful days,  
filled with talk and heated argument. 
Of all the long and sleepless nights,  
of our hearts beating like mad. 
Of all the people who’ve come to feel,  
at last we’ve found our way home, 
Together we are fighting for our today,  
but most of all for your tomorrow.1
In this article, my aim is to study how the Gdańsk shipyard 
strike and the formation of Solidarity have been remembered 
and observed afterwards, especially in connection with the 
30th anniversary in August 2010. In so doing, I want to explore 
how people create meaning in past events in relation to cur-
rent interests, and how the depiction of a shared history is 
constantly recast and used.
The empirical material consists of printed and published 
materials — including brochures, web pages, writings, and 
commemorative albums — as well as field observations and 
visits to various exhibitions in Gdańsk in connection with the 
anniversary celebrations. The material also includes printed 
matter and observations from earlier visits to the permanent 
exhibition Roads to Freedom in 2001 and 2005.2 Since the cen-
tral themes in the material are generation, history, and the 
future, I focus on the passing on from one generation to an-
other of the cultural legacy constituted by the strike and the 
Solidarity struggle. Beyond this, I will discuss the moral legacy 
of the activists of the 1980s and the exhortation to solidarity 
with the rest of the world in which this legacy is materialized 
in the 2000s.
The theoretical premises of the study are deconstructivist 
and power-critical, based on the school of discourse theory 
developed by the political philosophers Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe. A fundamental idea in this theory is that 
life is informed by a constant struggle for interpretive pre-
cedence about which understanding of the world should be 
considered the “right” one, and that these interpretations are 
always temporary fixations of meanings that might have been 
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utterly different.3 In this article, this overarching framework 
will be combined with tools of theory-in-use, primarily de-
rived from ritual theory.
pRedeceSSoRS and heiRS
Among the books for sale in the lobby to the Roads to Freedom 
exhibition is Freedom: A Do-It-Yourself Manual by Czesław 
Bielecki, a former Solidarity activist and adviser to Lech 
Wałęsa during his presidency in the 1990s.4 The book was 
intended to inspire and guide young people who want to 
start their own social movements and is available in several 
translations: I catch a glimpse of at least Polish, Spanish, and 
English behind the counter.5 There is a cover blurb, signed by 
Lech Wałęsa, which reads as follows:
I was fortunate to lead a unique revolution. In 1980—
1989 we won our struggle for freedom bloodlessly. 
It was as recently as 1956 in Budapest and 1970 in 
the Polish cities on the Baltic Coast that blood had 
flowed. We began to disassemble communism with 
our victorious strike in August 1980.
“Solidarity” was created. By joining together 
millions of people in Poland, we showed other na-
tions how they could escape their totalitarian cap-
tivity. We kept up our resistance, and the world sup-
ported us with solidarity. The Roundtable of 1989, 
at which the opposition reached a historic compro-
mise with the government, became the beginning of 
the end of communism and its rules of lies.
I recommend Czesław Bielecki’s book to all 
those who want to win their own non-violent fights 
for freedom. Its title conveys its meaning: If you do 
something for freedom yourself, others will help 
you.
The book was published by the European Solidarity Center, 
an organization founded in 2007 after a ceremonious signing 
of a Letter of Intent on August 31, 2005, the 25th anniversary of 
the Gdańsk Agreement, the social accords between manage-
ment and the strike committee at the shipyard. Like its prede-
cessor, the Solidarity Center Foundation, which was formed 
in 1999 under the chairmanship of Lech Wałęsa and is still in 
operation, the mission of the European Solidarity Center is to 
spread knowledge about Solidarity and the modern history 
of Poland by means of exhibitions, educational projects, an-
niversary celebrations, conferences, and publications.6
The poetic appeal — and the moral challenge — of Wałęsa’s 
text recurs on the European Solidarity Center website, where 
the former director, Roman Catholic priest Father Maciej 
Zięba, describes the organization as follows:
Solidarity means a commitment and a challenge. It 
is a commitment for the authors and participants of 
the events of August 1980 in Gdańsk and in Poland; 
and it is a challenge for the future generations and 
for those for whom freedom, dignity, and justice re-
main a dream. Sustaining memory about the moral 
message of the “Solidarity” movement and the 
creative delivery of its legacy to our posterity, indi-
cating how current and universal it is — these are the 
main tasks of the European Solidarity Center.
The Center strives to achieve the first goal — the 
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retrospective one — with a modern and interactive 
museum describing how the events initiated by 
the strike at the Gdańsk Shipyard started a domino 
effect — liquidating the communist system in the 
entire Central and Eastern Europe, also affecting 
other regions of the world. It will be supported by 
the multimedia archive and library, securing the 
legacy of “Solidarity”, which nowadays is scattered 
and sometimes neglected. Through expositions — 
including mobile exhibitions traveling throughout 
the world — the European Solidarity Center wants 
to enhance the memory of history, which seems to 
be weakening in Europe and which is necessary for 
building a European identity.
The other — prospective — goal is to transfer the 
legacy of “Solidarity” to the future, delivering it 
to the next generations of young people, not only 
Poles. Showing solidarity, caring for the common 
good, building a deeper community of ideas while 
respecting diversity as values that are not anach-
ronistic, which are a creative challenge, worthy 
of energy and skills. This is why education is very 
important for the Center. Even now the European 
Solidarity Center is working on it: organizing work-
shops for young people from all over Europe and 
seminars for young Poles, arranging a series of lec-
tures and discussions, and preparing a training offer 
for teachers and local leaders.
As a cultural institution, the European Solidar-
ity Center creates cultural events and stimulates 
artistic activities related to subjects concerning very 
broadly defined solidarity. It organizes concerts 
and festivals as well. In November 2007 the Center 
inaugurated a film review entitled “All About Free-
dom”, which presents various film forms speaking 
about freedom in the modern world. It has also 
organized a screenplay contest. The European 
Solidarity Center is a scientific research institution 
as well, analyzing the issues of freedom especially 
the achievements of “Solidarity’s” peaceful fight for 
justice, democracy, and human rights to share these 
achievements with those who are still deprived of 
these values. Moreover, the Center is a forum for 
public debate not only about history, but also about 
current objectives. And these objectives include 
civil society, integrated Europe, and peace.
The European Solidarity Center goes beyond 
politics and it is not associated with any party. It 
promotes deeper values, shared by Poles despite 
their differing political opinions. The intention of 
the creators of the European Solidarity Center is to 
make it a center for cooperation and integration. 
Even now, many organizations and institutions 
from Poland and abroad approach the Center with 
various proposals for joint projects. Private persons 
approach us as well. Every contact is priceless. This 
is more than just studying the past or presenting it 
in an attractive way. This is a way to create meta-
political connections between people for whom 
August 1980 is not a closed story. This idea brings a 
network of interpersonal solidarity to the map of 
the independent Republic of Poland, of the solidar-
ity which still is the most universal Polish product of 
the best quality in the world.7
This text and the previously quoted cover blurb by Wałęsa 
summarize, in an almost painfully clear way, the entire com-
plex of meaning activated in conjunction with the anniver-
sary celebration in 2010 and the recollection of the events of 
August 1980. This embraces both the dedication of those who 
were actively involved in Solidarity and in the strike in par-
ticular, and the challenge faced by today’s (and tomorrow’s) 
youth in shouldering the moral legacy and passing it on, both 
inside and outside Poland. The story that the shipyard strike 
in Gdańsk in 1980 was the first domino to tip in what would be 
the fall of Eastern European communism8 — and that another 
important push was given by the roundtable discussions in 
Warsaw after Solidarity’s electoral successes in 1989 — is, of 
course, also there, as is the oft-recurring national self-image 
of Poland as brave martyr and moral savior.9 The importance 
of building a common European identity based on historical 
memories is also emphasized, along with the importance of 
solidarity with — and the duty to aid and inspire — people all 
over the world for whom freedom, human rights, democracy, 
and justice are not the unquestioned conditions of life today. 
The multiplicity of activities described among the center’s 
operations also reflects the multifaceted celebrations that 
took place in 2010. These included everything from cultural 
events and educational initiatives to scholarly congresses and 
public debates: events for children, youth, adults, and senior 
citizens — including people for whom “August 1980 is not a 
closed story”.10
The passing down of historical knowledge to coming 
generations is a central aspect of the activities of both the 
European Solidarity Center and the Solidarity Center Foun-
dation. The websites of both organizations present several 
educational and exchange projects directed at children and 
youth in Poland and other countries. In 2010, before and dur-
ing the 30th anniversary of Solidarity and the shipyard strike, 
for example, the “My Little Solidarity” and “Gdańsk Station” 
projects were carried out at the European Solidarity Center. 
Projects at the Solidarity Center Foundation included “A Test 
of Solidarity” and “zaPLeCZe (Backstage)”. “My Little Solidar-
ity” was an essay project directed at younger Polish school-
children (in Poland and abroad):
We are looking for written works in which young 
people describe their perceptions of the historical 
Solidarity (what they know about it, what they value 
in it) as well as their perceptions of solidarity today 
(how they define and understand it).11
“Gdańsk Station” was an exchange project between teenagers 
and young adults from Western and Eastern Europe (but also 
attracted participants from countries including Brazil and 
Japan, according to the website), which was realized in con-
junction with the Youth Forum 2010 conference in Poland. 
Project participants listened to talks about modern European 
history, visited museums, and participated in workshops 
where they discussed the current state of the world. The 
young people were also able to visit significant places in the 
struggle for freedom, and sites that “symbolize the Polish 
people’s struggle for freedom”, and, finally, to attend Youth 
Forum, where “Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Lech Wałęsa” was 
a special guest.12 “A Test of Solidarity” was a solidarity and 
humanitarian aid campaign based on collecting postcards 
from people all over the world. It was in commemoration 
of Solidarity, and sought to aid an educational project in Af-
ghanistan:
“By organizing ‘A Test of solidarity’ action we want 
to demonstrate that in spite of distances between 
various countries, despite all the linguistic, cultural, 
and religious barriers, political affiliations or inter-
ests, we can share common intent, and the word 
‘solidarity,’ associated for 30 years with Poland, the 
Gdańsk Shipyard and Lech Wałęsa, apart from a 
common historic success, has also a universal val-
ue”, emphasizes Danuta Kobzdej, Chairwoman of 
the Solidarity Center Foundation. “‘A Test of solidar-
ity’ action is aimed not only to enhance knowledge 
about the civic movement, but first of all to promote 
the value of solidarity in its social dimension.”13
“zaPLeCZe (Backstage)” was a theater project involving teen-
agers and young adults from Poland and the Czech Republic, 
where one of the particular concepts explored was “solidar-
ity”, both as a value and in connection with “the history of 
the civil movement that began in Poland in 1980”.14 What 
these projects — and their descriptions — share is the moral 
link and the passing down of the idea of solidarity between 
generations, where the strikers in Gdańsk in 1980 and the 
founders of the Solidarity movement are established as moral 
predecessors and today’s youth — and coming generations 
— are written into the story as moral heirs in the struggle for 
freedom and human dignity.
The Eastern European expert and modern historian 
Timothy Garton Ash has also, in an eyewitness account of the 
strike, emphasized how dignity was the strongest, most pal-
pable feeling communicated during the weeks of the strike.15 
Solidarity, morality, and dignity became important discursive 
elements in the story created around the strike, the Solidarity 
activists, and the significance of both to the continued geopo-
litical, economic, and cultural development of Europe.
Through life history interviews with highly educated Poles, 
the ethnologist Katarzyna Wolanik Boström has shown how 
personal and family histories are intertwined with important 
events and phenomena in Polish history. By telling the stories 
of their lives, they also tell the story of Poland, evoke Polish 
society as they understood it — and their own place in it, as 
they would like to be understood. Solidarity, morality, and 
dignity also have an important place in these stories: no one 
wants to appear to be part of an oppressive system; everyone 
wants to understand themselves as a morally comprehensible 
person.16 Now, in retrospect, when we know which social 
system and ideology “won” and which lost — at least from the 
historical perspective we are capable of surveying today — it 
becomes important to take a stance on this “truth” (however 
provisional and potentially open to question it may be). The 
moral threads become central to the fabric of the projects for 
children and youth. They are offered a particular, discursively 
created and politically airtight understanding of historical 
phenomena — and a great responsibility is laid upon the 
young generation to be good stewards of their legacy.
MoRaLiTy and RiTuaL
In connection with the 30th anniversary of the strike in 2010, a 
number of happenings, exhibitions, and manifestations also 
took place that further underlined this moral legacy (such as 
marathon and roller skating races, musical, theatrical, film, 
and art events, conferences, book presentations, and other 
events in honor of Solidarity and the anniversary of the strike, 
with varying connections in content). These can  — like the an-
niversary celebrations overall — be analyzed as secular rituals 
or public events.
The anthropologists Sally Falk Moore and Barbara G. My-
erhoff coined the term “secular ritual” in the 1970s, meaning 
a sense of collective ceremonial forms with no religious or 
magical purposes — ceremonies that mirror, reorganize, and 
create social arrangements and modes of thought.17 The an-
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thropologist Don Handelman instead uses the term “public 
events” for public ritual contexts that can either be pompous, 
clearly defined, and solemn with an unambiguous message 
— “events-that-present” — or playful, messy, rebellious, carni-
valesque, and spontaneous — “events that re-present”.18 Quite 
often, the more carnivalesque elements of parades and other 
events are the province of teenagers and “young adults”.
One of the more playful events during the 30th anniversary 
celebrations in Gdańsk — which drew a great many young 
people — was “A Day in the Life of the Conspiracy”, a happen-
ing held at the “Klub Rock Café” at the Museum of Polish Rock 
in Gdańsk on August 30, 2010. Videos from the student move-
ment with connections to Solidarity were shown, a trouba-
dour sang protest songs typical of the times, and participants 
could print their own flyers with the text “THE CROW CAN-
NOT DEFEAT THE EAGLE”,19 or a copy of the very first bul-
letin issued by the shipyard strikers in 1980. Outside the club, 
passersby could paint slogans and political street art from the 
communist era using stencils and spray paint on a plywood 
panel. Afterwards, visitors could allow themselves to be ar-
rested by young men in militia gear. One of the costumed 
militiamen (who approached with a feigned threatening mien 
when I photographed one of the arrests) told me that he had 
come to Gdańsk from Warsaw for the sole purpose of tak-
ing part in the happening: “I think this is the best way to tell 
young people about the history”, he said, and pointed at his 
militia shield and baton. In this case, play was used to pass 
down the historiography of what happened in Poland in the 
1980s and before then to the young generation of today.
The previously mentioned do-it-yourself manual from the 
European Solidarity Center also ends with an exhortation 
aligned with this idea of handing over the history:
It is for them [the new generation] that this book was 
written. It was written by parents who had been 
successful at defeating communism, and now they 
don’t want the next thugs who come along, those 
who resemble Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, Castro, 
Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Haile Mariam, or Bin Laden, 
to turn our common house into a madhouse. And 
then blow us all up.20
The moral legacy to modern youth is emphasized again and 
again and the authorities are those who personally suffered 
and fought for a free, more humane society.21 The many exhi-
bitions and stage productions are effective tools — entertain-
ment and education wrapped up in one — for getting the mes-
sage across and making it stick in the minds of young people. 
Other ways of popularizing and passing on the message of the 
strike and what happened afterwards to a younger generation 
included the comic strip published in the Solidarity magazine 
at the XXX Congress in 201022 and the comic book published 
for the 25th anniversary in 2005.23 In a book about the im-
portance of museums as political arenas, political scientist 
Timothy W. Luke emphasizes the power that the exhibition 
medium has over the public, specifically through this inter-
twining of education and amusement:
One of the most effective techniques for governing 
these populations today is entertainment; and […] 
some of the most powerful public performances 
to interest and amuse people are museum exhibi-
tions.24
“History” is a construction, a negotiation, and a struggle 
about meanings, and the canonized, hegemonic version is 
always an exercise of power vis-à-vis other ways of depicting 
the same historical events.25 Through all of these exhibitions, 
writings, etc., endeavors are made to create a consensus 
by which other interpretations of Poland in the 1980s are 
suppressed and made unwelcome. From the perspective of 
discourse theory, this hegemonic version is called objectivity, 
a truth composed of discourses laid down and articulated so 
many times until it seems unquestioned and natural.
FReedoM and eMoTion
In addition to the emphasis on the moral legacy, freedom is a 
strong theme in most depictions and commemorations of the 
strike. Visitors given the brochure for the Roads to Freedom 
exhibition in 2010 read the following:
The “Roads to Freedom” exhibition tells of people 
who tried to make the dream of independence come 
true for hundreds of thousands of Poles living in 
the Polish People’s Republic. Those who sacrificed 
everything for the idea of freedom were many. The 
exhibition is dedicated to them.
The strike was commemorated at Solidarity Square on 
August 31, 2010, the 30th anniversary of the signing of the 
strike agreement, in an emotional and solemn Catholic 
mass — an obvious example of an event-that-presents in 
which secular and non-secular rituals were mixed. The 
participants were made up mainly of senior citizens and 
union people, probably with personal experience of the 
Polish people’s struggle for freedom, memories of the 
events in Gdańsk in 1980, and perhaps personal connec-
tions to the iconic figures of the strike:
August 31, 2010, 12.00: Mass at Solidarity Place. 
“Everybody” from the church is there. Men, men, 
men ... The Black Madonna from Częstochowa. 
Women in the choir and the orchestra. A young 
woman reads (aggressively) in English from the 
Book of Joshua. The men and women in the audi-
ence (most of them seniors) understand nothing ... 
they look around, impatient. The Smolensk Tragedy 
is remembered. After a while, Anna Walentynowicz, 
“legendary mother of Solidarity” is mentioned. 
(The big screen displays zoom in on the portrait 
of her and Lech Kaczyński, frames draped with 
mourning bands.) This unrelenting motherhood 
... Flags and banners, a flame burns in the monu-
ment to the workers shot in 1970, souvenirs are sold 
(mostly flags of various sizes), the Doki Pub outside 
the shipyard gate is doing brisk business, newspa-
pers and flyers are being passed out.26
It is interesting to note how various events, persons, and 
symbols are linked in a situation like this.27 The historiogra-
phy of the 1980 strike often emphasizes the importance of 
the Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyła’s election as pope in 1978, 
and that he, as John Paul II, chose his homeland for his first 
official pilgrimage in 1979. According to this version of history, 
he infused hope and courage into his countrymen with his 
homilies and addresses in Poland — and the very next year 
the revolt was a fact.28 The church was also a palpable pres-
ence during the strike — in the form of priests who celebrated 
mass inside the shipyard grounds — for the strikers and for the 
crowds outside. During the communist era, the church and 
religion in Poland stood for opposition to the state and for 
freedom, in contrast to communist ideology and the control 
machine of the regime. So, there is nothing odd about the 
close ties between the Polish Catholic church and the Polish-
born pope and the events at the shipyard in August 1980 and 
developments over the next decade.29 These bonds were 
strengthened by the death of John Paul II in April 2005, in the 
midst of Poland’s preparations for the celebration of the 25th 
anniversary. Five years later, in April 2010, another event with 
strong symbolic overtones occurred: the tragic plane crash in 
Smolensk, in which several former Solidarity activists died, 
including President Kaczyński and Anna Walentynowicz. It is 
thus no surprise that this event, along with memorials of the 
lethal shootings in the 1970 protests, were given a prominent 
place among the more solemn elements of the 30th anniver-
sary celebrations.
Motherhood is also an important symbol, both for Poland 
as a nation and for the Polish Catholic church (in the person 
of the Madonna). The family ideology of the communist era, 
centuries of Polish nationalism, and conservative currents 
in 21st century Poland: the mother symbol can be related to 
all of these.30 That Anna Walentynowicz is tied to Solidarity 
as a mother figure is thus to be expected. From a feminist 
perspective, however, this is problematic, as it implies a risk 
that Walentynowicz will not be fully recognized as a political 
activist and revolutionary as her male comrades have been, 
but rather portrayed and remembered based on the arche-
typal position of woman as mother — albeit on a symbolic 
level — which makes an understanding of her in a significant 
political context essentially impossible. We are quite simply 
incapable — within the framework of the discourses that cur-
rently dominate our society — of linking the “mother” with 
positions of “dissident”, “revolutionary”, and “union and 
political activist”.
Several memorial concerts were also held during the 30th 
anniversary celebrations, at which the words freedom and 
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solidarity were repeated again and again. I saw two of them 
on TV at home with friends in Gdańsk. Despite differences in 
format and setting, the events were remarkably similar. The 
same kinds of pictures of the strike and the state of war, every-
day life in communist Poland, dominos falling as the Eastern 
Bloc collapses, suffering and struggling people in other parts 
of the world. There was also the emphasis on freedom and 
solidarity in the choice of songs and other expressions; chil-
dren as symbols of hope and the future; Polish flags, the red-
and-white Solidarity logo, the constant presence of religion; 
and Lech Wałęsa with his fists raised — as a distilling emblem 
of this entire cultural legacy.31
It is interesting how elements from so many different con-
texts can be brought together in this public ritual (with both 
presentational and representational, secular and non-secular 
aspects) — John Lennon’s Working Class Hero, Leonard Co-
hen’s Hallelujah, and Bob Marley’s Get Up, Stand Up — and 
combined into something that becomes graspable here 
and now. The “here and now” constructed by joining these 
disparate components is the celebration of a Catholic labor 
and democracy movement with a distinct right-wing profile 
(even if some of the intellectuals who supported the strike 
and participated in the founding of Solidarity had Marxist 
backgrounds). It is obvious that the mash-up works as long 
as the various elements contribute to switching on the same 
emotional register.32 In connection with the generational 
theme, it is also interesting to note how a broad program is of-
fered in order to draw the younger generation to the celebra-
tions. Macy Gray, for example, was a huge hit in Poland in the 
summer of 2001, which I remember from my fieldwork for a 
previous study, when her songs were played “everywhere” — 
and Rufus Wainwright’s version of Hallelujah is mainly known 
from the animated film Shrek. Both of these are examples of 
pop culture references that appeal to young audiences.
The young geneRaTion
But what do Solidarity, the shipyard strike, and the Gdańsk 
Agreement of August 31, 1980 actually mean to young people 
today? Is the intensive campaign to ensure the survival of the 
memory mounted by groups like the European Solidarity 
Center a sign that the younger generations in Poland do not 
care enough about the history of their country? The Swedish 
historian Ulf Zander has thought about whether the reason 
for the lukewarm interest in Solidarity among youth in the 
21st century is that the strikes of the 1980s and the Solidarity 
movement were the final link in a long, tradition of rebellion 
in Poland, rather than the starting shot for something new.33 
He argues that young people are rejecting this and that they 
are weary of the constant harping on old injustices.34 In my 
own thesis, If We Are to Become Like Europe, on the creation 
of identity among young, urban, well-educated women in 
Poland, the same tendencies emerge when interview respon-
dents distance themselves from what they consider out of 
touch in the Poland that is to be integrated into the European 
Community and become part of the EU. These old and tired 
(and Polish — which is presented as old-fashioned in and of 
itself ) notions are represented in their minds by the older 
generation, as well as the poorly educated and the rural 
population.35
Older people often remember the oppression of the com-
munist era and the Cold War — and some of them even World 
War II36 — while those born since the late 1970s essentially 
lack this experience, even if they have assimilated part of the 
“collective memory” through the stories of others. Among 
older people, reminders of the strike and the formation of 
Solidarity in August 1980 trigger enough memories and deep-
felt emotion to fill the anniversary celebration with meaning, 
while the younger generations need more far-reaching con-
nections — references to the war-torn places of today and op-
pression in countries like Afghanistan, Tibet, and Sudan — in 
order to switch on a similar emotional register and engage-
ment.
concLuding diScuSSion
This article has described some aspects of the 2010 anniver-
sary celebration of the strike at the former Lenin Shipyard in 
Gdańsk in August 1980 and the formation of the Polish labor 
union and freedom movement Solidarity. The focus was on 
how these historic events are observed and remembered 
today — through various types of secular rituals and public 
events — and which elements are presented as important 
to hold onto and pass on to future generations. I have paid 
particular attention to concepts like freedom and solidarity, 
history and future, and the moral legacy from yesterday’s ac-
tivists to today’s young generation and generations to come.
The depictions of the events in the 1980s and the produc-
tion of history going on around them — continuously and in 
connection with the anniversary celebrations in 2010 — are, 
however, not entirely unproblematic. Historiography is al-
ways political, always commingled with power, just as presen-
tations of historic phenomena in words, pictures, exhibitions, 
and stage productions of various kinds are always the result 
of specific interests and selection processes. Which groups 
and figures in modern Poland are out to score political points 
by constructing the past in this particular way? Timothy W. 
Luke writes:
The politics of symbols are quite powerful, because 
they invoke ideals, recast realities, and manufacture 
meanings. Museum exhibits may not change public 
policies, but they can change other larger values 
and practices that will transform policy.37
Which values and practices are being changed by presenting 
history, the present, and the future in this particular way? For 
whom is it important, for instance, that the Polish struggle 
is ascribed universal meanings, as emphasized in both the 
projects for children and youth and the anniversary concerts? 
Why is it so important that the young generation accepts the 
baton and carries it forward? How are consensus, hegemonic 
discourses, and “objective truth” about the shipyard strike 
created, and how are other events linked with this in a logical 
and graspable chain of phenomena? For example: the elec-
tion of a Polish pope, and the pope’s visit to Poland in the late 
1970s ¨  the strike in Gdańsk in 1980 ¨  the founding and activ-
ism of Solidarity in the 1980s ¨  partially free elections in 1989 
¨ the fall of Eastern European communism in 1989—1990 ¨  
eastward enlargement of the EU in the 2000s. How are politi-
cal phenomena shaped and influenced by such discursive 
linkages, today and in the future? What other voices and 
alternative versions are silenced and ignored in such a histori-
ography? Further research — especially in the field of history 
and related disciplines — on the fall of Eastern European 
communism and its most iconic events, of which the shipyard 
strike in Gdańsk is one, is needed.
Many parallels to what happened in Poland and other 
countries in the former Eastern Bloc in the 1980s and 1990s 
were also drawn in connection with the Arab Spring in 2011. 
The comparisons describe courageous and desperate people 
rising up against the oppressive regimes in their countries 
in joint action — their actions guided by the hope of a better 
future. Many twists and turns are yet to come before anyone 
will be able to say with any certainty what the outcome of the 
revolts in North Africa and on the Arabian Peninsula will be — 
and what the historiography and memorial rituals surround-
ing these events will look like. Will they in any way resemble 
those surrounding the fall of Eastern European communism? 
Which events will be brought to the fore as special and sym-
bolic? And, in such case, which galling voices will resist these 
descriptions? ≈
Note: All essays are scholarly articles and have been peer-
reviewed by specialists under the supervision of Baltic 
Worlds’ editorial advisory board.
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GoinG Beyond 
the Perils 
of Activism
humAn riGhts 
in russiA
by freek van der vet 
photos Joris Besseling
human rights activism in russia can be a 
dangerous ordeal for those involved in it. one 
only needs to recall the killings of promi-
nent human rights activists and lawyers like 
natalia estemirova and stanislav markelov. 
moreover, the duma introduced nGo legisla-
tion in 2006 and 2012 that will likely curtail 
the work of human rights organizations and 
their foreign financial sponsors. the inter-
national press incessantly reports on the 
immediate negative effects of these laws for 
human rights associations. how do these 
dedicated human rights lawyers and activ-
ists nonetheless manage to advance human 
rights in russia?
in June 2012, freek van der vet spoke with 
valentina melnikova, leader of  soldiers’ 
mothers, oleg Kozlovsky, blogger, protest 
organizer, and political analyst, and vanessa 
Kogan, executive director of russian Justice 
initiative, on the current state of human rights 
activism in moscow.
Protective  mothers
have been working for these civil organi-
zations for such a long time; we have sur-
vived so many new situations.” 
Valentina Melnikova has seen it all: 
the aftermath of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
from 1989 to 1991 and the two violent conflicts in the 
Chechen Republic of 1994—1996 and 1999—2005. As 
the acting director of the Union of Committees of 
Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (UCSMR; Soyuz Komitetov 
Soldatskikh Materei Rossii), Melnikova has been lob-
bying for the past twenty-four years for a contract-
based army and for giving free legal aid to conscripts 
who want to avoid the obligatory military service. 
The organization monitors human rights violations 
in the Russian army. Hazing, or dedovshchina, is still 
practiced among conscripts and is allegedly the cause 
of many suicides and other non-battle deaths. Their 
work has often been compared to that of the Argen-
tinean Madres de Plaza de Mayo, who demanded the 
truth about what happened to their children who had 
disappeared during the military dictatorship. Accord-
ing to the sociologist Amy Caiazza, the work of the 
Soldiers’ Mothers has been so successful because they 
used their own roles as responsible mothers protect-
ing their children, children at the mercy of an irre-
sponsible state.1 Adopting the role of the mother made 
them a respectable organization, often bringing them 
to places where other human rights activists were not 
allowed to venture. They were given access to some 
military barracks and were able, in some regions, to 
establish close cooperation with military officials and 
prosecutors.
“Some groups have been active since 1988. We are 
celebrating our twenty-fourth anniversary. Can you 
imagine a female organization that has fought the 
army for this long? This is absolutely unique. We are 
not victims, but a true human rights organization with 
specific goals. Only one of our original demands has 
remained unfulfilled since the beginning: Russia has 
not changed the obligatory military service to a volun-
tary service. That is why we continue to work, which 
is of course remarkable in view of the difficult times 
we have had: a new political regime, a new economic 
system, and new people in positions of responsibil-
ity in the army. And that is to say nothing of the wars 
we have had. Our first war was in Nagorno–Karabakh 
from 1989 to 1990. Then we gathered on Red Square. 
Now everybody is complaining, ‘They don’t allow us 
to organize protests.’ But back then, we didn’t even 
ask for permission!
“There are a lot of people working in the regions 
who solve their problems on the local level. They un-
derstand that it is not necessary to turn to Putin with 
every little problem. Our experience tells us that you 
need to try to solve issues on this level: raise aware-
ness, make new contacts, and correctly formulate the 
claims you make. You know, we don’t work through 
the Internet. Of course, people can send us e-mail or 
text messages, but they have to come to us. We want to 
see their papers, documents, and applications. Imag-
ine a big country with several hundreds of committees 
of soldiers’ mothers. They all established themselves. 
We can’t force each other to do things. That was also a 
big internal problem of the organization.”
the ucsmr’s local   offices became hubs where 
conscripts could go for legal aid, especially during the 
two conflicts in the Chechen Republic. The Chechen 
to fight without being a victim. And not stop fighting when you are no longer vicitimized.
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conflicts left many casualties, both in the Russian fed-
eral forces and among the civilian population. During 
the winter of 1994, Russian military forces captured 
Grozny, Chechnya’s capital, to regain control over the 
republic which had just announced its independence. 
The conflict ended in a peace treaty. Yet, after a series 
of apartment bombings in 1999 and the spread of 
the conflict to the neighboring republic of Dagestan, 
Russia initiated a second “anti-terrorist” military 
campaign. Some activists embarked on a risky journey 
to the Chechen Republic during the first military cam-
paign — where many young conscripts were fighting 
against the Chechen armed forces — to save their sons 
from prisoner of war camps. They were able to get 
some of them released.
“When the first Chechen conflict started, a lot of 
people came to us for help every day. Every day 200 
to 250 people came, which was awful, of course. Jour-
nalists often ask me, ‘When was your work harder: 
back then, or now?’ I answer, ‘It was tough during the 
Chechen War, it has never been that difficult, and I 
hope it never will be again.’ It was terrible. We turned 
out to be one of the few women’s organizations that 
resisted this war. Of course, there were a lot of people 
who opposed it and who complained to Yeltsin. But 
we helped the wave of people who sought protection 
because they did not want to participate in the war or 
were looking to liberate those who were held captive 
there. 
“Now, in Chechnya, nothing can be done. We have 
600 people who have been lost without a trace since 
the first Chechen War. These 600 people lay in dozens 
of graves in the territory of the Chechen Republic. 
In 1998 there was a budget for the exhumation and 
identification of these lost soldiers and citizens and for 
their return to their relatives for burial. Some remains 
were found, but a special investigation team was never 
allowed to go there. They still have not returned the 
remains. Besides, there are only two brigades left 
there, and we have good contact with the prosecutor 
in that area, so there are actually few problems arising 
there.”
Valentina Melnikova remains optimistic about the 
current situation in the Russian military. Mandatory 
military service was cut to a one-year term in 2008. Ac-
cording to Melnikova, her group’s connections to the 
military prosecutor allowed them to file legal claims 
against the Russian and Soviet military.
“Our experience is enormous. The history of our 
organization has been quite successful. Especially in 
the last two years, thanks to our own efforts, Medve-
dev and Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov have 
changed the situation in the army; they have a more 
humane approach to the army. The violence has de-
creased. Since 2008, military service has been short-
ened. In the past three years, under the authority of 
Medvedev, serious conflicts have almost disappeared. 
Officers no longer cover up violations. I think a good 
recent development is that officers are no longer 
afraid to talk with parents. It was quite surprising for 
us when we were told by the parents themselves that 
they had direct contact with the officers about their 
sons. We never had this before, not in the Soviet army 
and not for a long time afterwards. The problem we 
faced in the Soviet Union was that its military system 
was completely closed. They said nothing, published 
nothing, and accepted no complaints. The first thing 
we heard from the parents was that they were general-
ly forbidden to visit the barracks, and when they were 
allowed to visit, they saw that the conditions were hor-
rible. Their visits improved the way we gathered infor-
mation on the situation in the army. We were able to 
identify the problem. After that, you only need to find 
somebody whom you can turn to with these issues.
“But who can you talk to if the system is closed? 
The military is basically inaccessible. We thought, 
instinctively, to approach the military prosecutor. We 
choose the right path, because we knew more than the 
prosecutor knew. Because of our courage [laughs] we 
started to become partners. In this way we acquired 
the ability to react fast: when a mother comes to us 
with a complaint about her sick son in a military unit 
interview
“ We hAve 600 
PeoPle Who 
hAve Been lost 
Without A trAce 
since the first 
chechen WAr. 
these 600 PeoPle 
lAy in dozens 
of GrAves in 
the territory 
of the chechen 
rePuBlic.”
What remains is abolition of mandatory military service. Political top dogs have been advocating that too.
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in Khabarovsk for instance, why would we contact the 
military commanders? I wouldn’t even have known 
how to contact these barracks back then when nobody 
had mobile telephones. They only had special military 
telephone lines. The prosecutor always had a tele-
phone and a fax, so we just had to pick up the receiver 
and call.”
in their search   for new networks, the UCSMR 
sought to gain influence in the Russian parliament. 
In Russia, NGO activity and opposition party politics 
often overlap. The Russian parliamentary elections in 
December 2003 were a watershed moment for Russian 
politics, consolidating the dominance of the United 
Russia party (Edinaya Rossiya) in the Duma. Demo-
cratic parties, like Yabloko and the Union of Rightist 
Forces (Soyuz Pravykh Syl) lost most of their seats. As 
United Russia became the focus of political power, 
the UCSMR rose to high popularity among the popu-
lation  — so high that it decided to enter the political 
arena by forming a political opposition party in 2003.
“In 2003, in December, there were parliamentary 
elections. The next morning my colleagues from the 
region called me and asked, ‘Valya, what are we going 
to do? Whom are we going to work with?’ Everybody 
understood that these elections were a political disas-
ter. We understood that there would be nobody to talk 
to in the Duma. We organized a meeting with about fif-
teen people, where we discussed whether we should 
combine our efforts to make one big human rights 
organization, and thus lose our own official status as 
Soldier’s Mothers. Another option was to create a po-
litical party ourselves. It would not be a problem with 
our wide network. So that is what we did. We started 
to recruit members. But ten days after our first con-
gress, the Duma changed the law on political parties. 
From then on, the number of members necessary to 
form a political party changed from 10,000 to 50,000. 
So establishing a political party became practically im-
possible. We didn’t have the resources to travel to all 
the different municipalities to gather all these people 
to support us. We tried, though. We still have 25,000 
applications lying safely in our archives somewhere. 
But then the Republican Party approached us with a 
proposal to join them, which we did. In the end, how-
ever, we were not registered.”
The Republican Party was banned by the Supreme 
Court of the Russian Federation in March 2007. Valen-
tina Melnikova and her colleagues in the party filed 
a complaint before the European Court of Human 
Rights (No. 12976/07), claiming that the Russian state 
had violated their right to freedom of assembly and 
association. On September 15, 2011, the European 
Court decided in favor of the applicants (plaintiffs) 
and ruled that the dissolution of the party had been 
disproportionate. Melnikova says that what happened 
afterwards was unique: the Supreme Court of the Rus-
sian Federation quashed its earlier decision to dissolve 
the party. The party could continue to exist.
As an NGO leader with many years of experience, 
overcoming political and bureaucratic obstacles has 
become part and parcel of her everyday work. She 
believes in the path through the legal system: “I have 
always said you need to apply to the courts. If you be-
lieve that you are right, sooner or later you will obtain 
your rights.” 
Melnikova reminisces on her own first protests: 
“Nobody knows how many protests we have visited 
and how many people we have gathered! There is a 
big picture on the Internet of the protests in 1990 on 
Manezhnaya Square in Moscow. We were standing 
there with a banner that read ‘Return our soldiers 
from the Caucasus’. I see a lot of young people today at 
these protests. I even went when it was freezing. This 
is also a wave of action that helps people to articulate 
their grievances. This wave comes from people who 
are able to organize something. I am almost jealous of 
them! These protests are good, because we practically 
never had them before. The communication between 
human rights organizations back then was of course 
much harder. We did not have many phones and did 
not have the Internet back then. A letter could take 
two weeks. Today those problems have disappeared. 
We have a totally different country now where com-
munication is just easier.” ≈
invisiBle  Behind  
the  Protests
leg Kozlovsky, blogger, activist, and PhD 
candidate, belongs to the new genera-
tion of activists that provoked the current 
wave of protests. Like an invisible hand, 
Kozlovsky plans the protests, tweets about them, and 
tries to unite the opposition. However, protesting is 
never spontaneous, but always follows precise plan-
ning and timing. The summer is a low season for dem-
onstrations: “It doesn’t make much sense to organize 
protests during the summer; people have other things 
to think about.” Like many contemporary young po-
litical activists, Kozlovsky was first active in a political 
opposition party in the early 2000s. In his case, it was 
the Union of Rightist Forces (Soyuz Pravykh Syl; SPS) 
that nurtured his taste for opposition politics and ac-
tivism.
the early and middle   2000s were a crucial time in 
the mobilization of protest. In Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Serbia, the popular youth movements Pora!, Kmara, 
and Otpor sparked the “color revolutions” that even-
tually led to the overthrowing of the sitting presidents 
at that time. These mass demonstrations inspired in-
ternational hopes of a transition towards a democracy 
in those states. The revolutions were contagious, gen-
erating similar mass protests in the region. In 2005, 
Russian youth activists attempted to emulate the suc-
cess of these movements by creating the movement 
Oborona (“Defense”) in St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
They copied the logo of the Serbian youth movement 
Otpor: a clenched fist in a black circle.
“Oborona was a grassroots democratic youth 
movement based on non-violent resistance and 
other legal techniques. It never had a vertical struc-
ture, but was a network of regional branches. The 
St. Petersburg branch is still active, whereas the 
Moscow branch has become virtually non-existent. 
Oborona’s main goal was to make Russia into a dem-
ocratic, free country without censorship, with fair 
elections and all the basic democratic institutions in 
place. Oborona was different from the opposition at 
that time because it was very outspoken. Most orga-
nizations at that moment practiced self-censorship: 
they would never attack Putin and say he was re-
sponsible for this or that. I remember when I was a 
member of the SPS youth group, we were planning 
a protest in Moscow that was connected with the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine. I prepared a press 
release and an official statement that accused Putin 
of supporting Viktor Yanukovych [the president 
of Ukraine who lost the 2004 elections after the 
Orange Revolution] in the unfair Ukraine elections. 
When the SPS spokesperson looked at the statement 
and press release, he struck out every reference to 
Putin. He said, ‘Our approval rating is four percent; 
his is seventy percent. When those figures are re-
versed, we can start criticizing him.’ That was the 
general attitude back then. I didn’t see much use 
in maneuvering within this political system when 
it clearly did not want the opposition to have any 
influence, to be anything but a shield or an alibi. Of 
course Oborona was inspired by the Orange Revolu-
tion. Everybody saw how effective mass protest can 
Protesters have to take care. they mustn’t be mistaken for future instruments of power.
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be and that you can achieve results. Youth can be 
important in that way.
“A lot of well-known people in Russia’s civil society 
used to be active in Oborona. It was like a school for 
them. Some are now in the liberal opposition groups, 
some in the left wing, others in the media as journal-
ists. Like Ilya Yashin [former leader of the youth move-
ment of the democratic party Yabloko] and the Ekho 
Moskvy journalist Irina Vorobyeva. They are pretty 
much everywhere, a new generation of activists.”
Since the 2011  parliamentary elections, the streets 
of Moscow have seen abundant public protests that 
gathered tens of thousands of people against the rul-
ing United Russia party and the current government 
under the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Kozlovsky 
is an active blogger and uses his Twitter account to 
inform a large audience in Russian and English on cur-
rent political affairs and ongoing demonstrations.
“You could probably sense a change on the Internet. 
Even among some Internet users. The first change was 
that people’s attitudes began to change towards civic 
activism. Five years ago, when I told people like my 
classmates at the university that I was doing something 
with politics or protesting, they could think up a couple 
of explanations for that: either I was getting into gov-
ernment or I was just crazy. That was usually sufficient 
explanation for them. But over the years more people 
are getting engaged in charitable campaigns, to benefit 
children for instance. It has nothing to do with politics, 
but people at least began to feel that they had some 
responsibility in society. We did not notice any radical 
change; we could only see that the society was becom-
ing more tolerant towards this kind of protest activity. 
Besides participating in   numerous demonstra-
tions, such as the Dissenters’ Marches and the Strategy 
31 protests, Kozlovsky has been involved in various 
attempts to unite the opposition into a single social 
movement. After setting up Oborona, he became 
an active broker in other opposition movements 
and political parties, such as the United Democratic 
Movement Solidarnost (meaning “Solidarity”, a 
political wink to the Polish trade union movement 
Solidarność). The movement assembled a number of 
former opposition activists and politicians, including 
the former chess world champion Garry Kasparov, the 
SPS leader Nikita Belykh, and members of the Russian 
United Democratic Party Yabloko. 
“Solidarnost is different from Oborona. It is a 
high-profile organization. People like Garry Kasparov 
helped to give the movement some of its initial fame. 
While Oborona was just saying, ‘we want democracy, 
whoever wins the elections’, Solidarity has a more 
thorough program, including plans for economic, 
domestic, and international policies. We think of it 
as a kind of proto-party, because it was impossible to 
register as a political party back in 2008 when it was 
founded. So they created a movement. Most of it has 
now joined the coalition of Solidarnost, Kasyanov’s 
People’s Democratic Union, and Vladimir Ryzhkov’s 
Republican Party.
“It will take some time for the political parties to 
know whether they can get enough support. It will 
depend on the leadership and whether they are prag-
matic enough to create coalitions with other parties. 
Or will they be ‘ambitious’ and get their 0.2 percent 
of the votes? I will see what kind of approaches these 
“ When i told 
PeoPle liKe my 
clAssmAtes At 
the university 
thAt i WAs doinG 
somethinG 
With Politics 
or ProtestinG, 
they could thinK 
uP A couPle of 
exPlAnAtions 
for thAt: either i 
WAs GettinG into 
Government or i 
WAs Just crAzy.”
In 2011, this process began to accelerate sharply and the 
approval ratings of United Russia began to fall towards 
the end of that year. Even on the night of the parliamen-
tary elections, there were only a couple of hundred 
people protesting. Just the usual suspects: activists who 
had already been protesting all these years. But the 
other day it was around 10,000 people, which was a big 
protest for Moscow. And later the number of people 
grew further.”
much of the work   in organizing public protests oc-
curs behind the scenes. Kozlovsky acknowledges that 
much of his work in the creation of the social move-
ments is covert. The education of a new generation 
of activists and NGO leaders is a long-term process. 
Oborona taught Kozlovsky and his peers about politi-
cal activism in Russia today. With this experience in 
mind, he appreciates educating a new generation of 
future activists.
“I was just like many others who used their blogs 
and participated in the protests. Most of the time I 
used the blog and Twitter to discuss political issues. 
My role has been to make all this happen in the long 
run. Maybe two years ago I decided, well, that I need 
to concentrate on the long-term preparation of the 
next generation of activists and civil society leaders. 
That is why I created a foundation, an NGO that orga-
nizes training for promising young civil activists. We 
organize conferences on new technologies for civil 
society organizations. It was mostly the invisible work 
of helping these activists become more knowledgeable 
and effective.”
What could have been portrayed as a united front is actually a coalition of networkers.
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parties have, and then maybe later I will join one of 
them. Oborona, from the start, wanted a united op-
position, when I was their coordinator. Back in 2006 
this approach began to prevail when the Other Russia 
coalition [under the leadership of Garry Kasparov] 
was created. It was a time when left-wing groups, Na-
tional Bolsheviks, and liberal groups came together 
and found that they had a lot in common in their 
immediate goals. From this initiative came the Dis-
senters’ March movement, for instance. Oborona was 
also among the founders of that coalition. From 2006 
to 2008 I was part of the leadership of the Other Rus-
sia coalition, and I think we did a lot to bring together 
all these ideological groups, to show them that while 
people have different opinions, they are also citizens 
of this country. They may have different answers to 
questions, but in the end we can find some compro-
mises and solutions. There is a new atmosphere in 
Russia. At the protests you can see people with red 
flags, LGBT activists, nationalists, all of them together 
at the same square. No quarrelling and no fighting. 
There is no formal organization that unites them now, 
but a network of people. There is no need for this for-
mal organization, when you have the Internet with its 
network structure.”
despite the protesters’   optimism, the Russian 
authorities attempted to curtail their activity. In June 
2012, President Vladimir Putin signed a new law that 
imposes high fines on those involved in the organiza-
tion of street protests. The New York Times reported 
that this legislation will give “Russian authorities 
powerful leverage to clamp down on the large antigov-
ernment street protests that began six months ago”.2 
Nevertheless, Kozlovsky believes that these new mea-
sures will only increase the numbers of protesters on 
the street:
“I don’t think that these new fines on protests will 
have a serious effect. When people are angry enough 
to protest, such measures only make things worse 
for the government, because then people have more 
reasons to protest. If people are fined, it will cause 
more outrage. They will have to sell their cars because 
of this. It is another reason for people to protest. Soon 
I will be the first who will be tried under this new law. 
Because we have purposely decided to challenge this 
law, and in particular one of its provisions that says 
that if you have been convicted of disobedience or a 
violation of public assembly laws over the past year, 
then you may not organize a protest. This is against 
the Constitution and even against common sense. You 
will be charged with a violation of public assembly 
laws because you have violated them in the past. We 
filed a notice that we are going to have a protest and 
that one of the organizers had been convicted of these 
offenses in the past year. The protest was banned of 
course, and we got arrested for it. Then we filed a 
lawsuit against the Moscow authorities. If we lose it, 
we will go to the constitutional court and later to the 
European Court of Human Rights to challenge the 
law itself. So we have already planned to take it to the 
higher court; this is a campaign that will perhaps take 
a year. The European Court will take a longer time 
though.” ≈
seeKinG Justice  
At the euroPeAn  
court of humAn riGhts
he organization Russian Justice Initiative 
(RJI) does not protest. Vanessa Kogan, RJI’s 
executive director, firmly states, “No. To 
protest as an NGO would be absolutely 
inappropriate. We are absolutely not a partisan or-
ganization. We do not care who the president is as 
long as rights under the European Convention are 
protected. I really think that should be the position 
of every NGO.” In 2002, a few Dutch human rights 
defenders established RJI to aid victims of grave atroci-
ties in Chechnya. Between 2001 and 2012 they lodged 
hundreds of complaints before the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg on disappear-
ances, torture, and indiscriminate bombings that oc-
curred during the anti-terrorist military campaign in 
Chechnya. The ECtHR is the international tribunal of 
the Council of Europe that protects the rights guaran-
teed under the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights. Citizens of the 47 Council of Europe member 
states (including Georgia, the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, and Turkey) can lodge individual claims with 
the Court when they fail to obtain justice at home. 
The Chechen applicants are often family members of 
people who disappeared after having been arrested 
by armed men. Most of those who disappeared were 
never reunited with their families.
Kogan became the executive director of RJI after 
working for the legal office of Human Rights Watch in 
New York. She recalls that, in 2011, RJI experienced first-
hand the bureaucratic restrictions on NGO registration. 
The NGO was registered in Utrecht, the Netherlands, 
but primarily works from its Moscow main office: 
“RJI always was a Dutch NGO in a technical sense, 
but the overall majority of the staff has always been 
Russian. There has never been a permanent office in 
Utrecht. So it is just a matter of the configurations that 
will allow you to work most efficiently and get around 
the restrictions. The NGO law that came into force in 
2006 has much more restrictive or draconian provi-
sions regulating the activities of foreign NGOs. One of 
those provisions has to do with the actual registration 
of the office. What happened to us was that we made a 
mistake in our required reporting. We acknowledged 
this mistake: it was not intentional, but a human er-
ror. But still, they struck us out of the registry, just like 
that. They have the power to do that under Russian 
law. They don’t have the power to do that to a Russian 
NGO, however. You can only strike out a Russian NGO 
by court order. So you have a little bit more protec-
tion. But it was quite a shock when we received the let-
ter that stated that ‘you don’t exist any more’!” 
Instead, RJI created another partner organization, 
Astreya, a Russian NGO: “Well, the shell of it already 
existed, which was fortunate. Basically it was the fore-
sight of some former staff members. The organization 
had already had registration problems in 2006—2007 
when the NGO law came into force and all the foreign 
NGOs were obliged to reregister. And RJI failed to re-
register twice as a branch office. So after the second 
rejection they set up this Astreya as a backup, but then 
we were registered on the third attempt. Luckily we 
kept Astreya.”
despite the bureaucratic   problems it has faced, 
RJI assists hundreds of clients in bringing their com-
plaints before the ECtHR. The organization has been 
vital in voicing the grievances of Chechen civilians 
on the international stage. While the overall major-
ity of their clients are family members of people who 
have disappeared, they also represent victims of 
torture, and people who lost their relatives during 
aerial bombings of their villages. A typical aspect of 
disappearances is that authorities deny involvement. 
Consequently, these families have limited access to 
domestic courts. RJI gives them free legal aid, lodging 
approximately 200 complaints across Russia’s bor-
ders with the ECtHR. The NGO has been immensely 
successful, winning close to 100 percent of its claims 
against the Russian state, with the Court finding viola-
tions of fundamental rights such as the right to life 
and protection from torture. In addition, the Russian 
authorities have had to pay financial compensation to 
the applicants.
seeking justice is not about mobilizing majorities. it is about encouraging individuals.
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“At the moment we are still working on what is 
considered RJI’s traditional mandate, which concerns 
the most serious violations of the Convention in the 
North Caucasus: disappearances, extrajudicial kill-
ings, torture, and in connection with these, arbitrary 
detention and violation of the right to a fair trial. We 
have also, in the past year or so, been expanding our 
mandate. We have started looking into other viola-
tions that we consider systematic in the North Cauca-
sus. The area that we have chosen is women’s rights 
in the North Caucasus. Which is a rather lesser known 
and much more hidden aspect — as it often is — of the 
human rights situation there.”
Although the Russian authorities have often paid 
the compensation in a timely fashion to successful 
applicants, Kogan is concerned that the authorities 
will not take any further measures to find alternative 
forms of redress for them. The Russian state estab-
lished a special investigation unit to investigate the 
violations named in the ECtHR’s rulings, yet Human 
Rights Watch reports that such investigations are car-
ried out ineffectively.3 Reparations concern more than 
financial compensation alone, as disappearances in 
particular have a profound emotional, social, and eco-
nomic impact on the lives of those left behind:
“There is a broader idea for reparations for the 
victims of armed conflict and disappearances, includ-
ing returning the body, making an effort to locate and 
exhume mass graves, and identifying remains. For the 
traditions of the North Caucasus, which is predomi-
nantly Muslim, not being able to bury the remains is a 
great hardship. As often as we hear the applicants say 
that they want the perpetrators punished, they equal-
ly say that they want to know what happened and get 
the bodies back and bury them. That is an equal con-
cern to them. But in cases concerning disappearances 
that have gone to the European Court, the persons 
have never been found. To my knowledge no body has 
ever been identified and returned to the relatives.”
Since only few bodies have been identified by the 
authorities, the relatives of disappeared people live 
in uncertainty about the fate over their loved ones. 
In its numerous judgments against the Russian state, 
the ECtHR has adopted the rule that, after a period of 
three to five years of disappearance without any news, 
a person can be presumed dead. Kogan indicates that 
RJI must explain to its clients what the Court’s judg-
ment, and the abstract human rights language in it, 
mean:
“One thing that applicants in disappearance cases 
also tend to get upset about when they read the 
Court’s judgment is that the ECtHR says that their 
relatives are dead. Obviously that is very upsetting, 
because as long as they do not have the body, many 
of the applicants continue to say, ‘They are not dead, 
they are going to come back.’ So that’s sort of a reality 
of working with people. We are trying to explain to 
them that, because of the circumstances of the case, 
the person is legally dead. But that no one can say that 
the person is actually dead. We also explained them to 
see a positive side to the Court’s finding that the per-
son can be presumed dead, because it holds the state 
to a much higher degree of responsibility.”
Since 2005, the number of ECtHR rulings against 
the Russian state from Chechnya has skyrocketed. As 
these judgments began to accumulate, RJI, together 
with its partner organizations, started to lobby for do-
mestic prosecution of the perpetrators under Russian 
criminal law. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
Russian state has failed to start effective investigations 
into the various violations, failing in the long run to 
bring perpetrators to justice.4
“Prosecution is not the only way to provide redress. 
But it is an important way to provide justice, especially 
because the government has undertaken nothing 
else in the way of reparations. In Latin America there 
were amnesty laws, but there were also other forms 
of reparations the government provided, like official 
apologies. There was an official process for moving 
on. But in the case of the North Caucasus, there has 
been absolutely nothing. Impunity is not a value of the 
Council of Europe. I think that is more of a value state-
ment than a legal standard though. But we are very 
concerned that prosecutions will not take place. One 
of the perpetrators was put into custody and was tried 
for certain offenses. He was found guilty of exceeding 
official powers, but later he was amnestied. There is 
an amnesty law that has been in force since 2006. This 
was a very disappointing outcome for us. It is a case 
that we have been writing about furiously to the Coun-
cil of Europe’s Committee of Ministers [the body re-
sponsible for the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments] 
and we’re going to appeal to revoke the application 
of the amnesty act. But it certainly is an indication of 
the government’s lack of will to start prosecutions. In 
addition to the amnesty law there is also the problem 
of limitation periods. These crimes were committed 
many years ago. Of course we argue that many of 
these crimes are crimes against humanity or even war 
crimes, but of course trying to get the Court to estab-
lish that is, to put it mildly, an uphill battle.” ≈
“ We Are tryinG 
to exPlAin 
to them thAt, 
BecAuse of the 
circumstAnces 
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n the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the ideas of prog-
ress and development were widely discussed in Russian 
society. Many Russian politicians and intellectuals saw 
their country as lagging behind advanced European 
countries in industrial, political, and social development. 
Indeed, starting with the agrarian reform of 1861, the Russian 
government made several attempts, not all of them success-
ful, to reform one aspect or another of the political and social 
system. While the most important of these attempts was the 
creation of the Duma, the first Russian Parliament, there were 
other modernization projects resulting from the 1905 revolu-
tion, such as new policies on the colonization of Siberia1 and 
the reorganization of medical services.2 The attempts at mod-
ernization were made in an atmosphere of growing social dis-
content and under the direct, often openly violent pressure 
of the state’s political opponents. The declared aspirations of 
change of the political and social actors, despite many differ-
ences, usually coincided in the use of a rhetoric of “progress” 
and “culture”.3
The ideas for modernizing Russia were many; here I will 
look at just one theme: the discussions and activities con-
ducted in connection with what was called the “women’s 
question”. At the beginning of the 20th century, a number 
of women’s organizations in Russia demanded rights for 
women, and many intellectuals and politicians discussed 
the need to improve women’s work, education, and health.4 
Those who defended women’s political and social rights often 
pointed out that Russia’s industrial and cultural development 
could not be achieved without improving the situation of 
women. For example, many participants in the first All-Russia 
Women’s Congress (St. Petersburg, 1908) found that the state, 
if it was interested in progress, should pay attention to the 
issues of women’s rights.5 As for the Bolsheviks, the existing 
research shows that they also used terms of progress and its 
opposite, backwardness, in discussing the “women’s ques-
tion”: the backwardness of Russian peasant society as well 
as that of women was hindering revolutionary activism, and 
later, the progress of socialism.6
Although discussions of the “women’s question” as 
such are rather well studied, the problems of emancipatory 
projects concerned with non-Russian women have only re-
cently started to draw researchers’ attention.7 Looking at the 
connections and contradiction between ideas of “progress” 
and “development” in combination with different approach-
es to the emancipation of Muslim women of the Volga-Ural re-
gion will help to expand our knowledge of the multiethnic di-
mensions of the “women’s question” in the Russian context.
The geographic focus of this article is the Volga-Ural region 
before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. The region is a 
multiethnic one, historically inhabited mostly by people 
belonging to Turkic and Finno-Ugric language groups. It was 
conquered by the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in the 16th cen-
tury. The region is known for several uprisings of the local 
population against Russian rule and for a very unique Muslim 
Enlightenment movement, Jadidism, which developed in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries.8 The Muslim population of 
the region consisted mainly of Tatars and Bashkirs, and the 
educated part of it had rather good connections to Muslim 
communities in other parts of the empire and abroad.
How was the “women’s question” interpreted by the pro-
ponents of women’s emancipation with respect to the Mus-
lim women and at the regional level? How did the situation 
change in the period between February and the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917? What was the specific early Soviet inter-
pretation of the “women’s question” in regard to the Muslim 
women of the region?
The sources are archive materials (in particular materials 
of the Soviet Commission for the Improvement of the Work 
and Everyday Life of Women,9 1926—1930, State Archive of the 
Russian Federation), published documents on women’s activ-
ism in Tatarstan on the eve of the revolution, periodicals, and 
Soviet pamphlets.10
“MusliM WoMan” and 
“Progress”: discussions 
and interPretations on 
the eve of 1917
The organization of the Russian Empire in the last period of 
its existence has been described by Jane Burbank as the “im-
perial rights regime”, characterized by practices of particu-
larity and localized ways of applying rights.11 Still, we know 
that the attempts at Russification of the non-Russian part of 
the population were multiple, and consisted mainly in edu-
cational policy. The Orthodox civilizers hoped to Christianize 
the Muslim population of the empire, which was accused of 
bringing with it threats of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.12 
As for the Muslim women, according to Azade-Ayse Rorlich, 
although the imperial government was “anti-feminist in its 
policies concerning Russian women on issues ranging from 
education to family law and citizen franchise and deaf to the 
demands of Russian women for emancipation” and “backed 
by the might of its bureaucratic structures and scholarly es-
tablishment”, it nonetheless “adopted a ‘feminist’ stand in its 
dedication to the emancipation of Muslim women”.13
In addition to propaganda for the education of Tatar and 
Bashkir girls in the Russian schools, the Russian government 
at the beginning of the 20th century was campaigning with 
the help of Orthodox missionaries to spread knowledge 
about hygiene and medicine among Muslim women of the 
Volga-Ural region. These policies were supposed to help the 
central authorities to maintain control over families and 
child-raising. One example of this logic is found in a delation 
by Andrei, Archbishop of Ufa and Menzelinsk, published in 
by Yulia gradskova  illustration ragni svensson
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the newspaper Kaspii14 soon after the February revolution. 
In his article, the Archbishop expressed fears that Muslims 
“could be separated from Russian life” as a result of the re-
forms — particularly the introduction of a multiethnic local 
management structure (zemstvo). The Archbishop insisted on 
the non-Russian people’s need for spiritual guidance, and saw 
the pamphlets on hygiene and home medicine for the Muslim 
population as particularly helpful.15
At the same time, many Muslim intellectuals in different 
parts of empire began discussing the role of women in Muslim 
society.16 One of the first to do so was Ismail Bey Gaspirali, 
a Tatar from Crimea and the founder of Jadidism, a new 
method of teaching in Arabic. After his third attempt, Gaspi-
rali received official permission in 1905 to publish a special 
magazine for women, Alemi Nisvan.17 At the beginning of the 
revolutionary year of 1917, Muslim women living in the Rus-
sian Empire could choose between several women’s publica-
tions that were produced in Kazan, Bahchisaray (Crimea) and 
Baku (Azerbaijan). The Jadidist plans for the cultural progress 
of the Muslim people of the empire also foresaw growing edu-
cational opportunities for women and girls — many Jadidists 
supported mixed education in primary schools — and sev-
eral schools in different parts of the empire were preparing 
female teachers. Many Tatar women were very enthusiastic 
about becoming teachers. Nevertheless, the organization of 
Muslim girls’ schools that taught after the European system 
but in the Tatar language was seen with suspicion by Russian 
authorities, and some of the schools were closed.18 Remem-
bering that time, the well-known Tatar intellectual Rizaeddin 
Fahreddin (who was head of the Central Spiritual Directorate 
of Muslims in Ufa in the Soviet period up to his death) includ-
ed in his book on famous women several Muslim women from 
Russia who, at the beginning of the century, “devoted their 
entire lives to education and to teaching girls”.19
As in other Muslim societies (such as Turkey for example),20 
the attempts to give girls a better education than in the past 
and to involve Muslim women in the social life of imperial 
Russia were presented by the Muslim reformers as contribut-
ing primarily to the well-being of family and children, and 
hence to the well-being of the whole Muslim society or the 
nation. In the context of increasing Russification, especially 
after the defeat of the revolution of 1905, as well as a general 
radicalization of the situation in Russia, direct connections 
between women’s education, women’s rights and the prog-
ress of the nation were made with increasing frequency.
finAlly, it is necessAry to note that the development of 
notions of progress that included women’s emancipation con-
tributed to the specific role that representatives of the impe-
rial science on the Orient played in discussions on the future 
of Muslim peoples and women in Russia. According to Vera 
Tolz, many Orientologists, while working for the progress of 
the empire, did not see support for local nationalisms and the 
rights of non-Russians as mutually contradictory.21 Although 
the “women’s question” was not at the center of Orientologist 
interest, it was important to a few women in that profession. 
Thus the Kazan-born Russian Olga Lebedeva, a translator of 
poetry from several Asian languages, presented herself at 
the Congress of Orientalists in Algeria in 1905 as “serving the 
idea of the emancipation of Muslim women within the limits 
that were indicated by the Prophet, the founder of a teach-
ing that is fully compatible with all recent cultural advances, 
provided it is correctly interpreted”.22 Supporting those who 
were trying to change the situation of Muslim women without 
criticizing Islam, Lebedeva suggested that a view of the Mus-
lim religion from this perspective could help Algerian Muslim 
women for example “to catch up to their European sisters”.
All actors advocating change — imperial officers, Muslim 
intellectuals and some Orientologists — were looking at the 
situation through the lens of a developmental paradigm (“to 
catch up”, “to enlighten”). At the same time, while imperial 
officers saw the solution in the assimilation and de-Islamiza-
tion of the non-Russian population, Muslim intellectuals saw 
the improvement of women’s situation as a prerequisite for 
the “progress of the nation”.
the WoMen’s Question 
aMong russian MusliMs in 
1917: BetWeen deMocracY, 
anti-colonialisM, and 
nationalisM?
While women’s organizations, led by the Women’s Union 
for Equality, demonstrated in Saint Petersburg demanding 
equal political rights for women in connection with the end 
of the monarchy in March 1917,23 many other organizations 
and groups (including nationalist ones) expressed rather 
similar demands in many parts of the empire, but in different 
contexts. Material from the newspaper Kaspii,24 for example, 
leads us to suppose that, at least for some part of the Russian 
Muslim society, the idea of broadening rights for women ap-
peared an obvious part of the social and political changes that 
would lead to “progress”. What arguments were used and 
what political measures were proposed?
Under the pressure of the central women’s organizations, 
the new legislation issued by the Provisional Government 
gave women the right to participate in the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly and local councils. The new legislation 
was seen positively by the Muslim politicians: the participa-
tion of women as voters and as candidates would increase the 
visibility of Muslims on the Russian political scene, and raise 
numbers of Muslims elected to office. Muslim women were 
therefore strongly advised to vote, first of all for the Muslim 
candidates.25 In order to eliminate doubts with respect to 
women’s political participation, the Central Spiritual Direc-
torate for the Muslims of Inner Russia, located in Ufa, used 
the image of women as mothers and looked for arguments in 
Sharia: “Because the Muslim Sharia does not limit women’s 
political rights, including their active and passive electoral 
rights, there is no obstacle from the point of view of Sharia to 
Muslim women’s participation in the electoral campaign.”26
Probably the most radical event of the time was the First 
Muslim Women’s Congress, which took place in Kazan in 
April 1917. The congress was attended by women from differ-
ent parts of the empire, from St. Petersburg and Crimea to 
Central Asia, and it voted to adopt a resolution on the rights of 
Muslim women. In May of the same year, this resolution was 
also supported by the All-Russian Muslim Congress in Mos-
cow.27 The resolution of the Kazan congress made important 
statements on gender equality: it declared the political rights 
of women, their right to divorce and to marriage by consent, 
the prohibition of the bride price, and the right of women not 
to be secluded. The declarations were made with reference 
to Sharia law28 to indicate that aspirations to such rights did 
not endanger the Muslim identity of the beneficiaries and had 
nothing to do with attacks on Islam by the Russian state. This 
resolution was one of the first to stress that women had a duty 
to participate in elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Furthermore, the Bureau of Muslim Women elected by the 
Congress prepared a pamphlet calling on all Muslim women 
in Russia (“Muslim sisters”) not to be passive in such a “his-
toric time”. According to the pamphlet, Muslim women had 
to become “full members of society” in order to serve the 
national interests and “not to burden men alone with the task 
of building the foundation of our national future”. If Muslim 
women would not take off the “chains of injustice and op-
pression”, then “our children, our young nation never would 
forgive this”,29 the pamphlet stated. The period between Feb-
ruary and October 1917 was when several Muslim Women’s 
Committees appeared in Russia.30 The Committee from 
Crimea was presented by Kaspii as trying to “bring together 
all Tatar women in order to liberate them from centuries of 
slavery, and to awaken the spirit of citizenship in Crimean Ta-
tar women, mothers of the free, democratic Russia”.31
Declaring women’s rights for the sake of the nation and 
with reference to Sharia laws was a rather widespread tactic 
that was followed in many documents issued around 1917, and 
even in some documents from the first years after the Bolshe-
vik Revolution. Both of the Muslim Congresses that took place 
in the period between February and October of 1917 — one 
in May in Moscow and another in July in Kazan — took the 
women’s question seriously. Although the general atmo-
sphere at the second Congress was much more conservative 
than at the first, its resolution still stated that “lack of clarity 
with respect to the solution of the women’s question in this 
historical moment could damage our national and cultural 
movement”. Indeed, the “women’s question” was seen by the 
Congress participants as a question that was important for 
the “whole nation” and not only for women.32
in Addition to recognizing equal rights in the political 
sphere, documents from 1917—1920 insist on many other 
changes in the status of Muslim women that would contribute 
to the nation’s well-being. For example, the resolution of the 
Kazan Women’s Congress contained a statement about the 
need for a health certificate for bride and groom before the 
religious wedding ceremony (nikah) could be performed; this 
was explained as necessary “for the health of the nation”.33 
Child marriages too were prohibited, not so much from the 
perspective of women’s rights, but in order to prevent “sick 
children” as the result of such marriages. The Kazan resolu-
tion insisted on 16 years as the earliest acceptable marriage 
age for brides (“in the North as well as in the South and 
East”) and demanded that the groom should guarantee that 
he would not take a second wife into his house (except on 
granting a divorce and maintenance to the first one). Finally, 
the right of women to divorce in case of “unhappy marriage” 
was also justified not only by the “woman’s suffering”, but by 
“bad conditions for children’s upbringing” in such a family.
the future of the 
revolution and 
“WoMen of the orient” 
in Bolshevik PolicY of 
Bringing culture to the 
Masses
While the political aims and rhetoric of Bolshevik women’s 
liberation are well studied,34 I would like to look here more 
closely at their application to the “women of the Orient” 
(vostochnitsa) — a broader concept that encompassed wom-
en from different ethnic and religious groups, and by which 
most of the non-Western, non-Slavic and non-Orthodox wom-
en living on the territory of the former Russian Empire were 
usually unified. This term, like natsionalka and natsmenka for 
women of national minorities, was usually used in the texts 
describing plans for the progressive development of society. 
Like activists of the nationalist movements in Tatarstan and 
Bashkortostan, the Bolshevik leaders and rank-and-file agita-
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tors were living in a world where the ideas of progress, devel-
opment and the common good were used by various actors 
to justify their policy plans. Thus women were also placed in 
the development/backwardness hierarchy created by the Bol-
shevik leaders. The conversion of the backward “woman of 
the Orient” into new, “cultured woman” of the socialist state 
implied scientific grounds for political actions. The “women 
of the Orient’s” cultural difference was to be reevaluated from 
the new, revolutionary perspective, and at the same time, the 
new day-to-day life of the “women of the Orient” had to be or-
ganized according to the latest achievements of science with 
regard to a healthy and prosperous lifestyle.
It is important to notice, however, that the question of 
Islam had a particular importance in the choice of paths to 
women’s emancipation. In the first post-revolutionary years, 
the Muslim population in Russia as well as abroad was seen 
by the Bolsheviks as an important ally on the way to World 
Revolution, and the Soviet government abstained from open 
attacks on Islam. As previous research shows, this helped to 
gain a certain support for Soviet reforms in the region. For 
example, the Muslim congress that took place in Ufa in 1923 
expressed support for the Bolshevik project of cultural revo-
lution, including support for the creation of mixed schools 
and secondary education for Muslim women,35 while some 
Muslim intellectuals from the Volga-Ural region got an oppor-
tunity to implement their plans with respect to education.36
While mAny eArlier periodicals for Tatars and Bashkirs 
were closed down,37 Soviet publications for and about Muslim 
women in the 1920s did not have a stable and coherent vision 
of Muslim customs and traditions, nor a vision of emanci-
pated women. For example, in his pamphlet on the veil, Niko-
lai Smirnov, the future head of Soviet Orientologists, wrote 
that the covering of women’s bodies was a subject of debate 
among Muslim theologians.38 He also made reference to 
Jadidist criticism of women’s seclusion (specifically, to Ismail 
Bey Gaspirali39). At the same time, Smirnov, like most authors 
of Soviet pamphlets, kept silent on the active involvement of 
women who did not refuse to follow their Muslim dresscode 
in work for the emancipation of women on the eve of the Oc-
tober Revolution.
Another pamphlet, published in Russian by the Women’s 
Council of Tatarstan in 1923 on occasion of International 
Women’s Day, also shows many contradictions in the evalu-
ation of women’s situation and Muslim culture. The article 
“Tatar Women in the Years of Revolution” by Zora Baimbe-
tova acknowledges the active participation of Muslim women 
in their own “emancipation” before the October Revolution 
(mainly in the period between February and October 1917): 
“There was no Muslim congress where questions about the 
rights of women in the context of Islam and Sharia would not 
be discussed.” However, pre-Soviet organizations of Muslim 
women were now called “bourgeois” and thus presented as 
negative rather than positive historic examples.40 Further-
more, the article presented the “woman of the Orient” as 
experiencing extreme exploitation due to religious and na-
tional traditions, a cliché that would be used daily during the 
entire Soviet period. Indeed, the Tatar woman is described 
in the article as “the most backward of the backward”, and 
subject to 1,000 times more discrimination than the Russian 
woman.41 This was explained by the specific local situation, 
which combined economic and religious oppression. Soviet 
policies are described as contributing to the disappearance 
of the “passive, unmovable and oppressed Tatar woman”, 
thus constructing lack of initiative and activism as important 
features of “backwardness”.
With time the suspicions and fears of the Bolshevik govern-
ment with respect to the Muslim population grew, and influ-
enced most of the projects aimed at solving the “women’s 
question” in the Volga-Ural region. Due to lack of trust in 
combination with ignorance of local languages and traditions, 
the Soviet authorities needed help from specialists in Oriental 
studies. The latter were invited to take part in designing poli-
cies and publications in the 1920s. For example, the series of 
pamphlets on work with mothers and children from differ-
ent ethnic groups of the “Orient” were published under the 
leadership of the Department of Health Care for Mothers and 
Children in 1927—1928, but the chief editor of the series was 
V. A. Gurko-Kriazhina, head of the national minorities section 
of the Agitprop department of the Central Committee of the 
Bolshevik party and a member of the presidium of the Scien-
tific Association of Oriental Studies. Each pamphlet started 
with an ethnographic description of the landscape and popu-
lation, presented in a rather romantic style and clearly for an 
outside spectator.42 The book on Tatar women, for example, 
contains ethnographic descriptions of a Tatar village and a 
Tatar wedding ceremony.43 These exotic pictures were mixed 
up with the presentation of women’s lives as rather difficult 
and unjust: the Tatar woman was over-exploited, “man’s 
property”, a “commodity”, often having an “animal life”.44 
These portrayals were followed by examples of the Soviet 
“emancipation of women”, which included women’s partici-
pation in new communist activities and education and data 
on new kindergartens and maternity hospitals.
In 1926 the Bolsheviks decided to create a special commis-
sion concerned with helping women from the national minor-
ities (or “backward women”, as they were frequently called in 
the commission’s internal correspondence) to co-exist with 
other Soviet citizens on the way to the communist future. The 
document establishing the Commission for the Improvement 
of the Work and Everyday Life of Women stressed the need to 
“combat the economic inequality of women and the inequal-
ity of their rights”, “prepare expert evaluations of the situa-
tion of working women for the various activities of the central 
institutions of the republics with respect to everyday life, the 
economy and rights”, and “draft proposals for new laws that 
could contribute to the improvement of women’s everyday 
life and work”.45 Each of the autonomous republics of the 
Volga-Ural region had its own commission to work with local 
women. The archive documents show that the effectiveness 
of these commissions depended in large part on the energy 
and interest of their members, who were usually new Soviet 
civil servants busy with other responsibilities. For example, 
in the report of such a commission in Bashkortostan dated 
1928, we read:
The regional institutions to date do not consider 
the work among natsionalki as a part of their work; 
activities are always organized under pressure. This 
refers in particular to the activities that should be 
under the supervision of the regional department 
of education. This department did not organize any 
activity pursuant to the plans we made together.46
The “women’s question” is addressed by the Commission as if 
women needed a kindergarten of sorts on the path to cultural 
development, and accordingly its documents attest to many 
problems and difficulties. For example, a 1928 letter to the 
central Commission presented the situation in Tatarstan as a 
“precarious network of institutions for the national minori-
ties” in spite of “the special role of preschool education for 
the emancipation of women of the national minorities, the 
improvement of their children’s health and the introduction 
of the new organizational forms of everyday life for the popu-
lation of the national minorities”.47
It is easy to suppose that a lot of the projects and activity 
plans designed for the progress and development of “women 
of the Orient”, in spite of their emancipatory rhetoric and 
scientific elaboration, did not produce enthusiasm among the 
broader masses of women in the Volga-Ural region. A certain 
similarity of the Soviet emancipatory rhetoric to the civilizing 
rhetoric of the imperial center may have played an important 
role: once again the “backward”, non-Russian woman was ex-
pected to fulfill plans for her culturalization that had been de-
vised in Moscow. With the beginning of forced collectivization 
in the early 1930s, the Commission lost its special mandate for 
the improvement of the work and everyday lives of “women 
of the Orient”, and most of the active participants in the early 
phase of the Soviet solution of the “women’s question” in the 
Volga-Ural region suffered imprisonment or death during the 
period of Stalinist repression.48
in conclusion it could be said that in the Volga-Ural re-
gion as in other parts of Russia in the first third of the 20th 
century the “women’s question” played an important role in 
discussions and visions of modernization and development. 
However, interpretations and decisions on the solution of this 
“question” differed significantly.
The nationalist leaders of the region saw Muslim women 
as an important political force for national progress and 
development. Looking at the ideals of progress and culture, 
Muslim intellectuals were eager to find examples of them 
in Western Europe and Asia and, only secondarily, in Rus-
sia. During 1917 the role of Muslim women as independent 
political actors increased: women created new organizations 
and designed their own programs for the solution of the 
“women’s question” in the region and among followers of 
Islam. The women’s activism, inspired by the rhetoric and 
organizational forms common for the women’s movement 
in Europe and Russia, continued to present itself as an activ-
ism closely bound to the progress of the nation and as part of 
Muslim culture. The end of the Russian Empire in February of 
1917 further strengthened the connections between the ideas 
of women’s emancipation and democracy among the people 
of the region.
After october 1917, the Bolsheviks preserved intact a 
substantial part of the emancipational rhetoric of earlier de-
fenders of women’s rights for non-Russian (including Muslim) 
women, but introduced a class-based assessment of women’s 
activism. Still, the emancipation of all working women, re-
gardless of their ethnicity, was declared to be an important 
goal of the new Soviet state. As part of the new goal, Muslim 
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women from the Volga-Ural region were to be educated and 
taught about their rights, and this educational campaign was 
seen as contributing to the development of the new socialist 
society. In the first post-revolutionary years the Bolshevik 
government saw Tatar and Bashkir women as important allies 
and was careful in its criticism of the Muslim religion as such.
Women’s ignorance of their new rights and duties was seen 
by the Soviet authorities as an obstacle to progress which had 
to be overcome with the help of the new institutions like Com-
missions for the Improvement of the Work and Everyday Life 
of Women. The new institutions, however, like those of the 
imperial period, were designed centrally and lacked funding. 
Furthermore, the Bolshevik design of work for emancipation 
placed Russian and Slavic women in higher, more privileged 
positions on the scale of emancipation. The hierarchizing of 
women by their degree of “backwardness” was increasingly 
a reminder of old imperial hierarchies, at the same time that 
low-level activism aimed at national progress and develop-
ment formulated locally (or the development of Tatar and 
Bashkir society and culture, in the case of the Volga-Ural re-
gion) became the object of punishment from the center. As a 
result, new interpretations of “progress” and “development” 
could not count on much support from the Muslim women 
of the Volga-Ural region, and with time, the Soviet central 
policy of solving the “women’s question” in the region had to 
depend more and more on coercive measures. ≈
Note: All essays are scholarly articles and have been peer-
reviewed by specialists under the supervision of Baltic 
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Anders Nordström holds a PhD in political science and 
is a research fellow at CBEES. He is currently study-
ing the Council of Europe’s monitoring processes in 
relation to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in an-
ticipation of closer European integration. Nordström 
is particularly interested in how “European values” 
are communicated, interpreted, and understood in 
these protracted monitoring processes. He argues that 
this is an example of cosmopolitan politics wherein 
European and national regulatory processes are being 
interwoven and are influencing each other.
In April 2012, he joined the Uppsala Association of 
International Affairs on a trip to the South Caucasus 
and visited the capitals of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Armenia. He was trying to understand how the people 
there describe the situation, and what their outlook 
on the future was like. On this journey, he met with 
representatives of think tanks, universities, govern-
ment agencies, the international community, the po-
litical opposition, and activists.
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are 
neighboring states, and all of them aspire 
to membership in the EU. Are there any 
important common factors in these countries’ 
perceptions of themselves?
“The countries in the South Caucasus all position 
themselves in relation to an omnipresent threat of war 
and insecurity. They paint themselves as prisoners of 
geography and history in the hands of great powers 
that have balanced each other’s interests.”
Anders Nordström believes that the countries have 
generally pinned their hopes for a better future on at-
tempts to climb out of their local context and connect 
to the global economy.
“There were hopes of commodity extraction and 
energy exports, but establishing ties with Europe and 
the Western world also represented a way of evading 
the influence of the traditional, regional imperial pow-
ers: Russia, Turkey, and Iran.”
Another recurring picture of the situation was that 
policy was in something of a state of double paralysis, 
where international policy was decided by the great 
powers, and national policy determined by local oli-
garchies.
How would you characterize these 
oligarchies?
“These are the people who have succeeded in the 
complex and often very brutal nationalization, privati-
zation, and globalization of economies after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union and who, in order to secure 
their financial interests, have also felt compelled to 
be involved in politics and the media. For this reason, 
they are thought to control not only local business, but 
also politics and media, and are well integrated in the 
top echelons of the global business world and world 
politics.”
What is the situation of people who are not 
oligarchs and who have not been able to profit 
from the economic transition?
“The majorities of the populations live under basic 
conditions in what may be described as deindustrial-
ized economies”, Nordström explains.
The picture of super-rich and powerful oligarchies 
stands in sharp relief against the picture of under-
employment and persistent poverty. The elderly 
person living on twenty or thirty dollars a month who 
could not afford to pay her electric bill was a story Nor-
dström heard in all three countries. The rural areas in 
particular were portrayed as subsistence economies 
that were either held together by strong family ties 
or survived on money sent home by family members 
working abroad.
But there were also wide disparities in how people 
described their country’s situation and in their visions 
for the future. These disparities were largely based on 
national stereotypes, according to Nordström:
“I felt that many of the stereotypes I was treated to 
before the trip showed up again in the description of 
the future: Azerbaijan as a sultanic petrostate, Georgia 
as wild and ungovernable, Armenia as ancient and 
tragic.”
There are significant differences between the three 
countries, which stem partially from historical causes 
and partially from the prevailing political situation. 
Local traditions, minority issues, intergenerational 
social conflicts, and relations to surrounding countries 
and the rest of the world also play a part, of course.
AzErbAijAn
Azerbaijan stood out as hypermodern, globalized, and 
yet archaically governed:
“The first thing that struck me when I got to Baku 
was the presence of petro-wealth. Hypermodern 
buildings rose up like stranded spaceships here and 
there around Baku, bringing to mind the rapidly grow-
ing cities of China and the petrostates in the Persian 
Gulf. This says something about the future that Azer-
baijan imagines is coming soon.”
Still, many older buildings and tourist attractions 
are built in a style designed to trigger associations 
with Islam and the Orient. In conversations with Azer-
baijanis, Nordström discerned a need to contrast the 
historical and colonial legacy with the image of the 
country as modern and secular.
“When people talked about Azerbaijan’s glory 
days, they were talking about the oil boom of the late 
19th century when the oil industry in Baku was compet-
ing with US oil fields to be the center of the global oil 
industry.”
Baku can thus be seen as the cradle of the modern, 
global petroleum-based economy, and modern Azer-
baijan is hoping for a resurrection of its greatness after 
an era of Soviet partitioning from the global economy 
and transfer of oil revenues to Moscow. In this sense, 
Azerbaijan can also be seen as a leading power in the 
modernization of the Muslim world. Today’s Azerbai-
jan has the same national symbols as the short-lived 
independent republic of 1918—1920, the first demo-
cratic state in the Muslim world, with female suffrage 
and religious freedom, and it is this tradition people 
say they want to build upon.
“The more controversial aspect of the current 
modernization is that it is so strongly connected to the 
Aliyev family. Azerbaijan as the personal property of 
the Aliyev family was a recurring theme — a total priva-
tization of the state.
“The country was characterized as a feudal soci-
ety where the family doles out regional monopolies 
as fiefs to local bigwigs. The president’s role in this 
shadow system is to resolve disputes and balance the 
interests of the powerful. For this reason, the presi-
dent’s authority cannot be questioned.”
Nordström interjects that this is sometimes remi-
niscent of the cult of Atatürk in Turkey.
“Everywhere, you see portraits, statues, monu-
ments, and writings that pay homage to former presi-
dent Heydar Aliyev, the current president’s father.”
The tacit acceptance created a pervasive sense 
that the family’s power over Azerbaijan had become 
consolidated and that this stability was universally 
desired by the country’s nearest neighbors, as well as 
by Europe and the US. There was omnipresent anxiety 
about what might happen if someone were to become 
an enemy of the regime, anxiety that has paralyzed 
political life and created a civil society oriented to-
wards survival rather than bringing about change.
GEorGiA
Compared to Azerbaijan, Georgia seemed much more 
politically open — open to inspection and open to un-
expected change. A common opinion was that Geor-
gian culture embraces an appreciation of the untamed 
and crazy, as well as the intrinsic value of indepen-
dence. It was exactly that which gave Georgians the 
courage to take on the impossible, such as effectively 
fighting inveterate corruption.
Georgia is proud to have become the World Bank’s 
poster child for anti-corruption. After the Rose Revo-
lution of 2003, the entire police force was fired and 
only those who passed stringent physical standards 
CosmopolitAn visions in  
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were rehired. The consequence was an efficient and 
loyal police force with a good reputation, Nordström 
explains.
The emphasis on openness and transparency in 
dealings with the public can be seen in the architec-
ture of the police headquarters. The entire building is 
glass, and thus transparent. The strong self-image is 
also clear in relation to the country’s European ambi-
tions.
Do Georgians see themselves as part of 
Europe?
“The Georgians regard themselves unquestionably as 
a part of Europe, but the government remains critical 
of the regulations on the European common market. 
Singapore was described as the role model and the 
economic objective was to globalize, rather than Euro-
peanize. But given Georgia’s position, Europe was the 
only option.”
Critics of the government believed the extreme 
neoliberal economic policy was counter-productive 
if integration with the West was in fact the goal. Nord-
ström says:
“The absence of regulations actually scared away 
European and American investors. The latter did not 
consider the unregulated situation sustainable, and it 
instead attracted the interest of Chinese and Russian 
investors with a shorter time horizon.”
What is the situation today?
“I arrived in the middle of the political prelude to 
the autumn parliamentary election, which is in turn 
the prelude to the presidential election in 2013. What 
generated the excitement was that the richest man in 
Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, had withdrawn his sup-
port from the government and changed directions 
from philanthropy to political action. He now openly 
challenged Saakashvili and had formed an opposition 
alliance called “the Georgian Dream”. Ivanishvili was 
already an unmistakable presence in Tbilisi, where 
his house dominated the city landscape like an eagle’s 
nest taken straight out of a James Bond film, overlook-
ing the government building.”
The establishment of a stronger government ma-
chine was a side effect of the Rose Revolution and the 
Georgian government’s anti-corruption initiatives. 
Efficiency has also been the operative word in relation 
to reforming the legal system. This has, according to 
Nordström, led to lopsidedness in the legal system in 
favor of the prosecution. Most legal proceedings are 
determined outside the courtroom and the posi-
tion of judges and defense attorneys has been un-
dermined. The opposition claims this government 
machine is being used to crack down on opponents 
of the sitting government. The opposition’s take on 
the situation is that this is a sign that corruption has 
not been eradicated, but only moved upwards in the 
system.
“In general, the mood in the run-up to the elections 
was agitated. The pundits I spoke with said that Geor-
gian politics is shaped by a revolutionary mindset. The 
government styles itself as revolutionaries and its op-
ponents as counter-revolutionaries. The opposition, 
meanwhile, describe themselves as the true revolu-
tionaries up against a government blinded by power. 
I noticed that neither side was eager to discuss how 
they would act in a situation where they did not win 
as big as they hoped. The political future of Georgia is 
an entirely open question. Or as one of the Georgians 
I met put it: ‘We are going to have sexy elections this 
year.’”
ArmEniA
the last country you visited on your trip 
was Armenia. How did Armenia differ from 
Azerbaijan and Georgia?
“When I arrived in Armenia, there was also an election 
in progress, but without the overwrought atmosphere 
of Tbilisi. In general, Yerevan seemed calmer than 
the choleric capital of Georgia. Along the lines of the 
Georgian fight against corruption, the Armenians had 
successfully combated the formerly anarchistic traffic 
culture: cars now stopped for pedestrians and people 
wore their seatbelts. But you could also see a new-
found anger and weariness of the entrenched political 
situation among the younger generation.”
The big symbolic action, Nordström argues, was 
the occupation of a park in central Yerevan in protest 
of how the rich and powerful oligarchs set themselves 
above the law. The rhetoric in these protests was in-
spired by the global Occupy Movement and was more 
anti-capitalist than nationalist.
“The criticism among the young and well-educated 
was aimed at the distortions created by the economic 
inequalities. In contrast to the traditional nationalist 
emphasis on history, their focus was on being able to 
live a normal life like others of their generation in the 
rest of the world today. ‘I care about Everest as much 
as I care about Ararat’, said one of the activists, refer-
ring to the vain longing for what is for many Arme-
1.
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nians the virtually sacred Mount Ararat on the other 
side of the Turkish border.
“The pervasive tone was otherwise mildly fatalis-
tic. The situation for Armenians was disastrous and 
always had been. The memory of the genocide against 
Armenians during World War I is part of that. This 
fatalism is exacerbated by a steadily declining and 
emigrating population, deindustrialization, natural 
disasters, and war since independence.”
Unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia is home to 
a fondness for the Soviet era and nostalgia for Russia 
as the historic protectors of the Armenians against the 
Turks.
How was that manifest?
“Well, you could see it for example in what their uni-
forms looked like and in the Soviet monuments they 
were still building”, Nordström says.
The ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan on the status 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the occupation 
of a large swath of the neighboring country has a para-
lyzing effect on both domestic and foreign policy. The 
pundits argued that despite this, there was no willing-
ness to compromise in Armenian society and that in 
light of an increasingly stronger and more rhetorically 
aggressive Azerbaijan that can afford to spend as 
much on its military as the entire government budget 
of Armenia, the situation was worrisome. The hope 
was that the precarious situation would force the 
institution of reforms, but there was a consensus of 
distrust in the politicians and businessmen who con-
trolled the country, as well as the only opposition on 
offer. It was as if society itself had carefully closed the 
roads to change, Nordström says.
GEopolitiCAl DEADloCks — 
CosmopolitAn fUtUrE
Was there anything that particularly struck you 
during this informal field study? Were there 
any main issues or recurring themes in the 
discussions?
“What was obvious in the three countries was that the 
economy is globalized, but politics has not kept up, 
having instead become mired in territorial conflicts 
that paralyze and divert political energy. The national 
stereotypes are still useful for defining enemies and 
friends, justifying actions, and explaining phenom-
ena, but not for describing visions for the future.”
Visions for the future are instead found beyond the 
realm of the national, in the globalized or cosmopoli-
tan, among transnational, super-rich oligarchs with 
multiple citizenship, but also among the well-educat-
ed, and Internet users. People are finding their own 
paths to global economic flows, either by migrating 
to the flows or by trying to control strategic points for 
the flows. To be in the flow is to be successful. Outsid-
ers have nothing to offer. Their labor is not useful and 
their voices can be bought cheaply, or manipulated.
“Why these injustices could not be mobilized into 
political fury was a recurring question. The explana-
tion often given was that politics was a dangerous 
business and people who get involved — and their 
families — risk losing their jobs or their health. Much 
political activism is aimed at creating conditions that 
make politics possible — but also at exerting influence 
through direct action.
“In many ways, the situation and the discussions 
reminded me of what you might experience in Europe 
or anywhere else in the world, only in a much more 
extreme version. The young, well-educated, and lin-
guistically talented in particular expressed frustration 
at the privileged position of the super-rich and how 
this spilled over into the rest of society and under-
mined ambitions to work hard and do the right thing.”
The most ambivalent attitude Anders Nordström 
encountered was in Azerbaijan.
“It was a mix of pride in economic progress since 
independence and worry about a lack of alternative 
futures.
“The attitude communicated in Georgia was pride 
and self-confidence, fearlessness, ‘it’s all up to us now, 
we will do what we want’, a sometimes slightly naive 
belief that the future can be absolutely anything, and 
that the country can start over from the beginning.
“I recognized the Armenian attitude as the most 
post-Soviet, but perhaps also the most realistic, in that 
there was no expectation of radical change. Or as one 
Armenian summed up the situation: ‘It will probably 
go wrong this time, too; you should never underes-
timate the stupidity of our politicians’. This is an ac-
knowledgement of a partially self-inflicted, paralyzing 
stagnation where the future is in the hands of us poor, 
inadequate people; something felt these days in con-
nection with the entire European project.” ≈
ninna mörner 
Editor of Baltic Worlds.
Note: See BW’s election coverage at www.balticworlds.com. 
Anders Nordström comments on the outcome of the 
elections in Armenia, and there is also an analysis of the 
election results in Georgia.
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T
he last refuge of a govern-
ment ideologue unable to 
offer a realistic program for 
development is religion. The 
consequences of playing the religion 
card are unpredictable.
Dmitri Medvedev, then president 
of the Russian Federation, refused to 
release the members of the punk group 
Pussy Riot. On April 26 2012, speaking 
to representatives of five TV chan-
nels, the president, for the first time in 
months, voiced his opinion on a topic 
that had Russian society even more 
drastically divided than the discussion 
of pre-election programs. “As a devout 
Christian” — a rare admission — Dmitri 
Anatolievich (Medvedev) remarked that 
“the young ladies got what they wanted: 
popularity”.
The three members of the feminist 
punk group were arrested in late Febru-
ary and were supposed to remain in 
custody until the end of June. When 
asked whether the young ladies were 
so dangerous to society that they de-
served to be put behind bars for such a 
long time, Mr. Medvedev responded by 
pointing out that it was not possible for 
him to interfere with the decision of the 
court. Thus, the case of Pussy Riot ad-
vanced to the next stage; it also signaled 
to observers the government’s stand 
on recent questionable actions of some 
church officials. It is evident and not 
surprising that the liberal segment of 
Russian society was disappointed with, 
among other things, Medvedev’s evalu-
ation of the situation, as it was with his 
statement about freedom of speech: 
once again, the president mentioned 
the absence of censorship and different 
priorities set by government-sponsored 
TV channels on the one hand versus the 
Internet on the other.
But let us get back to the religion ques-
tion, or, to be more precise, to the use 
of religious symbols, which became 
an inseparable part of the political 
discourse — increasingly so with the 
inauguration of the new/old president, 
Putin, fast approaching. Let us be clear: 
these issues have never played such an 
important role in the country’s history. 
Reports about the highest-ranking gov-
ernment officials visiting monasteries 
and cathedrals on religious holidays 
have become an integral part of pro-
tocol; meetings with the head of the 
Russian Orthodox Church and leaders 
of other denominations officially recog-
nized in the country are now an almost 
daily ritual. We are already used to the 
fact that during the stormy pre-election 
campaign or before unpopular deci-
sions on vital issues were made — es-
pecially reductions in social services or 
increases in the cost of utilities — so-
ciety’s attention was deliberately dis-
tracted by such seemingly “burning” 
issues as whether to allow polygamy, to 
ban abortions, and so on. People threw 
themselves with great agitation into the 
discussion about polygamy, forgetting 
completely about increases in the cost 
of electricity and water. Such “vital” 
topics would then be laid to rest for a 
while until the beginning of a new cam-
paign. We have already gone through 
that.
What transpired last winter, however, 
appeared unprecedented. Let us recall 
just one event which paralyzed the 
city of Moscow for several days: the 
adoration of the girdle from the robe 
of Mary in the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior in the center of Moscow. It was 
a well-organized event and was craftily 
advertised immediately before the par-
liamentary elections. Elderly women 
prayed for their families and health 
as well as for the head of the Russian 
Orthodox Church and for the ruling 
political party, which oversaw the ar-
rival of the sacred item from Athos. At 
the time, no one took notice of the fact 
that a Greek official who helped strike 
the deal was later imprisoned for fraud. 
In the melee of the moment — about a 
thousand people ended up in the hospi-
tal after waiting in line for hours — few 
citizens noticed the media reports of 
the shameless sale of spots in the queue 
for a pretty penny, and stories of of-
ficials holding VIP passes. People could 
have read in several media publications 
about our own fragment of the same 
girdle from the robe of Mary, which was 
given to Russia more than a hundred 
years ago by grateful monks from Athos 
after the Shipka battle. It has always 
been displayed in an old church just a 
few steps from the agitated crowd. Yet 
there was no line for that.
In all honesty, I cannot think that the 
number of true believers has multiplied 
significantly since my younger days, 
when religion was, to say the least, not 
“in”. I recall the Komsomol (Union of 
Young Communists) leaders bullying 
their classmates who dared to attend a 
church or synagogue. Nowadays, many 
68commentaries
of those same officials can be seen hug-
ging and kissing the reverend fathers 
on camera. Faith, in general, is an inti-
mate matter. It is hard to imagine a true 
believer of any denomination drooling 
with cruel anticipation at the brutal ex-
ecution of a fellow human being, wheth-
er innocent or guilty. Orthodox and 
non-Orthodox alike have written about 
it in their blogs when commenting on 
the Ku Klux Klan-style campaign being 
waged against the three young women, 
members of the little-known feminist 
punk rock band Pussy Riot, who, on 
February 21, staged a performance in 
the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in 
Moscow, during which they asked the 
Virgin Mary in prayer to rid the country 
of Putin and Kirill, Patriarch of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church.
there is noW no doubt that the subse-
quent arrest of the members of Pussy 
Riot and the disproportionately severe 
punishment they had to face were the 
result of their having mentioned the 
above two individuals, and were meant 
to discourage others from doing the 
same. The message was crystal clear 
to all. The result, however, was unex-
pected. In addition to the mass demon-
strations calling for violence against the 
“perpetrators of sacrilege”, the incident 
gave rise to a protest movement. More 
and more people became infuriated 
with the government’s actions, as well 
as those of the church. The scandal — 
unworthy of a person who has taken 
a vow — surrounding the Primate’s 
property, be it his costly Breguet watch 
or his home in an elite housing complex 
(where he ruined a neighbor, himself 
a clergyman), merely added fuel to the 
fire. With increasing frequency, believ-
ers and even some church officials have 
been asking unpleasant questions on-
line and in the media, thus demonstrat-
ing the absence of unity among them. 
Some Russian Orthodox clergy do not 
share the Patriarch’s opinion about the 
Dangerous games.
When official religious doctrines provoke
Illustration: Karin Sunvisson
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Class as crucible. 
Analysis of social differentiation
Any judgment about the relative 
importance of class and status 
factors and about the role of 
market processes per se in the 
life chances of individuals may 
be difficult to make […] it is es-
sential that it is attempted.  
 Joan Scott, 1994
I
n September 2011, Tony Wood — 
the author of Chechnya: The Case 
for Independence — visited the Cen-
tre for Baltic and East European 
Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn University 
(see Baltic Worlds vol. IV:2; 2011). At the 
end of his sojourn he held a well-attend-
ed seminar at CBEES and presented a 
paper of which I was the principal com-
mentator. Seven months later a revised 
and updated version of the article en-
titled “Collapse as Crucible: The Reforg-
ing of Russian Society” was published 
in the March/April issue of the New Left 
Review (vol. 74; 2012), presenting Russia 
on its cover as “The Iceberg Society”, 
an allusion to a famous remark by 
Moshe Lewin on the Soviet society of 
the 1920—1930s as the “quicksand soci-
ety”. The CBEES seminar was a lively 
event, with many interventions and 
questions duly acknowledged in the 
first footnote of the published article. 
Below are some of my remarks from 
this occasion reworked after the release 
of Wood’s article.
draWing on the recent protest mobiliza-
tion in Russia and Western press asser-
tions of the arrival of the urban middle 
class that would put an end to the era of 
unaccountability and corruption in the 
country, Wood asks a simple question: 
Why was there no such open and mass re-
sistance movement since 1991? The ques-
tion is not so much about whether the 
levels of inequality, social injustice, and 
exploitation have reached the point that 
can no longer be tolerated, but rather 
about where these people came from 
who make claims determining what 
country they want to live in. The author 
sees the origins of the perverse “stabili-
ty” of the Putin era in the persistence of 
“the old”, the “social consciousness of 
the Communist era”, which disfigures 
economic and political structures and, 
more importantly, permeates social re-
lations, concealing the levels of inequal-
ity and preventing different parts of the 
population from realizing their poten-
tial mutual interests and mobilizing for 
collective action.
The article focuses specifically on 
how transformation of the means of 
production and productive relations, 
conditions for access to property and 
power, military conflicts and global 
economic disruptions transformed 
the system of social differentiation 
in the country in the period from the 
October Revolution to the events on 
Sakharov Avenue. Wood begins with a 
rather conventional argument that the 
peculiarities of the post-Soviet Russian 
society with regard to social, political, 
and economic organization are a result 
of the norms and practices inherited 
from the previous epoch. The major 
original contribution of the author’s elo-
quent discussion is the conclusion that 
the past is not simply responsible “for 
the deformities of Russian capitalism 
today”; more importantly, “it is […] the 
persistence of the old that has under-
written the stability of the new”.
Wood states that “the rulers”1 of the 
Communist era, the nomenklatura, al-
though not explicitly distinguished as a 
class of their own, were not only auton-
omous in relation to the working class 
(its own base), but had a monopoly on 
political representation and economic 
resources. It is precisely this dual mode 
of domination of the elites that survived 
the dissolution of the old regime and be-
came the foundation for the new one, in 
many ways so similar to its predecessor. 
Wood follows how the political power 
got quickly converted into property, 
allowing the oligarchs to accumulate 
assets that are especially striking when 
the levels of poverty and deprivation 
are juxtaposed with them. The author 
finds a new name for the current politi-
cal and economic regime in Russia that 
captures its historical continuity and 
change, namely the “neo-authoritarian 
recentralization”.
“The subordinate classes” — peas-
ants and workers, distinguished by 
Wood into several categories based 
on skill and income levels — were frag-
mented by virtue of their economic and 
social dependency on the enterprise 
and its management: employees were 
tied to their employers by a system 
of social provisions, and inequalities 
within the strata were justified by varia-
tion between economy sectors. In the 
1990s, many of them were faced with 
regular payment arrears, thrown into 
unemployment, or forced into precari-
ous employment patterns and double 
fate of the punk group members and his 
harsh judgment of their actions.
 An ambitious public prayer service 
to protect the faith and the desecrated 
relics took place in that same Cathe-
dral of Christ the Savior the following 
Sunday. Its goal was to counteract this 
“information attack” as well as the 
“wiles of the devil” against the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church and its head. 
(The ones helping the devil were obvi-
ously the members of the punk group 
and their supporters.) Security for 
the 65,000 believers brought in from 
all over the country was provided by 
1,500 riot police. In their interviews, 
organizers and participants in the ac-
tion minced no words. They cursed the 
punk group members, emancipated 
women, females in general, and anyone 
who dared to desecrate the church and 
the authorities. “The Orthodox religion 
is the basis of Russia’s ethnic identity.” 
This was the statement broadcast to the 
whole world. Watching the television 
reports, I could hardly recognize the 
country I had grown up in and still live 
in. And I was not the only one who had 
such feelings.
the very next day, it was obvious from 
blogs that, with the public prayer meet-
ing and propaganda, the autocratic 
Orthodox Church authorities had gone 
overboard. The Internet was overflow-
ing with statements to the effect that the 
worst enemies of faith in Russia are not 
the likes of the Pussy Riot performers or 
atheists, but rather the clergy who were 
taking it upon themselves to fill the cur-
rent vacuum and become a substitute 
for the ideological department of the 
former Soviet Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. Orthodox journal-
ists openly denounced incitement to 
hatred in the country. But the process 
had already begun. On March 24, in an 
interview on REN TV, a Moscow lawyer 
of Chechen origin, Daguir Khasavov, 
stated that if Muslims in the capital were 
not tried in accordance with Sharia 
law courts, he would “drown the city 
in blood”. The Internet exploded: 
government-sponsored media pub-
lished comments by the spiritual leader 
of Russian Muslims and the spokesman 
for Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, 
in which Khasavov’s statement was 
branded a “provocation”. The Office of 
the Public Prosecutor cited the TV chan-
nel for incitement to extremism. At the 
same time, Vsevolod Chaplin, Chairman 
of the Synod Department for Public 
Relations, expressed his support for 
Khasavov and was branded an extrem-
ist himself on the Internet. Mr. Chaplin, 
by the way, is a well-known proponent 
of a mandatory religious dress code and 
other medieval practices.
It is safe to say that the attempt to 
unite society around the traditional 
totalitarian-theocratic model has failed 
utterly. Instead, it made evident the 
growing polarization of the population 
and the inability of the authorities to 
formulate a truly attractive vision for 
the country. It is disconcerting to think 
that dangerous games on the field of 
denominational and ethnic issues can 
pose a threat to our common future.
Khasavov Was forced to make a quick 
exit from the country. The three mem-
bers of Pussy Riot, Maria Alyokhina, 
Yekaterina Samutsevich, and Nadezhda 
Tolokonnikova, were still held in pris-
on. A news anchor from NTV reported 
that Vladimir Putin, immediately fol-
lowing his inauguration ceremony, met 
with the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church for a talk and, possibly, for part-
ing wishes. At the same time, believers 
demanded that Kirill Serebrennikov’s 
new production of the “Golden Cock-
erel” performance be removed from 
the Bolshoi Theater repertoire because 
they regard it as an insult to Orthodox 
religious people.
Apparently, the real “performance” 
is yet to come. ≈
nadezhda azhgikhina
Note: This article was written in the  
summer of 2012.
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shifts. A mobilization and demand for 
social representation is impossible due 
to the lack of independent trade unions 
and a misguided interpretation of social 
reality, in which many were encouraged 
to think of themselves as still the “lead-
ing class”, although this time under the 
name of the “middle” class.
Wood also indentifies the social base 
of the recent protests among the suc-
cessors of the perestroika-era intelligen-
tsia, the top “layer” of the working class 
that still does not exactly fit the poster 
image of the middle class. This group 
is small and its main characteristics are 
defined as “urban, highly educated and 
broadly liberal”, i.e. people whose main 
gain in the process of transformation 
was knowledge, access to information 
and some economic independence. It 
might broaden and gain more strength 
as the deepening economic crisis 
increases social problems, which the 
current system “is not built to even ad-
dress”. However, today, the obscurity 
of the scope of actual inequalities in the 
consciousness of the people, the persis-
tent lack of accountability of the elites, 
and the limited and uneven economic 
modernization across the country allow 
the author to conclude that two socio-
economic systems, and therefore multi-
ple schemas of social identity and forms 
of lived experience, co-exist, blurring 
some of the outcomes of the extreme 
social polarization in Russia. Only with 
the departure of people who carry the 
memory of the USSR among the ranks 
of “the subordinated” will the inertial 
social base for stability fade away.
My starting point for the discussion 
at the seminar was Wood’s emphasis 
that widely spread mistrust toward 
class as a theoretical category suitable 
for understanding social phenomena 
presents one of the major challenges 
in working with class analysis. I argue 
that the lack of a consensual theoreti-
cal and methodological approach to 
operationalizing class is another equally 
important challenge, which more often 
leads class analysis to ad hoc historical 
interpretations than to fruitful theoreti-
cal constructs. The author is very care-
ful not to speak of social stratification 
in Russia but cannot avoid mentioning 
intersections with gender and ethnicity, 
and his overall theoretical approach 
is somewhat eclectic. Claiming no 
adherence to any established school 
of thought, Wood uses a Weberian ap-
proach to categorization of social dif-
ferentiation based on occupation and 
skill level at several points in the text. At 
once point, he also refers to one of the 
Russian classics, Ovsei Shkaratan, and 
later even finds it useful to employ some 
of Bourdieu’s analytical tools. However, 
the author’s problem formulation and 
the conclusions are essentially Marxist: 
he establishes the relational character 
of the category “class” and argues that 
without a realization of the actual levels 
of social polarization and mechanisms 
behind it, without a transformation of 
consciousness of those from the sub-
ordinate classes, no significant social 
conflict is to be expected. Nonetheless, 
it is surprising that Wood does not ex-
plicitly identify himself with this school 
of thought.
One of the things that might 
strengthen the central argument of the 
article even further is a richer empirical 
presentation of the “parallelism of so-
cial structures”. While the presentation 
of the process of transformation is very 
detailed, the account of its structural 
outcomes “in the realm of conscious-
ness and in material reality” does not 
extend beyond the discussion of the 
middle class. Moreover, it is possible 
to suggest that the outlined parallel-
ism is supported and reinforced by 
the rulers as a means of maintaining 
the stability that puzzled the author in 
the first place. The elites inherited not 
only economic and political means of 
domination; they have also acquired 
the means of ideological control. Wood 
emphasizes how the powerless do class 
— they deny it through consumption (of 
old and new patterns). There is a need, 
however, for further discussion of the 
role of the powerful in supporting this 
way of staging social inequalities, the 
imagined class relations that are im-
posed on every sphere of daily life.
Wood’s analysis is especially important 
today, amid a wave of mass protest 
movements around the world, as it 
brings forward the issues of deeply con-
cealed social inequalities that extend 
beyond the problems of corruption 
in governance or violation of election 
procedures. As the proposed “iceberg” 
metaphor suggests, the celebrated 
triumph of political and economic lib-
eralism of the 1990s might have brought 
some economic growth to Russia, but in 
the pseudodemocratic context, uneven 
distribution of wealth became built into 
the system of political relations. Kurt 
Andersen, writing for Time magazine 
on the protest actions around the globe 
in 2011, finds that protesters are after a 
new social contract. Thus, even if the 
old ideological confrontations between 
liberalism and communism have be-
come obsolete, true democracy is un-
reachable without social justice.
It is also Andersen who claims that 
the only explanation protest sociology 
has to offer is that protest arises when 
expectations that a share of rising pros-
perity will be received are not fulfilled. 
Indeed, Gidden's leading theoretical 
paradigm had asserted the breaking 
down of traditional constraints of col-
lectivities, and increased reflexivity, or 
cognitive consciousness, which mani-
fests itself in the use of modern social 
media as one of the key instruments 
of mobilization instead of traditional 
organizational forms. The recent events 
can be seen as a part of the contesta-
tion of individual statuses, with regard 
to access to economic and political 
resources, by protesters who want to 
realize their rights and aspirations. 
However, another stream of sociologi-
cal theory of modernity — that of Ulrich 
Beck,  discussed by Woodman — sug-
gests that the individual is not simply 
emancipated from norms embedded 
in the collectively constructed institu-
tions, but is subsequently subjected to a 
set of regulations and boundaries which 
are re-embedded at the level of people 
in the singular. As a result, individuals 
are not completely free to realize their 
preferences, nor  are they completely 
free to choose their life pursuits. Wood’s 
article is an important contribution to 
the discussion about the origins of so-
cial conflict, as it attempts to place the 
potential protesters within the struc-
ture of social relations and hierarchies, 
actual and imagined. ≈
zhanna kravchenko
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T
his is a report about a deep 
break in recent academic, so-
cial, and political history: the 
abrupt end of the academic 
system of East Germany (officially the 
German Democratic Republic, GDR) 
and its partial integration in the emerg-
ing system of a unified Germany, which 
was basically an extension of West 
Germany (the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, FRG) to the East. This change has 
been controversial, and its interpreta-
tion still is. At the end of this report I 
will touch upon these controversies. 
First, I want to tell what happened.
In the early 1990s, the roughly fif-
teen East German universities were 
fundamentally restructured. None was 
discontinued, two new ones emerged. 
Many East German research institutes 
outside the universities — mostly under 
the aegis of the huge Academy of Sci-
ences of the GDR — were discontinued. 
Those which survived were restruc-
tured and placed in new institutional 
contexts. Some new institutes were 
founded. The legal structure was 
changed; basically West German law 
was introduced in the East.
The personnel employed in East Ger-
man academic and research institutions 
were reduced. University staff was cut 
by about 30 percent. Those dismissed 
were mainly below the professorial 
level, including both academic and 
non-academic staff. A new personnel 
structure was introduced that included 
many non-tenured positions, most 
of which had been absent in the East 
German system before. West German 
academics moved into newly defined 
positions in East German institutions, 
especially in the higher ranks. By 1995, 
43 percent of the professors in East Ger-
man universities had come in from the 
West. The percentage was much higher 
in the humanities and the social scienc-
es than in the natural sciences, the life 
sciences, and engineering. Many East 
German academics lost their jobs, went 
into early retirement, changed to new 
positions inside and outside academia, 
had to readjust, or suffered interrup-
tions of their careers. At the same time, 
some East Germans started to develop 
careers which they had been prevented 
from pursuing in previous years, often 
by the political system. Many East Ger-
mans, particularly young ones, quickly 
learned to make good use of the new 
intellectual and professional opportuni-
ties in Germany and abroad.
As far as the cognitive substance 
of the break is concerned, it is hard to 
generalize. Disciplines strongly differed 
from one another. Clearly, some special-
izations disappeared, like the science 
of Marxism-Leninism. In the GDR, re-
sources, freedom of teaching and study-
ing, and access to international debates 
had been severely restricted. In these 
respects there was now much progress. 
Liberation, broadening of horizons, and 
diversification took place. Lots of West 
German resources were pouring into 
the East: money, stipends, equipment, 
know-how, practices of communica-
tion, procedures. Still, the scientific 
substance seems to have changed much 
less, less rapidly and less thoroughly, 
than the institutional set-up and the 
personnel.
in its coMprehensive scope, its radi-
cal thoroughness, and its remarkable 
speed, this was a change which had no 
precedent in German history. It was 
much more comprehensive, radical, 
and speedy than the changes occurring 
in the other East Central and East Eu-
ropean countries which also emerged 
from communism in those years. After 
all, it was only in Germany that the 
departure from communism took the 
form of the unification of two states.
While the East German system had 
to undergo this fundamental change, 
the West German system hardly 
changed at all. In fact, its status quo was 
confirmed and reinforced by the fact 
that its basic principles were exported 
to the newly acquired East, which with-
out a doubt had proved to be less effec-
tive, less democratic, less pluralistic, 
and less innovative than what had been 
achieved in the West. The collapse of 
the defeated East confirmed the status 
quo of the victorious West. In fact, some 
of the reforms under way in the West 
in the late 1980s were slowed down 
and postponed in those years in which 
unification took place on West German 
terms — absorbing resources, attention, 
and political energies.
Much could Be said about the proce-
dures and mechanisms of initiating 
and implementing this change. I must 
concentrate my remarks here on three 
points.
i. Clearly, fundamental decisions were 
made under West German dominance 
on the political level. For example, the 
decision that one integrated German 
system was to be implemented as quick-
ly as possible by basically extending the 
West German model to the East —  
instead of living with two different 
academic systems under one constitu-
tional roof for some years for example, 
or replacing both the Eastern and the 
Western system by something new, to 
be jointly negotiated between East and 
West. These were major political deci-
sions.
But in more specific decisions, such 
as those concerning individual institu-
tions, disciplines, projects, and recruit-
ment processes, the role of academics 
was strong and influential. The overall 
process was not merely decreed from 
above. A lot of academic self-adminis-
tration went on. One indicator was the 
strong role played by evaluation, peer 
evaluation. Peer evaluation? Well, most-
ly the evaluation was performed by 
West German scientists, scholars, and 
experts, supplemented by some from 
East Germany and some from abroad, 
usually from Western countries. Evalu-
ation took place according to Western 
standards and within the scope defined 
by the fundamental political decisions. 
Still, it was a serious evaluation on a tre-
mendous scale.
ii. What happened was not a central-
ized, streamlined, coherently planned 
action, but a process with many actors 
who were not fully coordinated. The 
united Germany would be a federal po-
litical system, dividing power between 
the central government and the Länder, 
the individual states. Universities were 
controlled by the states, and the politi-
cal texture of state governments varied. 
While the evaluation and reconstruc-
tion of the universities were under the 
control of the single states, the evalu-
ation, dissolution, and restructuring 
of the research institutes outside the 
universities were controlled by federal 
institutions and bodies.
iii. Laying off and replacing staff, reshuf-
fling them and recruiting new people 
was the most controversial, most sen-
An asymmetric affair.  
West and East German academia during reunification
Illustration: Karin Sunvisson
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sitive, most painful part of the whole 
process. There were many losers and 
many winners, unequally distributed 
between West and East. It is here that 
major injustices occurred, life courses 
were changed, careers damaged or giv-
en new opportunities, all in the course 
of processes with a high degree of com-
petition, limited transparency, political 
and personal biases, and very imperfect 
knowledge. Many of those who had 
been active and influential in the East 
German system now lost their jobs as 
a consequence of political screening 
and purging. More often, the change 
of personnel was achieved through an-
other mechanism: the institutions were 
thoroughly restructured, positions and 
their requirements were redefined, 
and when they were advertised, the 
former incumbents from the East and 
new competitors, many of them from 
the West, applied. Competitive hiring 
processes took place under the criteria 
and the rules of the newly established 
system. In this process, many Western 
competitors turned out to be better 
prepared and qualified than many from 
the East, who had been raised and 
trained and had practiced in a different 
system.
But another iMportant point should 
be observed which is frequently over-
looked. The decisions, gains, and losses 
in these processes of displacement, 
recruitment, and restructuring were 
not only determined by the asym-
metry between powerful Westerners 
and dependent Easterners. Conflicts 
between Easterners and Easterners also 
played an important role. East Germany 
had been a dictatorship. Recruitment 
processes had been highly politicized. 
Politics and ideology had pervaded the 
academic system. There had been many 
losers. They now had the opportunity 
to speak out, sometimes after having 
contributed much to bringing down the 
old system as dissident activists in the 
non-violent revolution which took place 
on the streets of East German cities in 
1989/1990. They were very critical of the 
old system and not at all generous when 
it came to the question whether figures 
of the old establishment should con-
tinue to work in leading positions under 
the new system. The mostly young 
speakers of the non-establishment 
people, many of them victims of the 
now collapsing dictatorship, spoke out 
in favor of more radical change. They 
deplored the fact that not enough of 
the old elites were replaced in the early 
1990s. This was an influence in the over-
all process of change.
finally, four points that were contro-
versial then are still controversial today.
i. Could the whole reorganization 
have been accomplished with a lesser 
human cost and with less asymmetry 
and inequality between West and East? 
To a limited extent, I believe it could 
have been. There were some endog-
enous attempts to reform East German 
institutions in the late 1980s and in 1990. 
I am skeptical about their real strength, 
but they should have been given a 
chance. There should have been more 
time, less rigidity, more willingness to 
experiment.
ii. What happened was basically the 
extension of the West German system 
to the East. This was the pattern of Ger-
man reunification in general, and it was 
the pattern in the academic sphere as 
well. But the West German academic 
system itself was not without weak-
nesses and deficits. It was not the best 
conceivable model in the world by any 
means. Could the moment of unifica-
tion have been used to put through 
basic reforms, not only on the East 
German, but also on the West German 
side? Demands for such comprehensive 
changes were raised in those years. 
Could we in the West, for the sake of 
this aim, have learned more from the 
East, and should we have incorporated 
more from the East into the emerging 
unified system? There were voices in 
support of such strategies.
Even in retrospect, however, it is not 
at all clear what from the East German 
system could and should have been pre-
served to make the outcome as a whole 
different and better. We must not forget 
that it took tremendous resources and 
energy to restructure the East. Were 
there resources and energy left to re-
structure the West as well? I have men-
tioned the political and psychological 
situation of the early 1990s, which made 
the West overconfident in its strength 
and little inclined to dwell on its own 
weaknesses in order to remedy them.
Still, the issue continues to warrant 
debate: Could and should the moment 
not have been used to build a new 
and better united Germany, instead of 
implementing a process in which the 
East would catch up with the West, even 
though the West was far from perfect?
iii. It is now possible to judge some 
long-term results. First of all, and most 
importantly, in the East — that is, in the 
territory that was formerly the GDR 
and is now the Eastern part of unified 
Germany — there has been tremendous 
improvement in the institutional condi-
tions, resources, quality, and results of 
research and higher education. This is 
true although the top academic institu-
tions, the best departments, and the 
most outstanding scholars and scien-
tists, with few exceptions, are still found 
in the West (at some but not all Western 
institutions, to be exact). And this point 
is significant even though German uni-
versities are never among the top ten in 
international ratings. They are under-
represented among the top hundred, 
but strongly represented among the top 
500.
In some respects the proclaimed and 
intended aims have not been reached. 
The Wissenschaftler-Integrations-
Programm, WIP, is an example. It was a 
program which was concerned with sci-
entists whose non-university institutes 
had been discontinued, and was aimed 
at finding them jobs in universities. This 
program was a glaring failure.
On the other hand, there were also 
unintended consequences that are still 
with us today. The decisions of 1990 
have led to more non-university re-
search institutes, which, on the whole, 
now make up a higher proportion of sci-
entific institutions and are stronger and 
better organized than they had been be-
fore in the West. In this sense, the uni-
versities have not been the winners, but 
the relative losers of reunification. The 
structural difference between universi-
ties and non-university research institu-
tions has also been reinforced. Many 
people see this as a structural problem. 
Another result is that systematic evalua-
tions, which were undertaken en masse 
in the process of reunification, have 
become common and institutionalized, 
and have stayed with us ever since. This 
is an unintended but positive result of 
the process.
iv. Some major problems of today 
were neither anticipated nor addressed 
in the early 1990s. Europeanization and 
globalization were much less of a chal-
lenge twenty years ago. The aim then 
was to achieve more homogeneity with-
in the system, especially between West 
and East. In the meantime, major steps 
have been taken not only to recognize, 
but also to accentuate and strengthen 
the differentiations within our system of 
research and higher education. Major 
challenges of today were not anticipat-
ed in the early 1990s, yet the system es-
tablished then for Germany as a whole 
is able to deal with new challenges. It 
has major problems, but it is capable of 
learning.≈
jürgen kocka
Note: This presentation was given at a 
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quences for German universities at the 
Uppsala Centre for Russia and Eurasian 
Studies (UCRS), October 1, 2012.
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Inflationary use of a political concept.
Reinterpreting “genocide”
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I
In 1990, a debate began in leading American 
and British scholarly journals as to just how 
many people fell victim to Stalin’s rule. Par-
ticipants in the debate included prominent 
Kremlinologists like Alec Nove2 and Stephen 
Wheatcroft,3 who used demographic, 
economic, and other data combined with 
reports in memoirs to try to estimate the 
number of people who were executed, were 
deported to face an early death in exile, or 
died in famines the causes of which could be 
traced to government policy.
As Russian archival data became avail-
able, the discussions took on a more robust 
nature. Wheatcroft sorted the victims into 
categories: those executed during terror ac-
tions, those who died prematurely during 
the famine years of 1932—1933, and those who 
died during deportations of entire peoples. 
He distinguished the latter as death from 
criminal neglect by the government for better 
comparison of Stalinist and Nazi repression, 
since global figures on the millions of excess 
deaths used until that point had tended to 
cloud the qualitative differences between va-
rieties of state terror.4 Steven Rosefielde then 
reentered the debate with a reply in which 
his opening salvo was to categorize all excess 
deaths as homicides in the title of the article. 
Rosefielde’s approach has not been adopted 
by other scholars, who have instead given us 
an increasingly complex picture of the causal 
connections that led to famines, as well as 
Stalin and his closest associates’ underlying 
motives for carrying out various actions (re-
prisals, imprisonments, mass executions, or 
deportations).5
In light of this increasingly sophisticated 
analysis of the terror of the Stalin epoch, 
Norman Naimark turns things upside down 
in a recently published book by categorizing 
all of these events with a term that has, until 
now, had a precise meaning, but which he 
argues should be expanded. Specifically, he 
asserts that all the thoroughly studied phe-
nomena that characterized the terror of the 
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s should be included 
in the category of genocide, and hence the 
use of the plural in his title. The book has 
been translated into German, Ukrainian, and 
Russian; translations into Estonian and other 
languages are in progress. This fact, rather 
than the inherent qualities of the book, has 
triggered critical examination of Naimark’s 
grossly simplified and, if anything, confusing 
account.
Norman Naimark is the Robert and Flor-
ence McDonnell Professor of East Euro-
pean Studies at Stanford University. He is 
renowned for his studies of ethnic violence and of the Soviet 
occupation regime in Germany from 1945 onwards.6 The 
present book, included in the series “Human Rights and 
Crimes against Humanity”, edited by Eric Weitz, seems to be 
merely an extended essay based on a number of arguments 
presented earlier in an article in the festschrift in honor of 
Robert Conquest reviewed in this journal by your humble ser-
vant.7 After analyzing his extended version, my skepticism of 
Naimark’s reasoning either for abandoning the legal concept 
of genocide as defined in the 1948 United Nations Convention 
or for applying the concept — with a stretch of the historical 
evidence — has only been reaffirmed.
Naimark iNcludes amoNg Stalin’s crimes the forced collec-
tivization, expropriation, and deportation of the purportedly 
richer peasants (“kulak”) in 1930—1933, the famine that struck 
many regions of the Soviet Union (and in particular Ukraine) 
in 1932—1933, the Great Terror of 1937—1938, and the deporta-
tions of entire peoples in the USSR in 1937—1944, and argues 
that all of these separate events should be classified as geno-
cide. This is a significant revision of the standard interpreta-
tion by Western historians of the historical evidence of the 
USSR, which is that there was nothing like the premeditated 
killing of a group of people, whether on the grounds of race, 
nationality, or religion.
The plural form of the English title, Stalin’s Genocides, and 
of the Ukrainian and Russian translations Genotsidi or Genot-
sidy Stalina, implies that several or all of the well-known and 
currently heavily researched historical phenomena should be 
termed “genocide”. In recent years, few Western historians 
have argued that any series of events, except for the famine 
in Ukraine in the fall of 1932 and spring of 1933, can be termed 
genocide as defined by the UN convention. In order to accom-
plish his reinterpretation of the Stalin era, Naimark reasons 
along two contradictory lines concerning the very concept of 
genocide.
II
Naimark starts his argumentation with a cursory presentation 
of how the convention is allegedly only a perverted form of 
what the UN Commission had originally intended. In agree-
ment with quite a few others, Naimark claims that the final 
draft of the convention narrowly focused only on persecu-
tions leading to mass killings of people based on ethnicity, 
nationality, or religion because the Soviet Union had opposed 
the original draft, which also counted mass killings based on 
social and political criteria as genocide. Presumably, Naimark 
argues, the USSR feared that such a conven-
tion would open the door to investigations of 
actions taken by the Soviet regime against its 
own people and against the peoples incorpo-
rated into the USSR early in World War II.
Naimark delves into the UN Commission 
that, in 1946—1948, attempted to draft the 
most precise convention possible in order to 
prevent the repetition of mass murders like 
the attempted elimination of European Jewry 
by the Nazis. He refers to the preliminary 
versions or drafts of the convention, but only 
as presented in a few American books on 
the subject. A more careful interpretation of 
all the deliberations of the Member States’ 
legal experts involved in the Commission’s 
work should, in this reviewer’s opinion, be 
based on the primary sources, not textbooks 
whose reliability may vary. In this case, the 
task would be fairly easy, since the complete 
documentation is already available in print 
in an excellent edition by Hirad Abtahi and 
Philippa Webb.8 In a single publication of 
almost 3,000 pages, Abtahi and Webb have 
brought together the records of the multi-
tude of meetings which, in the context of the 
newly established United Nations, led to the 
adoption of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide on December 9, 1948.
discussioNs about the wording of the 
convention have revolved around the finally 
adopted draft as being a concession to Soviet 
pressure to exclude actions that could be 
characterized as oppression and mass kill-
ings of political groups, on the one hand, 
and state actions that could lead to cultural 
genocide. The criticism that the UN Conven-
tion on Genocide did not address political 
groups is well-known and has been voiced 
in many contexts — but, obviously, few have 
taken the trouble to go back to the sources to 
see what arguments the lawyers from various 
countries presented against an expanded 
wording.9
The arguments for and against various 
wordings, definitions, and restrictions seem 
to have been much more nuanced than a cer-
reviews
the inclusion of political and social groups, in part or in 
whole, in the text of the 1948 convention, but fails to mention 
that the adoption of the convention immediately spurred a 
plethora of books and pamphlets that accused not only the 
Soviet Union under Stalin, but also the United States, of pre-
cisely that: genocide in a wider sense than that expressed in the 
UN convention.
By 1949, K. Pelekis had published Genocide: Lithuania’s 
Threefold Tragedy, and a year later the Supreme Committee 
for the Liberation of Lithuania (Vyriausias Lietuvos Islaisvini-
mo Komitetas) released its Appeal to the United Nations on 
Genocide. In 1950, the Estonian Information Office in Stock-
holm issued a paper by Aleksander Kaelas, Human Rights and 
Genocide, which referred to remarks in the UN General As-
sembly in September 1950. Albert Kalme published his Total 
Terror: An Exposé of Genocide in the Baltics (1951) and Arveds 
Svabe his Genocide in the Baltic States (Latvian National Fund 
in the Scandinavian Countries 1952). The exiled Hungarian 
Magyar Bizottság referred to the convention in his Genocide 
by Deportation: An Appeal to the United Nations to Enforce the 
Law (1951).
While the abovementioned works referred to nations and 
peoples that were incorporated into the USSR or sovietized 
in Eastern Europe, literature on the presumed genocide in 
the Soviet Union proper was also at hand. 
Based on accounts by liberated Polish citi-
zens and others who had come to the West, 
the early Cold War saw a mass market for 
books on the Soviet camps where slave labor 
was allegedly responsible for the intentional 
death of millions of innocent citizens. This 
was also the message in several chapters of 
the international — American, French, and 
Swedish — bestseller of 1947—1949, I Chose 
Freedom by the former Soviet engineer Vik-
tor Kravchenko. The chapters of the book 
(ghostwritten and “edited” by Eugene Ly-
ons) reprinted in Reader’s Digest suggested 
that the entire Soviet military industry was 
dependent upon such death camps, which, 
according to Kravchenko, had 15—20 million 
slaves. These and other estimates of Soviet 
slave labor camps were reflected in books by 
Albert Herling, The Soviet Slave Empire (1951), 
and Guy Vinatrel, L’URSS concentrationnaire: 
Travail forcé en Russie Soviétique (1950). In 
South America, the pamphlet by Casimiro Ve-
rax, (a pseudonym of Kazimieras Cibiras), El 
tain historiographic trend tends to describe. 
For example, the Soviet representative ar-
gued that:
It is a mistake to include political 
groups among the groups protected 
by the Convention on Genocide, just 
as it is a mistake to include political 
opinions among the grounds for per-
petrating the crime of genocide. 
      Crimes committed for political 
motives are crimes of a special kind 
and have nothing in common with 
crimes of genocide. The very word 
“genocide” [which is] derived from 
the word “genus” — race, people — 
shows that it concerns the destruc-
tion of nations or races as such, for 
reasons of racial and national per-
secution and not for the particular 
opinions of such human groups.10
The setting for the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention was the nascent Cold War that 
by 1947 had already given rise to renewed 
“information warfare” between the former 
Allies. In particular, propaganda from the 
Communist Information Bureau (Kominform, 
a recasting of the International dissolved in 
1943) directed at the peoples of the British 
colonies was seen as a major communist ef-
fort to undermine the “Free World”. Shortly 
thereafter, London had set up its own anti-
communist propaganda center and created 
a worldwide network for the distribution of 
articles, pamphlets, and books.11 When the 
British delegation to the United Nations dur-
ing the same period initiated an international 
investigation into the use of forced labor that 
emphasized the not always documented but 
allegedly widespread use of slave labor in 
Soviet Union, the Communist press was soon 
replete with articles condemning slave labor 
conditions in several British colonies.
it is thus not surprising that the Soviet del-
egates insisted that the UN Genocide Conven-
tion be mandatory upon dependent territories 
as well as sovereign nation-states. They also 
urged an amendment, in line with an earlier 
proviso originally proposed by Raphael Lem-
kin himself in 1933, namely that cultural geno-
cide be included in the convention. British 
representatives argued vehemently against 
both proposals because they feared — rightly 
or wrongly — that such a convention could be 
used against the United Kingdom.12
In a historical work like Professor Nai-
mark’s, readers have the right to demand 
a full-fledged historiographic background. 
Surprisingly enough, Naimark repeatedly la-
ments the successful Soviet lobbying against 
reviews
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imperio del genocidio: Las deportaciones y la 
esclavitud en el mundo soviético [The empire 
of genocide: The deportations and slavery of 
the Soviet world] (1954) seems to have been 
widely distributed. These interpretations of 
the annexations of the Baltic States by the 
USSR in the 1940s were widespread through-
out the Cold War era.
Norman Naimark has another forerunner 
well worthy of mentioning in a historio-
graphic survey: the Chechen scholar Abdur-
akhman Avtorkhanov, who under the pseu-
donym “Uralov” published a book in 1951 
on the persecution of the Chechen people.13 
Avtorkhanov did not have exact data on the 
consequences of the 1944 deportation of 
the Chechen and Ingush peoples, but the 
point is that he characterized the event as an 
intentional killing operation against whole 
peoples, or, in other words, “genocide” 
(narodoubiistvo).
oddly eNough, Naimark also fails to men-
tion the great forerunner to his study, namely 
the solid collection of articles published by 
the Munich Institute for Studies of the His-
tory and Culture of the USSR, a well-known 
exile institution during the Cold War. In 1958, 
Nikolai Deker and Andrei Lebed edited the 
book Genocide in the USSR: Studies in Group 
Destruction.14 The authors involved in the 
project wrote specifically about the elimina-
tion of social groups and referred to the UN 
1948 Genocide Convention15 in relation to 
the repression of the former ruling social 
classes, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the 
merchants, the bureaucrats, and the richer 
peasants. Stalin’s struggle against the wealthy 
peasants is also termed genocide, as is the 
1932—1933 famine: “In view of the fact that 
the famine of 1932—33 was artificially created 
and was directed against a definite social stra-
tum, the peasantry, this famine can only be 
described as an example of social genocide.”16 
(Emphasis mine.) In passing, one may note 
that the author wrote that dekulakization is 
supposed to have claimed six million victims 
and the ensuing famine in 1932—1933 another 
six million.
It should be mentioned that the adoption 
of the UN Genocide Convention likewise 
spurred activist citizens in the United States 
to examine the country’s historical and cur-
rent policy towards its Black population. In 
the pamphlet We Charge Genocide, published 
in 1951, the situation of African Americans 
in the US was condemned as precisely that: 
genocide. The foreword to a new edition of 
the book states:
This historic Petition was first 
presented to the world in 1951. Ad-
dressed to the United Nations it was submitted to 
that body in Paris, France at the Palais Chaillott 
where the Fifth Session of the General Assembly 
had gathered. Simultaneously a delegation led by 
Paul Robeson presented copies to the office of the 
Secretary General of the UN in New York. We had 
two aims: to expose the nature and depth of racism 
in the United States; and to arouse the moral con-
science of progressive mankind against the inhu-
man treatment of black nationals by those in high 
political places. The Petition called upon the UN to 
take notice of the fact that even a cursory examina-
tion would reveal the savage racist policy that de-
termines the attitude and reaction of city, state and 
federal governments in their relations with black 
nationals. […] The Petition declared that the racism 
of government was a criminal policy. It constituted 
a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, its Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, more specifically the 
UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment 
of Genocide and the Constitution of the United 
States of America.17
Norman Naimark presumably takes for granted that his 
readers know that the UN Convention on Genocide was not 
ratified by the US Senate until forty years later, and for obvi-
ous reasons. It was finally made law in 1988, contingent upon 
a series of “conditions” known as the “Lugar-Helms-Hatch 
Sovereignty Package”, which according to one scholar signifi-
cantly weakened this adapted convention text.
The analysis by Lawrence LeBlanc suggests that the bitter 
debates and opposition to the convention sprang from fears 
that it would be used domestically as a tool by groups such as 
African Americans and Native Americans who might hold the 
US accountable for genocide in matters of race relations.18
III
It is no exaggeration to say that during most of the Cold War 
era, Western Kremlinologists accepted the notion that the 
scale of terror, repression, and deprivations seen in forced 
labor or internal exile all added up to genocide of an unprec-
edented scale. For example, Professor Stephen Cohen in his 
stimulating essay Rethinking the Soviet Experience wrote:
Millions of innocent men, women, and children 
were arbitrarily arrested, tortured, executed, 
brutally deported, or imprisoned in the murder-
ous prisons and forced-labor camps of the Gulag 
Archipelago. […] No one has yet managed to calcu-
late the exact number of unnatural deaths under 
Stalin. Among those who have tried, twenty million 
is a conservative estimate. Judged by the number 
of victims and leaving aside important differences 
between the two regimes, Stalinism created a holo-
caust greater than Hitler’s.19
While others have argued against the comparison between 
Stalinism and Nazism, contending it is conducive to a relativ-
ization of the Shoah, Stephen Cohen obviously saw no such 
problem, and not only because he relied on quantitative data 
on the number of victims that — as it later 
turned out — were far from accurate, but also 
because the seemingly systematic nature 
of Stalin’s terror, as described in the main-
stream literature, was indeed littered with 
examples of death camps and mass execu-
tions. Suffice it to say that in his 1978 book on 
the infamous Kolyma camps in the Soviet Far 
East, Robert Conquest contended that the 
primary purpose of these camps was not gold 
extraction, but systematic extermination of 
the prisoners on a scale rivaling Hitler’s Final 
Solution. He calculated that from the late 
1930s to the early 1950s at least three million 
people were eliminated out of the some three 
and a half million prisoners allegedly sent to 
Magadan and other ports in the Soviet Far 
East. Few reviewers of his book even dared 
to challenge his numbers in light of the hor-
rific descriptions already known from the 
memoirs of Polish and German survivors of 
these camps.20
My point is thus that Norman Naimark 
would have lent much more credence to his 
arguments if he had bothered to mention the 
precedents in the literature that have likewise 
termed Stalin’s terror genocidal. He would 
then have had to acknowledge which of these 
forerunners’ descriptions have withstood the 
test of time. On the other hand, if Naimark 
had taken the trouble to read the original 
transcripts of the deliberations among law-
yers over the draft convention, he would 
probably not have so blithely accepted the 
thesis that only the Soviet Union’s opposition 
to certain wording made the final version so 
different from that proposed by Lemkin and 
others at the end of World War II.
IV
Norman Naimark also tries to use the original 
UN Convention’s concept of genocide as ap-
propriate to characterize (a) the dekulakiza-
tion of 1930—1933; (b) the mass famine of 
1932—1933; (c) the Great Terror of 1937—1938; 
and (d) the deportations of entire peoples 
before and during World War II.
Naimark was asked in an interview why the 
title uses genocides in the plural given that he 
has otherwise spoken of “Stalin’s genocide” 
in the singular. His answer is connected to his 
main thesis:
I don’t think this is an important dis-
tinction. The 1930s as a whole and 
the mass killings in the 1930s should 
be considered a single historical epi-
sode composed of a series of events, 
all of which are genocides. 
     Each of the separate episodes — 
Russian people carried out revolution and led to power an 
anti-human and barbarous regime, and allowed it to exist, 
and took part in an ‘auto-genocide’ (samogenotsid), a system-
atic, wave-like annihilation of its best representatives, tradi-
tions, and the destruction of churches, cultural heritage, and 
in many respects, the culture as such.” Obviously, Karaganov 
alludes to the concept of cultural genocide as a consequence 
of Soviet policies.
The auto-genocide began during the Civil War with 
the elimination and deportation of the intelligentsia 
and the clergy — the bearers of culture and tradi-
tional values, of the bourgeoisie — the strongest and 
most competitive part of society, of the aristocracy 
— the most educated and patriotic segment thereof, 
as the conservers (khraniteli) of national self-
consciousness and pride. Thereafter followed the 
golodomory (terror-famines), collectivization that 
was aimed at extermination of the best peasants. 
[…] Then followed the repressions of the new intel-
ligentsia and military. After the World War — of the 
prisoners-of-war.23
It is thus obvious that Naimark’s essay-like book on the géno-
cidaire Stalin will most probably find support among certain 
groups in today’s Russia, both among the elite and among the 
general public. From an analytical point of view, however, 
it is doubtful whether or not any actual new knowledge can 
be gleaned from the blurring of concepts such as genocide. 
It is more likely that Naimark’s essay will only lead to further 
obfuscations of the real causes and effects of the Stalinist ter-
rorist regime. Outside a tiny current of partisans of the Rus-
sian Communists, whether the grand KPRF under Gennadyi 
Zyuganov24 or the sectarians surrounding Viktor Anpilov25, it 
is beyond doubt that Stalin was responsible for the untimely 
deaths of millions of completely innocent citizens as well 
as his real or imagined political opponents. All the more so 
since in his writings from the late 1920s on Stalin decreed the 
physical destruction of his perceived enemies. However, hav-
ing been involved in several research projects lately — on the 
collectivization of 1930—193426 and the Great Terror of 1937—
193827 — I have all too often found that the empirical evidence 
for the conclusion that Stalin and his entourage actually went 
after people for their ethnic, racial, or religious origins is 
doubtful. Even all the hearsay concerning his alleged ambi-
tions against Ukraine in 1932—1933 is easily refutable.
V
Like so many other observers, scholars, and politicians in 
the West, Naimark emphatically maintains that the Russian 
people today must not only repent but fully acknowledge 
the criminal deeds of the Georgian shoemaker’s son, Jo-
seph Dzhugashvili — better known by his Russian sobriquet 
“Stalin” than by any of his Georgian underground noms de 
guerre like “Koba” — who ruled them for almost thirty years 
(1924—1953). The word “Georgia” is absent from Naimark’s 
text, so one is led to presume that the Georgian people have 
already fully assimilated the dire lessons of history in this 
respect, despite the fact that the only Stalin statue left unmo-
lested in the entire Soviet Union by 1991 was found in the city 
of Gori, Georgia! Strangely enough, Naimark 
ignores the influence of the man’s Georgian 
background and conditions in the evolu-
tion of Dzhugashvili to the future tyrant and 
génocidaire. In light of the real situation in 
Gori and the rest of Georgia, it is peculiar that 
Naimark demands repentance only from the 
Russians but not from the Georgians.
Why indeed should only the Russian 
people want to apologize for this Georgian 
who, in the late 1920s, might as well be said 
to have usurped power in the All-Union Com-
munist Party and ruled as a non-Russian 
tyrant over the whole Soviet Union for some 
twenty-five years? And this while the Geor-
gian people, who to this day honor Stalin’s 
memory, should have no reason according to 
Naimark (and many others) to examine their 
history, mentality, and traditions in search 
of an explanation for the behavior of “the 
people’s greatest son”? Only in the aftermath 
of the 2008 war against Russia did the rulers, 
evidently in response to critique from foreign 
observers, deem it necessary to remove the 
statue of Stalin from the central square in his 
hometown of Gori!
coNsideriNg the esteem in which the 
Georgian public hold “their Dzhugashvili”, 
it is even more characteristic of the tenden-
tious American campaign for which Naimark 
is a typical representative for him to allege 
that “a majority of Russians continue to hold 
Stalin in high esteem”, and to urge them, in a 
bid to improve their relations with the Ukrai-
nians, Poles, Chechens, and Crimean Tatars, 
to “openly acknowledge and conscientiously 
investigate the crimes of the past”.
Gallup polls in recent years that allegedly 
show that Stalin is held in high esteem by 
ordinary Russians have been criticized as 
structurally biased and for having survey 
questions that do not meet the standards of 
ordinary statistical methods. Furthermore, 
the nation hardest hit by “Stalinist geno-
cides” was, after all, not Ukrainians, Poles, 
Chechens or Tatars, but the Russians them-
selves, and few historians in Russia would 
argue along ethnic lines as to the origins of 
the terror and the repressive measures that 
victimized millions in the Russian Socialist 
Republic in the period of 1928—1953. Finally, 
any serious scholar who has followed recent 
historiography in Russia cannot have failed to 
notice the sea of publications, documentary 
and source collections, exhibitions, and tele-
vision series intended precisely to broaden 
the public’s knowledge and understanding 
of the terrorist traits of the Stalinist regime in 
particular and the oppressive characteristics 
of the Soviet party-state in general. In other 
words, Naimark’s exhortation is tantamount 
the dekulakization, the Ukrainian 
famine, the attack on asocial people, 
the attack on national peoples like 
the Poles, Chechens, Ingush, and 
Ukrainians — should be considered 
episodes of genocide.
However, Naimark also argues that the cur-
rent concept of genocide, twenty years after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the 
wake of the well-known events in former 
Yugoslavia and Sudan, needs to be used in 
a wider sense in order to understand such 
historical phenomena as those mentioned 
above. This line of reasoning seems to lead to 
a situation in which any interested party can 
introduce their own use of such a value-laden 
term as “genocide” and dismiss the strivings 
of jurists to keep to a rigorous, non-contra-
dictory use of terminology and concepts.
Naimark’s own extension of the concept of 
genocide to include the premeditated mass 
killings of political opponents, if accepted, 
would seem to require the concerned scholar 
to reassess several historical personalities as 
génocidaires of the same ilk as the Bolshevik 
leader. For example, the new book by Paul 
Preston on the aftermath of the 1936—1939 
Spanish Civil War bears witness to the use 
of the term Holocaust, often considered 
uniquely characteristic of the extermination 
of the Jews of Europe, to apply also to Gener-
al Franco’s early years in power. As with the 
extension of the génocidaire concept when 
applied to political groups, this same term 
would thus be attached to Marshal Gustav 
Mannerheim in Finland for the persecution 
of Socialists and Communists after the War of 
Independence in 1918, or to General Suharto 
of Indonesia for the 1965 killings of hundreds 
of thousands of members of the Communist 
Party — to mention only a few obvious cases 
of political massacres that Naimark’s at-
tempts at reclassification would include in 
the same genocidal actions as the Shoah.21
iN early 2011, Sergei Karaganov, a Russian 
political analyst chiefly known for his foreign 
policy surveys, was invited by President 
Dmitry Medvedev to speak on the theme of 
overcoming the historical legacy of Stalin-
ism. As this group surrounding the Council 
for Human Rights established by President 
Medvedev has received no notice in Western 
media, it might be worthwhile to quote how 
Russia’s present ruling elite can describe 
their recent past in terms and concepts that 
make Naimark’s thesis look feeble.
At the assembly in Ekaterinburg22 and in 
his later article on the same theme, Karagan-
ov said the following to President Medvedev 
and the Human Rights Commission: “The 
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to banging on a wide-open door, and his 
conceptually confusing essay is hardly likely 
to contribute to greater knowledge or insight 
into the dramatic twentieth-century history 
of the country.
Certain Russian politicians and writers are 
demanding the removal of Lenin’s Mauso-
leum from Red Square. Less often do the poli-
ticians suggest a more venerable, traditional 
resting place for Lenin’s corpse — next to his 
wife Nadezhda Krupskaya who lies in a grave 
in front of the Kremlin wall alongside other 
leaders of the Communist Party. But what 
should be done with the rest of the necropo-
lis along the Kremlin Wall? In a long row, you 
find the graves of Stalin, Frunze, Sverdlov, 
Brezhnev, and other communist leaders. 
Considering that communists will continue 
to revere his memory, is it acceptable in a 
“modernized” Russia to keep a place of pil-
grimage and a monument to one of the worst 
tyrants of the 20th century in such a place? 
Finally, one has to wonder whether Professor 
Naimark would propose another graveyard 
for Stalin, and if so, what the most appropri-
ate place would be.≈
Critique and morality.
Consensus and dissent in post-revisionist Soviet studies
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F
ew scholars today deny that that 
their work is in some way related 
to values. On the contrary, most 
scholars acknowledge and even 
make use of a certain value-relatedness 
in order to emphasize the importance of 
their work. This means that the nature of 
the questions posed may be determined by 
values, but the answers given should not be 
value judgments but value-neutral empiri-
cal or logical statements. The ethos behind 
this attitude is value subjectivism. Cognitive 
norms are universal, inspiring values that are 
subjective and freely chosen. The formula 
behind this ethos is freedom and rational 
self-control. The spheres of morality and 
cognition are supposed to be separated so 
that they can be theoretically clarified and 
the relation between their separate means 
and ends scrutinized. This hampers immedi-
ate emotional experience but simultaneously 
enhances moral agents’ ability to leave a 
mark on the world by making them better 
informed. In the case of historical research, 
this doctrine prevents the moral passions 
from defining the entire research process 
in detail, which is helpful, since large parts 
of human history are quite a grim business 
from the viewpoint of contemporary moral 
standards.
Value subjectivism is not an idea without 
alternatives, however. Proponents of Leb-
ensphilosophie on both the left and the right 
have argued that the technical character of 
the scientific ethos dispossesses the human 
intellect of will and intensity, thus leaving it 
powerless and agnostic. Another way to over-
come the agnosticism intertwined with value 
subjectivism is to hold the position of value 
objectivism. Morality is then immanent in 
historical facts, and not at all separated from 
cognition. Intellectual quality coincides with 
moral certitude. A strong proponent of value 
objectivism in history is the German scholar 
Jörn Rüsen. Rüsen has earned a lasting repu-
tation as one of the world’s leading experts 
on German historicism. In recent decades, 
he has also launched a large-scale normative 
project regarding the uses of “history for 
life”. At the core of this project is the claim 
that the past is impossible to conceive of as 
static other. It is rather a precondition for all 
historical thinking that the past is inseparable 
from the present and also from the visions of 
the future. The merging of these dimensions 
is unavoidable because historians, unlike 
other scholars, can only conceive of the past 
by narrating it, according to Rüsen. It is of 
course possible for the historian to have sep-
arate views of morality in the past and in the 
present. Rüsen tries to say rather that such 
double standards would be irrational. They 
would, in German philosophical terminology, be expressions 
of “instrumental reason” with the whole of the human “life-
world” taken into account. Their narratives would in that 
case be devoid of “meaning”, that is, cognition would not be 
related to values. The traditional, value subjective scholar is 
portrayed as powerless in the face of ideological forces, un-
less he consciously adopts them.1
Rüsen was recently granted an honorary doctorate at the 
University of Lund, where his normative and highly abstract 
thinking has earned him a dedicated following. It is not 
surprising, then, that a recently published study from Lund 
aims to follow in his footsteps. Valter Lundell’s study is a bold 
attempt to analyze history from the standpoint of value ob-
jectivism. Although this standpoint is not clearly stated, value 
objectivism is the theoretical underpinning of the study, and 
Lundell would certainly regard the sentence 
“communism is evil” as descriptive truth 
rather than subjective opinion. The aim of 
Lundell’s study is to investigate “how it can 
be that, with the fall of the Soviet Union 20 
years behind us, it is still difficult to form a 
consensus around what role the communist 
experience should play in Swedish historical 
culture”. Lundell would certainly not agree 
that the lack of consensus, or “the asymmet-
rical historical culture”, as he chooses to call 
it, mirrors the plurality of views among re-
searchers and democratic citizens. Inspired 
by Rüsen’s thinking, the social psychology 
of Leon Festinger, and the conservative 
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American sociologist Paul Hollander, Lundell 
searches for the “deeper causes” of this lack 
of consensus. He has therefore conducted 
in-depth interviews with nine university 
historians and eleven history teachers from 
the Swedish secondary education system, 
the gymnasium. The university historians are 
especially interesting to him because they all 
signed an infamous appeal to stop a recent 
state sponsored exhibition of crimes against 
humanity under communist regimes.
The method applied consists of confront-
ing the respondents with questions derived 
from three different paradigms of research: 
the totalitarian paradigm, which originates 
with the attitudes of the Cold War; the revi-
sionist paradigm, which proposes a challenge 
to the totalitarian view in the seventies and 
eighties; and last but not least the “post-
revisionist paradigm”, which conforms 
with the views of modern Sovietological 
research, according to Lundell. The first two 
paradigms are summarized quite brilliantly 
in short explanatory narratives. The third 
paradigm, however, Lundell declines to sum-
marize, which is quite surprising since he 
unabashedly proclaims it to be the supreme 
alternative that has refuted the revisionist 
paradigm altogether, and thus reinstated 
the totalitarian paradigm in a new and more 
versatile form.
The main conclusion of his study is that the 
university historians, and, to a lesser extent, 
the secondary school teachers are lagging be-
hind the progress of Sovietological research, 
that is, the “post-revisionist paradigm”. They 
come up short as moralists and are haunted 
by quasi-religious sentiments towards com-
munism, the loss of which causes mental 
dilemmas such as “cognitive dissonance”, 
“moral relativism”, and a bundle of similar 
things. As interesting as these questions may 
be, it is not clear whether Lundell actually 
pursues an active interest in them, or simply 
suggests his explanations for derogatory pur-
poses. Attributing an opponent’s position to 
mental illness might make a spectacular TV 
show, but ranks low in a scientific debate.
Although Lundell fails to give a clear ac-
count of what the post-revisionist paradigm 
consists of, it is possible to deduce its com-
ponents from frequent references to it in 
his analysis: it is a thoroughly idealistic and 
hermeneutical explanation that posits the So-
viet terror against its own citizens as chiefly 
caused by the ideology of communism, 
produced by Karl Marx and consciously put 
into practice by Lenin, Stalin, and the Soviet 
people. As a historical explanation, this may 
of course be true, but Lundell is not out to 
validate this explanation or to show that it 
reflects a consensus or a majority among 
Sovietologists. The explanation rather serves to elevate com-
munism to the same mythical level as Nazi ideology: an ar-
chetype of evil for our secular time. Why not attempt a demy-
thologization of Nazism instead, if the concern is to improve 
the symmetry of historical culture?
He also has a very sanguine idea of objectivity. The state-
sponsored exhibitions are repeatedly referred to as “pure en-
lightenment”, and on page 134 he proclaims the explanations 
of his survey respondents to be intellectually weak because of 
their “caution towards ideology and morality”. He devotes a 
chapter to methodological self-reflection but does not try to 
invalidate or challenge his position of value objectivism. It is 
fair to say that his methodology consists of moral identifica-
tion with certain views, coupled with a few pinches of arm-
chair psychology and German Wesensschau. In fact, Lundell’s 
“post-revisionist paradigm” is more or less synonymous with 
the view expressed in a much-debated article by Kristian 
Gerner from 1999.2 Lundell has not managed to achieve criti-
cal distance from the biased brilliance of Gerner, and a pau-
city of guidance seems to have been offered by the academic 
supervisors. Gerner’s position is hardly strengthened by such 
doctrinaire apprenticeship, which naturally leads to ideologi-
cal ossification rather than critical development.
I agree with Rüsen and his followers that the scientific 
ethos of value subjectivism is problematic. Clearly, it is not 
a norm that serves its purpose independently of the use 
individuals make of it. It might degenerate into indifference 
to moral problems, and so in practice resemble the hollow 
catechism of value nihilism. But here I think that Rüsen and 
his followers are beating a dead horse. Few scholars in the 
humanities and social sciences would agree that statements 
expressing values are equivalent to “any arbitrarily com-
pounded series of words” as Rudolf Carnap provocatively 
stated in his The Unity of Science (1934). On the other hand, 
the logical perfection Carnap professed has a certain similar-
ity to the moral perfection envisaged by Rüsen. Both share 
the dream of consensus. There is a general weakness in Jörn 
Rüsen’s thinking in that he tends to suppress the possibility 
of irresolvable conflicts between norms. Cognitive norms 
such as disinterestedness, universalism, and organized 
skepticism might not at all be reconciled harmoniously with 
norms of morality. So if the case for value objectivism in his-
tory is hardly furthered by Lundell’s study, perhaps there is 
still a lesson to be learned. Historical writing is fostered by 
righteousness, but not always the most intense forms of righ-
teousness. ≈
simon larsson 
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W
e were so similar, Tony Judt 
and I. Yet we were so differ-
ent in so many ways. Both 
of us were born in London 
in the 1940s, had Eastern European secular 
Jewish family backgrounds, lived in the US, 
trained as historians. We even attended some 
of the same seminars in Cambridge in the late 
1970s. But still, he was completely unique. 
Outspoken, opinionated (he took pride in 
the fact), argumentative and aggressive. 
He stood out from the rest of us historians, 
who were innately introverted. He caused a 
mighty uproar with one of his early articles in 
which he scathingly rejected the new forms 
of history that were informed by sociology, 
social anthropology, and political science, 
and he disliked feminist history to boot. To 
me the new forms of history were wonderful 
and ground-breaking novelties; Tony thought 
they fostered “bad” history and “clowns in 
royal purple” pretending to be historians. 
Most of us wanted to change the whole con-
tent of history, but Tony wanted to use tradi-
tional history to make moral statements.
For Tony Judt the true territory of the 
historian was limited to national politics, 
macro-economic policy, the ideas that un-
derpinned the building of political and eco-
nomic structures, and the personalities that 
made the choices. Through this limitation 
he could emerge after the turn of the twenty-
first century as perhaps the only intellectual 
historian with nearly world-wide influence. 
Tragically stricken by the degenerative mus-
cular disease ALS, he died in August 2010. 
During his progressively worsening illness a 
colleague, Timothy Snyder, started a series of 
conversations dealing with Judt’s intellectual 
trajectory and how it related to his view of 
history. It has now appeared as Thinking the 
Twentieth Century. 
the NiNe coNversatioNs roam over an 
incredible number of issues and naturally go 
back and forth. All of them are deadly serious 
though there is a Monty Pythonesque mo-
ment when Snyder and Judt go through the 
list of British prime ministers to see whether 
any of them was an “intellectual”. Most of 
the talks begin with reminiscence over some 
stage in Tony’s life or academic career. Above 
all, the conversations document how, after 
moving to New York, Judt became a political 
moraliste with an explicit ethical viewpoint 
and with an international impact.
Judt describes how he was groomed by the 
editor of the New York Review of Books to have 
the courage to expand the range of his public 
writing from European history into interna-
tional foreign policy issues. As he admits, 
he would “never have had the intellectual 
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S
tefano Bottoni, an adjunct profes-
sor of Eastern European history 
at Bologna University, was invited 
in 2006 to take part in the work of 
the Presidential Committee for the Study of 
the Communist Dictatorship in Romania as 
an expert in the history of Romania’s Hungar-
ian minority. He has published numerous 
papers in Italian and Hungarian (his mother 
tongues), as well as in English, on the history 
and international relations of Hungary and 
Romania. In addition, his book Transilvania 
Rossa: Il Comunismo Romeno e la Questione 
Nazionale (1944—1965) [Red Transylvania: 
Romanian communism and the national 
question (1944—1965)] is an interesting mono-
graph that deals with the development of an 
ethnocratic state in Romania during the rule 
of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: government 
policies were aimed at the Romanization of 
Transylvania, the assimilation of the Hungar-
ian minority, and the marginalization and 
neglect of German and Jewish minorities. 
Having become a member of the Institute 
of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences in 2009, Bottoni decided to publish Un 
altro Novecento, a history of Eastern Europe 
from 1919 to the present. This was a vast and 
difficult task to which few others in Italian 
historiography had dedicated their energy.
the book was presented to the Italian pub-
lic as an interpretative synthesis “intended 
for specialists and for all readers interested in 
the recent history of a peripheral area whose 
needs and problems increasingly impact the 
social and political dynamics of a continent 
that is formally reunified, but still divided by 
invisible walls and reciprocal differences”. 
The book is based on a number of central 
themes that allow an understanding and a 
sense of the contemporary history of coun-
tries that, with the dissolution of the three 
multinational empires, first experienced the 
fall of liberal systems and then became ter-
ritories to be conquered, by German National 
Socialism and later by Soviet occupation. 
Finally, in the 1990s, these countries found 
themselves on a path towards European 
integration characterized by economic shock 
within the framework of a fragile democracy.
It should be pointed out that the national 
events described in this book do not em-
phasize any particular geographic region, 
nor do they marginalize the history of any 
individual Eastern European State. Rather, 
they combine “a general timeline view with a 
comparative thematic approach, focusing on 
the social and economic development of the 
various countries”.
But what does Bottoni mean exactly by 
“Eastern Europe”? This is not an insignifi-
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The burden of 
sad times.
or social self-confidence to propose those subjects” himself. 
But he became persuaded in spite of doubts that he really 
could “think and comment upon subjects far removed from 
[his] formal scholarly concerns”. This leap was perhaps not 
so improbable given Judt’s ingrained willingness to stick his 
neck out. He discovered soon that many other public pundits 
with access to the media often knew even less about the is-
sues under debate than he did. In addition, they often lacked 
the most elementary ethical positions on war or peace, but 
were the mouthpieces of ideologies. This became most clear 
when Judt, nearly alone among all media commentators, 
questioned the wisdom of invading Iraq in 2003. Eager also to 
punch holes in the theories of political scientists, he pointed 
out how the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan disproved the 
theory then widely held that democracies do not start wars. 
They do, after a great deal of manipulation, disinformation, 
and downright lies, he stressed.
Judt attaiNed a unique position. Marginalized by choice 
from his colleagues, he formed his own center, the Remarque 
Institute, and broke away from the Department of History. At 
the same time he grew in importance as a public commenta-
tor. This status was reinforced by the publication of his major 
work Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (2005). This is a 
very wide-ranging book of close to nine hundred pages with 
few references and no bibliography. One of its best points is 
Judt’s ability to integrate the history of Eastern Europe with 
that of Western Europe. This is no mean feat: many had tried 
and failed before him. The Polish exiles Leszek Kołakowski 
and Jan Gross brought Judt into contact with Eastern Euro-
pean dissidents. Along the way he taught himself the Czech 
language. He discovered a whole generation of intellectuals, 
such as Adam Michnik and Václav Havel, marked by a lifelong 
experience with communism. Their message was clear: there 
was “nothing to be gained from negotiating with authoritar-
ian regimes” because what the dissidents wished to achieve 
those regimes simply could never deliver.
But it is actually the West that is highest on Judt’s mind. He 
holds that the century’s main intellectual political debate was 
that between the ideas of Maynard Keynes, the British econo-
mist, in deep conflict with the ideas of Friedrich Hayek, his 
Austrian colleague. Note the total absence of Marxism in Judt’s 
narrative. The conflict was about the role of the state in eco-
nomic life. Keynes described the positive role that government 
could play not just in overcoming the depression of the 1930s, 
but also in creating a welfare state which could finance various 
forms of social services and benefits. Hayek insisted that the 
state should be far removed from the economy and that the 
private sector could provide the same services more efficiently. 
In the early years after World War II there was nearly universal 
consensus in Europe that Keynes was right. However, since the 
1970s Hayek’s view has increasingly broken that consensus.
By the end of the book Judt appears to despair. The dia-
logue focuses on the role of the intellectual in the present 
century. The message is decidedly defensive. The role of the 
twentieth-century intellectual might well have been to be 
visionary, future-oriented, utopian or at least progressive. In 
the twenty-first century, the intellectual’s role is reduced to 
that of a rear-guard realist fighting to prevent democracies 
from becoming worse societies. ≈
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cant consideration in an attempt to identify 
a region that is defined solely by the sum of 
the events of its component nations, and that 
lacks a center and a periphery when it comes 
to the international economic and political 
decisions of the hegemonies in the West and 
the East. Bottoni acknowledges that “the con-
cept of Eastern Europe has […] for some time 
lacked scientific legitimacy, having become 
an appellation that is closely bound to a po-
litical context and the relationship between 
this region and Western civilization”. In this 
book, “Eastern Europe” refers to “the col-
lection of territories that, having witnessed 
the dissolution of three multiethnic empires 
after the First World War, subsequently expe-
rienced Soviet-style communism from 1939”. 
This includes twenty present-day states: 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, 
Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Monte-
negro, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. The 
book also makes reference to the history of 
Eastern Europe’s “peripheries”, namely the 
decision-making centers (Russia as a tsarist 
empire and subsequently as a Soviet empire), 
and the states involved in or created by the 
dissolution of the multinational empires, but 
not included in the experience of real social-
ism: Austria, Finland, West Germany, Greece 
and Italy. The pivotal role of Italy’s northeast-
ern Friuli-Venezia Giulia region between the 
blocs is a more complicated issue that has yet 
to be investigated thoroughly.
The biggest problem in preparing a his-
torical synthesis of Eastern Europe is “the 
extreme political, social and cultural diver-
sity” of a region that “never developed a 
real supranational community” and whose 
common denominator was a prewar past 
consisting of multinational empires, a war 
of extermination, and forty years of submis-
sion to the Soviet empire. The most unifying 
factor was perhaps the memory of a past 
that never passes, consisting of the shared 
experience of real socialism. According to the 
Hungarian historian Istvan Rev, the burden 
of this memory of “sad times” is still present 
in contemporary Eastern European societies. 
it is oN this very lack of a truly homogeniz-
ing factor that Bottoni bases the underlying 
thesis of his book. In order to decipher and 
narrate the twentieth-century history of a 
region that has not followed any type of po-
litical planning, it is not sufficient to employ 
nationalism and the ethnic factor as a key. To 
do so would reduce this history to “a continu-
ous series of vendettas and massacres driven 
by ancestral impulses” (p. 16). While taking 
into account the significance of national and 
ethnic factors, the author believes that the importance of the 
social and economic development of the various countries 
must also be understood in order to convey the complexity 
of Eastern Europe. “Another” Novecento was the century of 
nationalist movements and authoritarian regimes whose 
presence in Eastern Europe cannot be assimilated into the 
mold of Italian fascism or German National Socialism. Rather, 
their presence demonstrates the persistence of cultural, so-
cial, and political elements of the old multinational empires 
in new national realities. However, as Bottoni emphasizes, 
the Eastern European nationalism that had become familiar 
to Western European interwar public opinion was only one of 
the many elements of the social and political life of small East-
ern European states. The author considers it misleading to 
catalog the creation of Eastern European states as “impossi-
ble democracies”, and he encourages the reader not to judge 
the historical development of the interbellum period only 
as a prelude to an inevitable catastrophe. In these countries, 
state control allowed spaces of freedom that were unimagi-
nable during the fifty-year period of communism. This was 
especially true in the cultural realm, where the elite created 
a mass political culture centered on a national independent 
state that would be born after 1989, when national sovereign 
communities were reconstituted.
The roots of the Eastern European states’ catastrophe may 
be sought instead in the expansionist policies of Nazi Germa-
ny, which conducted a war of conquest and annihilation that 
only ended with the Red Army’s liberation-cum-occupation. 
This provided “the only salvation” for peoples reduced to 
slavery by Nazism and collaborationist re-
gimes, but it also resulted in the massacre of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians by Soviet 
soldiers, who had conducted one of the larg-
est military operations in modern history. 
It is important to remember the difference 
between the period after the Second World 
War in Western Europe and that in Eastern 
European countries: the latter was far more 
traumatic, and fundamental for the subse-
quent reinterpretation of events by individu-
al national communities.
like the war of extermination, the collabo-
rations with and resistances against the Nazi 
invasion — including the Soviet occupation, 
which lasted much longer — represent a 
common experience in all of the countries 
considered here. The Eastern European 
countries had to come to terms with their 
past by purging the collaborationists and 
forcing millions of people to leave their 
homes in order to comply with a political 
plan that envisaged homogeneous national 
areas. The Soviets applied this principle to 
national minorities, condemning “the past 
behavior of the minority community and the 
geopolitical position of the states involved in 
the conflict”. In this way, they achieved an 
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“ethnic simplification of the territory and of 
the social space” that resulted in thirty mil-
lion Eastern Europeans enduring population 
changes, forced relocation, deportation to 
work camps, and massacres. Bottoni also 
mentions the annihilation of Jewish commu-
nities as a peculiar characteristic of Eastern 
European countries. A new anti-Semitism, 
rooted in xenophobia and social envy driven 
by communist movements, resulted in the 
pogroms that drove tens of thousands of 
people to emigrate to the West or to Israel.
Bottoni also criticizes the concept of the 
“Sovietization” of Eastern Europe between 
1945 and 1948, which incorrectly associates 
the Soviet military occupation of some re-
gions in Eastern Europe with the conquest 
of power by the communists. The history 
of communist conquest is “complex and 
sometimes contradictory”. The communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe were created 
through “a political, social and cultural 
revolution aimed at reproducing the system 
forged in the Soviet Union by Stalin”. Every 
effort of the Eastern European communist 
parties was aimed at copying the Soviet mod-
el — from the issuance of new constitutions 
based on the Soviet one, to industrialization 
and agricultural collectivization, to the trans-
formation of the managerial classes on the 
basis of political loyalty. Another important 
consideration identified by Bottoni is that the 
advent of the Soviet bloc temporarily froze 
national and territorial conflicts, replacing 
ethnic rifts with policies that integrated 
minorities. This resulted in a radical review 
of the individual populations’ national pasts 
by communist regimes. These years were 
also characterized by “a complex web of 
political and ideological violence, as well as 
social, ethnic and religious repression”, that 
is, purges within parties and mass repression 
instituted by the political police.
compared with that phase, the Khrush-
chev era was one of continuity and break-
downs, inconsistencies and paradoxes. 
Nonetheless, the new era changed the face of 
Eastern European communities thanks to a 
regimentation that created new social spaces 
and better living conditions for millions of 
people. Within this general framework, the 
utopia of real socialism was brought to a halt 
by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
and then normalization under Brezhnev’s 
grayness. As the system tried to meet the ex-
pectations of previous generations, Bottoni 
explains, it earned the complete mistrust of 
the younger generations in Eastern European 
countries.
Subsequent economic decline was decisive 
in the fall of the Soviet Empire. Bottoni deals 
with the various trajectories of this decline and the paths that 
various countries followed away from real socialism during 
the 1980s — from a repressive nationalism (Romania and 
Bulgaria) and an increase in propaganda (East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia), to explicit attempts to abandon the socialist 
model (Hungary and Poland).
Subsequent events in 1989—1990 quickly redrew the Euro-
pean political map. The dissolution of the Eastern European 
federated states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in 1991—
1993 engendered a bitter debate, from which many of the 
points discussed in this book emerged. According to Bottoni, 
neither of these countries was destined to fail because “they 
were both born in a time of crisis out of political will and 
accompanied by a long intellectual gestation, due to the in-
ability of communist regimes to manage national differences 
in a more satisfactory way than the regimes of the interwar 
period”. Overall, it was an extraordinary period of change, 
and its non-violent outcome was by no means expected. The 
Yugoslav catastrophe, according to Bottoni, was an excep-
tion among the unresolved ethnonational disputes, which 
would suggest that the handling of diversity has now become 
a global problem.
In the economic decline of between 15 per cent and 40 per 
cent that occurred with the uncontrolled privatizations in 
Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s, Bottoni none-
theless perceives the liberation of the new generations. With 
the freedom to travel and the availability of technological 
innovations, these new generations turned out to be the real 
winners of this period of change, to the detriment of those 
born in the ’40s and ’50s, for whom the end of communism 
also meant the loss of social status and existential meaning. 
In this atmosphere, a selective nostalgia for the totalitarian 
past developed, while the search for responsibility for crimes 
perpetrated during the dictatorships — using the evidence 
of state archives that had become public — threatened to be-
come a form of political and economic blackmail.
bottoNi dedicates the conclusion of his book to European 
integration. This he considers a positive development, given 
that the imposition of legal standards has contributed to the 
democratization of countries defined as imperfect democra-
cies or semi-authoritarian systems, even though the cases of 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have shown how “corrupt 
and inefficient executors can frustrate the positive aspects of 
European integration”. In the new century, the region’s chal-
lenges lie in understanding the problems of the immediate 
present. It would be useful to reappraise the journalistic ste-
reotype that makes nationalism, anti-Semitism, and religious 
fundamentalism “specters that reappear in every news item 
as a threat to democracy, demonstrating that Eastern Europe 
remains an uncivilized place after all”. Bottoni highlights 
the socio-demographic problems faced by Eastern Europe: 
emigration and demographic decline, with a consequent 
decrease in active labor and taxpayers, a sharp increase in 
people receiving state assistance, and a lack of socio-cultural 
integration of Romani communities. However, as Bottoni 
explains, “the challenge of the social sustainability of post-
communist Eastern European capitalism has now tran-
scended the ethical dimension of protecting minority groups 
to become one of the thorniest social issues of our continent". 
He concludes that, “in order to prevent continuing fragmen-
tation into strong centers and forgotten peripheries, theaters 
of conflict and massacres, Europe must learn 
to face the challenges and problems that are 
now common to East and West with no men-
tal reservations”.
Un altro Novecento has succeeded in pro-
viding an interesting and balanced synthesis 
that summarizes the main themes in the 
history of Eastern European countries as 
highlighted by historiography, correlating 
interpretations with many examples, analyz-
ing rather than simplifying the narrative, and 
thus conveying the complexity of history. 
Furthermore, Bottoni provides a rich source 
of inspiration for researchers who wish to 
delve deeper into the history of Eastern 
Europe: the book has a useful, up-to-date 
bibliography and ample endnotes, which un-
fortunately require page-turning. Since the 
book is currently only available in Italian, this 
reviewer hopes that it will be translated into 
other languages, for it deserves to be known 
by the general public worldwide, and by the 
academic community in particular.≈
francesco zavatti
reviews
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This year’s Berlin Biennale, the seventh incarnation, 
is called “Forget Fear”. The curators are Polish artist 
Artur Żmijewski and Joanna Warsza, the latter active 
in the Warsaw-based organization Krytyka Polityczna 
(Political Critique). Żmijewski and Warsza have togeth-
er created a platform where the art tourist can take in 
political manifestations from all over the world, from 
the mayor of Bogotá, Colombia, Antanas Mockus, a 
practitioner of non-violence, to the civil rights move-
ment in Hungary. Things heat up when the focus is 
switched to the lines between Poland, Germany, and 
the EU. In Świebodzin near the Polish-German border 
zone — usually a zone of smuggling, prostitution, and 
violence — Mirosłav Patecki has built a gigantic statue 
of Jesus gazing across the landscape. The work of 
building the statue was filmed and the documentary 
shown during the Berlin Biennale.
The activist art collective Voina (War) was denied 
exit visas from Russia to attend the press conference, 
even though they were the associate curators of the 
entire Biennale. “But surely it is the Schengen coun-
tries that decide who is allowed in, not the countries 
outside who gets to leave”, a journalist from Copenha-
gen opined.
Voina are the creators of several actions that have 
garnered considerable attention. They painted a 
seventy-meter-long phallus on the Liteinyi drawbridge 
in St. Petersburg, thus creating a huge “Fuck You” sign 
pointed directly at the headquarters of the secret po-
lice on the shore. They also participated in the “blue 
bucket” protests, a street uprising in which motorists 
put blue buckets on their car roofs as a protest against 
the way powerful politicians routinely use flashing 
blue lights to abuse the envied high-speed lanes in 
Moscow, where traffic jams are relentless.
The huB of The enTire Biennale is KunstWerke, The 
Institute for Contemporary Art, now an established 
cultural institution that has over the years shown  
high-quality exhibitions including “Shrinking Cities”, 
“Privatizations: Contemporary Art from Eastern Eu-
rope”, and “Regarding Terror: The RAF Exhibition”. 
Thus a zone of cheap, squatted buildings was trans-
formed in the space of a few years into a gentrified 
gallery district. Klaus Biesenbach, now the director of 
the prestigious MoMA PS1 in New York, founded both 
KunstWerke and the Berlin Biennale “to give space to 
controversy”.
The Biennale has worked as a megaphone for the 
“artist-politician” dedicated to using the alternative 
means of art to create power “without the fear, oppor-
tunism, and cynicism of the politicians”, according 
to curator Joanna Warsza. “We want to give a voice to 
people other than the tiny elite that usually monopo-
lizes the major international art events.”
one of The main themes in Berlin was to bring street-
level political debates to the fore by putting them in 
the art salons. The other main theme was memory: 
how do we describe history, how do we relate to our 
history, and is there one collective image that is cher-
ished above all others?
In the middle of tourist flows among the city land-
marks of Brandenburg Gate and the Reichstag build-
ing, with its glass dome by world-renowned architect 
Norman Foster, is the unfinished Sinti and Roma Holo-
caust Memorial. The foundation pit for the pedestal is 
filled with debris and rain water and is partly hidden 
behind a mobile construction hut and shabby chicken 
wire. Even if marked on the biennale map, both my 
friend and I, who have lived in the city for twenty 
years, had difficulty finding it. When we first passed it, 
we thought is was just one more of those non-sites so 
plentiful in Berlin.
In the “Berlin-Birkenau” project, people can sign 
up to plant a birch sapling from Auschwitz-Birkenau 
and thus assume responsibility for caring for a memo-
rial for several decades. “Join Us in Remembering” 
shows objects that millions of people displaced in 
World War II tried to save along with themselves. We 
have seen black-and-white photographs of people 
walking in columns along endless roads of mud, drag-
ging their belongings with them after having left their 
homes, farms, and businesses. A carefully pressed 
handkerchief embroidered with the family mono-
gram, a muff that protected fingers from frostbite, the 
coat worn by pregnant woman. As the only material 
link to the family’s roots, these pitiful objects and their 
stories have been cherished as precious heirlooms by 
children and great-grandchildren. The exhibition is 
being made permanent and will be shown at Deutsch-
landhaus, just a stone’s throw from Potsdamer Platz.
As soon as the gunpowder smoke had settled after 
the performance art piece “Reenactment of the Battle 
of Berlin, 1945”, I asked the Polish “soldier” dressed in 
a Russian uniform, “Is this a way to cope with the war 
trauma? Or a way to communicate history?”
“No”, said the soldier, in Germany for the first time 
even though he does not live far from the border. “Not 
at all. I am here because I collect uniforms and stuff 
from the war. Weapons and so on.”
He explained that the Berlin audience that day was 
served the “light version” of the battle: “Not so much 
blood”. After all, it took place on a Sunday afternoon 
in a recreational park between amuse-
ment park swans for couples in love to 
be photographed in and dinosaurs for 
the children to climb on. This is where I 
met Janet Cardiff’s collaborator George 
Bures Miller, who recorded the sounds 
of machine guns for their “Documenta 
13” video walk.
The Berlin Biennale is more than an 
art exhibition in the traditional sense. 
It is a network of places and events that 
are tied together for a few months in 
the summer. Another purpose is to start 
an ongoing process and to enable the 
political art manifestations to continue 
after the official event has ended. The 
net has been cast over that which until 
two decades ago was an insurmount-
able barrier, and the threads reach far 
beyond the city limits. This November, 
teatr.doc in Moscow is going to perform an action in 
which the actors are displaced migrants without pass-
ports from former soviet republics.
The questions posed by this year’s Berlin Biennale 
are an expression of anger over the way things are 
arranged in the world, the issues Naomi Klein has pin-
pointed in her books No Logo and The Shock Doctrine: 
the lack of attention to issues that concern ownership 
of access to the public space, control of money, and 
frustration about how the art world is being controlled 
by increasingly few hands, even as events are increas-
ing in number and being spread all over the world.
The 2012 Berlin Biennale has, quite rightly, had to 
withstand some criticism: “Lukewarm cynicism”, 
proclaimed an indignant Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung. Certainly, it could have been somewhat less of 
a blunt instrument. And yes, I would have preferred 
that the participants understand they were involved in 
an art event and not just an ordinary protest action or 
theatrical performance. And it is possible that today’s 
Occupy members are not as well-spoken as their pre-
decessors, the situationists of the 1968 revolts or the 
German artist Joseph Beuys with his social sculptures. 
But they have nonetheless found their way into the 
most rarefied circles of the art world. After the Berlin 
Biennale, Occupy went on to Documenta in Kassel, 
the most important art event in Germany. Political 
art has thus finally made a true breakthrough, even in 
the news media. And news from the former Eastern 
Bloc is also being given more space. The Russian punk 
group Pussy Riot, whose message about Putin’s pact 
with the Orthodox Church, moved from social media 
to the elite news forums — the news columns of the 
daily broadsheets. After all, the trick is getting people 
to listen, which can be especially hard when you are 
trying to bring attention to oppression and suffer-
ing. ≈
margareta tillberg
Associate professor, researcher at CBEES.
A megAphone  
for the “Artist-politiciAn”
art
“Draftsmen’s Congress” initiated by Pawel Althamer  
at St. Elisabeth-Kirche. Photo: Sandra Teitge
Art and politics have always had a symbiotic relationship. As if in a cold War setting.
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n Shane Meadows’s film This Is England (2006), 
which portrays skinhead subculture in Britain 
in the 1980s, the twelve-year-old schoolboy 
Shaun (played by Thomas Turgoose) becomes 
a member of the skinhead scene. The group he joins 
is apolitical and fashion-oriented: it includes both 
white and black members, who spend their free time 
hanging around. The process of his initiation involves 
a change of behavior, music preferences, hairdo, and 
outfit. The symbol of his transformation is perhaps the 
purchase of a pair of Dr. Martens boots. As soon as all 
the necessary elements of his “uniform” as a skinhead 
are in place, the other members recognize him as one 
of them.
Starting in the late 1950s, when England’s postwar 
economic boom led to increased purchasing by many 
working class kids, inspired by American and British 
music, actors, and Carnaby Street, youth groups de-
veloped their own behaviors and styles, with outfits 
ranging from the practical, such as boots and jeans, 
to the more aspiring and elegant, such as dancehall 
suits. These youths, usually referred to as mods, were 
known for their interest in fashion and music, but also 
for their violent behavior. When the mods started 
to fragment in the 1960s, a skinhead culture began 
to emerge, identified by shorter hair, a more pro-
nounced working class image, and a fondness for ska, 
rocksteady and early reggae music. Early skinheads 
were not necessarily part of any political movement, 
but by the 1970s some of them had aligned themselves 
with National Front and their violence became more 
political and directed towards immigrants. Largely be-
cause of its portrayal in the mass media, the skinhead 
subculture was viewed as one that promoted racism 
and neo-Nazism, although there were anti-racist as 
well as merely apolitical youth among them.
This complex evolution of youth cultures, accom-
panied by media scandal and ambiguous relations 
with consumer-goods industries, led Dick Hebdige to 
regard subcultures as forms of resistance to authori-
ties and the dominant social standards.2 Individuals 
who shared a feeling of being neglected by those stan-
dards came together and developed a sense of group 
identity. Scholars have pointed out, quite rightly, that 
rebellious youth signaled their group membership 
through distinctive and symbolic appropriation of vis-
ible status and cultural markers, such as accessories, 
clothing, music, mannerisms, and argot. But even 
though the mods, rockers, punks and other subcul-
tures were described in the media as “aggressive” and 
“subversive”, they nevertheless became incorporated 
into the mainstream: as Stuart Hall pointed out, 
media not only registered their resistance, but also 
normalized them within the dominant mythology.3 
Meanwhile, the conversion of the subcultural signs — 
such as music and dress codes — into mass-produced 
consumer goods undermined their rebellious mean-
ing. I will nevertheless argue that the nature of these 
subcultures was first and foremost about consump-
tion, because they intentionally communicated 
“through commodities even if the meanings attached 
to those commodities are purposefully distorted or 
overthrown”.4 Thus it is almost impossible to find a 
clear-cut distinction between commercial exploitation 
and the creative appropriation of consumer goods 
constructed by the subcultures. But at the same time 
it becomes evident that it is the way and the context in 
which commodities are used that mark subcultures in 
relation to consumer industries. Youth cultures revive 
and transform fashion items and patterns of behavior 
by relocating them into the contemporary context and 
ascribing to them new meanings through different 
use. Through this unconventional or unexpected use, 
youth cultures question the predominant values and 
social order. Thus rebellion does not necessarily have 
to be violent: any unconventional interpretation of, 
for instance, gender differences, mediated through 
dress codes and ways of life, can potentially appear in 
a list of subcultures, which undergoes great changes 
daily.
The exhiBiTion Fashion Talks: Fashion as Communi-
cation, which was shown for several months at the 
Museum for Communication, Berlin,5 was designed 
to explore — by looking at the messages conveyed by 
clothes — how people deal with fashion, both individu-
ally and collectively. Accompanied by Vera Franke, 
one of two curators, I took a stroll through the exhibi-
tion. Starting with the illustrated timeline Style Stones, 
which showed how closely the history of fashion has 
been interwoven with important historical events, 
such as the feminist movement, the Olympic Games 
and the two World Wars, I passed between a pair of 
 fAshion 
tAlks “We 
must not 
forget 
that an 
object is 
the best 
messenger 
of a world 
above 
nature.”
 Roland Barthes, 19721
by ekaterina kalinina
photos Ute langkafel
fashion is the outside of consumer society. the inside may well be uniformity.
mirrors that confronted me with my own reflection. 
Like many others, I was forced first to reflect upon my 
own image, as well as others’, before starting my jour-
ney in the world of communication through fashion.
stAndArdizing identity
The word fashion originates from Latin facio, which 
means making or doing and refers to a process. “To 
fashion” implies a conscious activity of self-reflection 
and construction of one’s identity. Identity is com-
posed in turn of both individual characteristics and af-
finity to a group (or groups). Thus what a person seeks 
to express by his or her appearance is individuality on 
the one hand and membership of a certain class or a 
social group on the other. By leading into the exhibi-
tion with a uniform, the curators elegantly indulged 
themselves in a complex topic of identity construction 
by means of commodities.
For centuries uniform dress functioned as a sym-
bolic instrument of both inclusion and exclusion, 
maintaining strong hierarchies within a society. To 
this day the highly codified language of uniforms 
remains accessible only to those who have the knowl-
edge to recognize the signs and codes of belonging and 
distinction. But who ever said contemporary fashion 
doesn’t function according to the same rules? Read-
ing labels and almost invisible designer signatures in 
everyday dress is a rather difficult task, which requires 
keeping abreast of style changes and monitoring the 
latest collections.
With a postman’s attire as an illustration of a uni-
form in the more common sense, the curators initi-
ated a series of associations between modern status 
markers (such as labels, headphones, and glasses) 
and more conventional elements of uniform dress 
(such as buttons, epaulets, and textile colors). Today 
status-manifesting signs are very diverse and cannot 
be reduced to epaulets. In the age of advertising and 
electronic media, anything we possess can serve as a 
sign of symbolic or economic capital: from drinking 
water brands and real estate to the number of stars of 
eBay accounts and number of friends on Facebook.
VisiTors To The Fashion Talks exhibition were invited 
to request the addition of new youth cultures that they 
thought were not included in the existing database by 
filling in a form on an old-fashioned typewriter. The 
notion that urban youth cultures are laboratories for 
new trends runs through the whole exhibition, show-
ing how contemporary designers and mainstream 
fashion brands seek out certain subcultural styles for 
commercial purposes in order to capitalize on their 
subversive allure for larger consumer groups. The 
adaptation of initially shocking and distinctive punk-
style clothing by mass-market fashion brands perfectly 
illustrates this mechanism, and paves the way for the 
curators to open a discussion on strategies of fashion 
marketing, involving pop and celebrity culture, DIY, 
retro and vintage, changing beauty standards, politics 
and social engagement. For example, the commercial 
exploitation of the DIY trend as a marketing strategy 
found its expression in colliers de chien (paper 
bracelets by Hermes), available for download 
and, at least, free of charge. Meanwhile, the 
Fendi DIY Baguette Bag, a woven, unfin-
ished Fendi Baguette with everything nec-
essary to complete it, was priced at “only” 
$995 at Net-a-Porter.com. The expensive 
opportunity to have your own one-of-a-
kind designer bag is a perfect illustration of 
how personalization, used commercially, is 
turned into industrial pseudo-individ-
ualism.
3 in 1: JeAns, 
tArtAn, And 
cAmoUflAge 
As originAls 
And sArtoriAl 
obJects of 
desire
The term jeans comes from the 
name of the city of Genoa, Italy, 
where cotton fabric was pro-
duced and exported to the rest 
of Europe. Originally manu-
factured as work clothes for 
gold-hunters, jeans became one 
of the basic items in the wardrobe of many 
youth gang members across the Western 
for each subculture, there is a need for it to distinguish itself. And exclude others.
86 report
hemisphere in the 1950s, after being popularized by 
James Dean in Nicholas Ray’s film Rebel Without a 
Cause (1955). If jeans in the 1950s communicated open 
rebellion, nowadays they are a more or less universal 
uniform, suitable for any occasion, from business 
meetings to beach volleyball games.6
Associating the history of jeans styles (which are 
currently dominated by a craze for vintage and worn-
out looks) with cultural trends, the exhibition com-
mented on the dramatic results of the production of 
jeans with a vintage twist. For example, producing a 
pair of jeans consumes an enormous amount of water, 
with damaging consequences in parts of the world 
that suffer from water shortages. This is one of the rea-
sons why some jeans producers are researching more 
ecological methods of manufacturing. Moreover, the 
huge demand for jeans that appear worn has led to an 
increased use of sandblasting, which causes deadly ill-
nesses among workers.
anoTher inTeresTing part of the exhibition involved 
tartans, woven patterns of intersecting horizontal and 
vertical bands in various colors. Tartans as we know 
them today were widely adopted in Scotland from 
the 16th century on: the earliest illustration of Scottish 
soldiers wearing plaid dates back to 1631.7 In the early 
18th century, when rivalry with England turned into 
outright rebellion, tartans became a symbol of patri-
otic unity against the English. Recognizing this, the 
English Dress Act of 1746 after the Battle of Culloden 
banned tartans in civilian circles, although they were 
still allowed in the Highland regiments of the British 
Army. Although the ban was repealed in 1782, it was 
King George IV’s official visit to Scotland in 1822 that 
signaled a real change in public attitudes to tartan. 
Almost overnight, tartan dress became highly fashion-
able.8
The notion that tartans always served to distinguish 
families is incorrect. Tartans were originally associat-
ed with a district or a region, and only gradually came 
to refer to families or clans.9 In modern times, trade 
tartans have been used for decorative and commercial 
purposes, while commemorative tartans are commis-
sioned for anniversaries, events, or institutions.10 The 
Diana Memorial tartan, presented in the exhibition, 
was launched after the death of Princess Diana in 1997 
to benefit her charities. Some significant development 
in the design and use of tartans has been seen in the 
growth of corporate tartans, which promote goods of 
Scottish origin on global markets. Sports-related tar-
tans have also proved successful, perhaps because the 
bond among fans is as passionate as any family ties. 
The most celebrated examples of the use of tartans in 
the fashion industry are found in the 1993—1994 Vivi-
enne Westwood collection Anglomania, which appear 
to have been inspired by the uniforms of Scottish regi-
ments, and in Alexander McQueen’s exploration of 
Scottish dress and its political history, as well his own 
Scottish heritage, in several of his collections (High-
land Rape, 1995; Widows of Culloden, 2006—2007).
Having been appropriated by a number of subcul-
tures, tartans became increasingly detached from 
Highland dress, and the checked patterns lost any as-
sociation with Scotland. Burberry check, introduced 
in 1924 and originally used as a coat lining, lost its 
association with the upper class after being copied 
thousands of times. The profile drift that occurred 
after Burberry became 
associated with the chav 
subculture forced Burb-
erry to launch a rebrand-
ing campaign.
While tartans origi-
nated as a symbol of 
distinction, camouflage 
(from the French word 
camoufler; to disguise), 
originally served to let 
the wearer go unnoticed 
by blending with the sur-
roundings or resembling 
something else. Before 
the 20th century, most army uniforms were made of 
bright colors in order to be easily distinguished from 
the enemy in combat situations. Also, if an army had 
a reputation as a fierce fighting unit, the very sight of 
the uniform might strike fear into the enemy. But with 
the use of firearms of increasing range and accuracy, 
brightly colored uniforms became easy targets on the 
battlefield.
During WorlD War i, several artists inducted into 
military service produced camouflage designs. The 
natural world of animals, insects, and plants served 
as inspiration. The French Cubist artist André Mare 
(1885—1932) designed camouflage schemes used on 
land, while at sea Norman Wilkinson’s (1878—1971) 
dazzle patterns were meant to confuse enemy gun-
ners about the speed, range, and heading of warships 
and troop carriers. Indeed, after the two World Wars, 
demand for new design was high and creativity flour-
ished. Military camouflage patterns penetrated into 
conventional fashion from World War I onward. Cer-
tain contemporary subcultures, such as the junglists, a 
UK-based drum-and-bass youth culture originating in 
West Kingston, Jamaica, incorporate camouflage into 
their styles. Today camouflage is appropriated across 
the whole spectrum of fashion, from the high end to 
mass-market brands. Designer labels market “urban 
camouflage”, fashionable garments, evening gowns, 
and accessories with a “camo” touch, playing on its 
original associations with disguise and power. Today’s 
“urban camouflage”, by serving a desire to stand out 
and show off, has reversed the patterns’ original pur-
pose.
the mediUm is the messAge
The curators’ decision to give designer pieces priority 
over expensive multi-media installations paid off. The 
simple but functional design of the exhibition space 
gave it an alternative Berlin look and a slightly relaxed 
industrial atmosphere.
The exhibition succeeded elegantly in conveying 
important messages: it presented fashion as a cultural 
phenomenon and a system of signification through 
which society’s experiences, order, values, and beliefs 
are communicated. By establishing uniformity as a 
basic principle of fashion, clearly seen throughout the 
exhibition, the curators encouraged visitors to reflect 
on questions of individuality and conformity, per-
sonal and group identity. After its presentation at the 
beginning of the exhibition, the uniform serves as a 
reference point for successive themes. It kicks off a di-
alogue between original 
and copy, for example, in 
which the uniform is first 
presented in its explicit 
sense, then transplanted 
into the sphere of subcul-
tures, where the notion 
of a uniform has been 
redefined to serve prin-
ciples of exclusion and 
inclusion according to 
people’s interests, politi-
cal views, class, and work 
situation.
At the same time, the 
exhibition illustrated the principle of mixing, restyl-
ing, and recycling by bringing together designer piec-
es, elements of uniforms and second-hand clothes. 
Shuffling and mixing meanings by putting together el-
ements in a seemingly random, non-compatible man-
ner — and giving total freedom to individual expres-
sion and non-verbal communication through fashion 
objects — became the apogee of the exhibition.
Fashion Talks convincingly hammers down the 
last nail in the debate on who sends the message: the 
consumer, media, the designer, or the manufacturer. 
Indeed, meaning is created by the society as a whole 
through a constant process of non-verbal communica-
tion by means of clothing. Moreover, the medium of 
fashion is a message of its own. Its very existence signi-
fies long-lasting trends of change, migration, global-
ization, ecology, individualism, identity, gender, and 
appearance. This excursion into the world of fashion 
and identity made me realize that a little bit of courage 
in picking and mixing clothing items would do my im-
age good. ≈
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Ultimately, one should perhaps ask whether informality can also be seen as an expression of uniformity.
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not only a wristwatch, worth approximately €30,000, 
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lion euros, which he appropriated with the help of 
the government, getting them to evict the previous 
resident, a former minister of health. Among his pri-
vate assets are, in addition, a villa in Switzerland, an 
airplane, a fleet with a Cadillac Escalade, a Mercedes 
S, a Toyota Land Cruiser; and he has business interests 
in tobacco, oil, fish. Much of this appears to be gifts 
from individuals who, according to representatives of 
the church hierarchy, desire that their office holder 
“should not appear in a worse light than the represen-
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Good revolutionaries are those who channel a tidal wave 
of popular dissatisfaction and mass upheaval in order to 
smash the obstacles that hinder a nation’s development, 
to clear the road cluttered up by the ancien régime, and to build 
upon what has been achieved — in other words, to resume a track of 
evolution derailed or arrested by their predecessors. This is what the 
revolutionaries in the Baltic and the central eastern European states 
did; they built upon the achievements of prewar statehood within 
a new international environment much more supportive of liberal 
democracy. In a sense, they returned to the track of evolution inter-
rupted, reversed, or put on hold by the authoritarian leaders, but 
they completed this return with new historical experience and a new 
global vision.
Bad revolutionaries, on the other hand, are those who try to 
implement their utopian doctrines regardless of circumstances, 
regardless of the domestic and international environment, of politi-
cal culture or of economic development. They escalate violence and 
spill blood because they believe that goals justify means, that any fail-
ure results merely from insufficient will, and that any resistance of 
circumstances is merely proof of sabotage. Communist revolutionar-
ies are the best examples of the sort, and today’s attempts to ‘democ-
ratize’ Iraq and Afghanistan have something in common.
The Orange leaders were neither good nor bad revolutionaries, 
because they were not revolutionaries at all. They simply hijacked 
the revolutionary movement that was genuinely driven by popular 
dissatisfaction with the corrupted regime and its total lawlessness 
and impunity. They replaced their predecessors but failed to imple-
ment any changes that could be deemed revolutionary, primarily 
the rule of law that is crucial for any other reforms in the country. 
Throughout all five years of their tenure, they demonstrated the 
same nepotism and disrespect for legality as their predecessors. For 
five years, they stubbornly played with the rules, rather than by the 
rules.”
mykola riabchuk, Gleichschaltung: 
Authoritarian Consolidation in Ukraine, 
2010–2012. kiev: k. i. s. publishing 2012
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